



Tracing the Roots and Gateways of Radicalization in Countering Radicalism through a System Approach at the State Islamic University of Mataram

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Abstrak

Artikel ini mengkaji tentang konter radikalisasi di UIN Mataram dengan pendekatan system dan difokuskan pada bentuk dan tipologi radikalisme, akar (*root*) dan pintu masuk (*entrance*) radikalisme di UIN Mataram. Dalam tulisan ini, akar dan pintu masuk dibedakan, jika akar lebih mengarah pada aspek sistem secara internal sedangkan "pintu masuk" mengarah pada aspek sistem secara eksternal. Riset ini menemukan bahwa upaya konter radikalisasi di UIN mataram harus didahului oleh pemahaman tentang (a) bentuk dan tipologi radikalisme, (b) pemahaman tentang akar dan pintu masuk radikalisasi dan (3) selanjutnya diberikan solusi dengan pendekatan sistemik yang melibatkan kepemimpinan, diseminasi nilai-nilai *washatiyyah*, kaji ulang kurikulum atau materi yang rawan disalahpahami, modifikasi metode pembelajaran, pelibatan pesantren serta banyak melakukan kajian tentang radikalisme di Perguruan Tinggi Islam.

Kata Kunci: Konter-radikalisasi, Pondok Pesantren, Terorisme. Pendekatan System, Akar Radikalisme

Abstract

This paper examined counter-radicalization at UIN Mataram (Mataram State Islamic University) through a systematic approach. It focused on the forms, typology, roots, and gateways of radicalism in the Islamic university. This study categorized the roots of radicalism as the internal aspect of the system, while the gateways are referred to as the external component. The findings showed that the efforts to demolish radicalism at UIN Mataram should be preceded by an understanding of (a) the forms and typology of

radicalism, (b) the roots and gateways of radical ideology, and (c) offering solutions through a systemic approach. These include leadership involvement, disseminating moderate Islamic values (washatiyyah), re-examining the curriculum and materials prone to misunderstanding, modifying the pedagogical methods, involving Islamic boarding schools, and carrying out more studies on radicalism at Islamic higher education institutions.

Keywords: *Counter-radicalization, Islamic Boarding Schools, Terrorism, Systemic Approach, Roots of Radicalism*

INTRODUCTION

Religious radicalism is one of the recent issues that has sparked public interest in Indonesia, particularly on West Nusa Tenggara, including Lombok Island. In the latest cases related to terrorism in NTB, on Sunday, June 19, 2022, Densus 88 arrested three terrorist suspects from the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) network in Bima. The two terrorists are former convicts, namely SO and MH. SO is a recidivist of terrorism crimes from 2013 who was released on December 20, 2019. He was arrested again because he was active as a Daulah speaker and provided motivation to a terrorist group in Bima through Aman Abdurrahman's series of tauhid (monotheistic) materials. In 2012, SO participated in assembling an improvised bomb in a rented house by JIPO in Kalora Village, Poso. Meanwhile, the suspect, AS, is a recidivist terrorist who was acquitted on February 19, 2020 (Kompas, 2022). Then Densus 88 also arrested six suspected terrorists in NTB on March 7, 2022. The arrested terrorists allegedly planned to attack the Mandalika MotoGP event. However, the National Police Chief had anticipated this by deploying Densus 88 personnel to NTB, especially in Central Lombok, where the Mandalika circuit is located. According to Sulisty, "Mr. President Joko Widodo directed the Polri institution and Special Detachment 88 to protect the MotoGP event from terror attacks" (CNN, 2022).

Ali Mutafa Ya'qub states religious radicalism as "*al-thatharrufu fi al-diny*" It means standing on the edge, deviating from the common ground, or being excessive in doing something (Nasaruddin Umar, 2014). Furthermore, Nasaruddin Umar emphasizes that the phenomenon of radicalism in the Islamic world is not a sudden phenomenon. It arose as a result of a political, economic, and socio-cultural situation in which

supporters of radical Islam accused others of undermining the religion (Zamrodah, 2016).

With regard to the radicalism-based religion in Indonesia Azra Said:

"Islamic radicalism has strongly colored the picture of Islam in contemporary Indonesia. The face of Indonesian Islam is identified with some radical Muslim-based groups, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Mujahidin Council), Laskar Jihad (LJ, Jihad Paramilitary Troops), and Jama'ah Ikhwan al-Muslimun Indonesia (JAMI, Indonesian Ikhwan al-Muslimun Community). Even though Islamic radical groups do not have a significant number in comparison with moderate ones, such as Nahdlatul Ulama' (NU, The Awakening of Muslim Scholars) and Muhammadiyah, they can draw popular attention" (Muzakki, 2014).

The quote above indicates that the reality of Islam in Indonesia has been inundated by radical groups such as FPI, MMI, LJ, and JAMI. Although their existence do not outnumber the moderate Islamic mass organizations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah (emerging in Java) and NW (arising in Lombok), their existence requires serious attention. Indeed, radicalism is not threatening because almost every religious believer has radical beliefs and behaviors to some extent. Nonetheless, it would be dangerous when realized in actions featuring exclusivity and truth claims. Consequently, it leads to riots or violence on behalf of religion, such as suicide (suicide bombing), often killing innocent people in the name of God's verses. In addition, religious radicalism also requires serious attention because it often leads to separatism. It is generally acknowledged that radical thoughts and attitudes are contradictory to the democratic system in Indonesia, claiming that democracy is a product of the West, which does not adhere to Islamic principles. Hence, it is subject to changing the caliphate system. Concerning the dimensions of radicalism, the term "radicalism" used in this paper refers to any radical thought based on religion, excluding other kinds of extreme behaviors or actions. Hence, the term used is "*counter-radicalization*," not "*counter-violence*" or "*counter-terrorism*."

Radical in this paper refers to radicalism in Islamic thought because it may happen in any political, economic, and cultural sphere. The word "*Islam*" is mentioned because radicalism also happens to exist in other religions, such as Hindu, Buddha, Christian, or Konghucu. One example is the persecution of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar by radical Buddhists. Furthermore, Islamic organizations in

Islamic universities are a home for the development of Islamic radicalism. It is difficult to uproot or challenge their existence because it is like waking up people who pretend to sleep rather than waking up those who genuinely sleep. The radical communities have established a different ideology, which remains complicated to change. The members of the organizations often challenge the arguments using questions, such as: who is the real terrorist?; who is the real radical?; why is it that an Islamist who commits suicide is considered a terrorist, but non-Muslims who kill hundreds or even thousands of people are considered terrorists or radicals?; Why is Islam always the scapegoat?; They usually state that what they have done is a religious obligation (a religious mandate), even though they have to commit a suicide bombing. With this regard, it is not surprising that in his article published in the *Journal of De-radicalization*, Luke Bertram begins with the question, "*How Could a Terrorist Be De-Radicalized?*" (Bertram, 2015). This question can be altered to "*How could a radicalized person be de-radicalized?*" because, despite being illegal in Indonesia, an ideology will remain alive.

For instance, Mariani, one of the students at UIN Mataram who was former member of HTI, states that although the organization has been prohibited, we continued to consolidate as usual without the HTI flag. To answer the above question, there is an Arabic proverb saying, "*kullu da'in dawa'un illa al-maut*", that all problems have solutions, except death. It indicates that although radicalism has turned into an ideology, it must have a solution. The prominent alternatives to the problem can be classified into two categories, *soft* and *hard counter-radicalization*, and *de-radicalization*. The former refers to de-radicalization through education, while the latter encompasses invasions into the regions of the radical groups.

Metaphorically speaking, the efficacy of certain drugs is determined by their price and accuracy according to the patients' diagnoses. Similarly, the effectiveness of a solution in countering religious radicalism is heavily influenced by appropriate solutions based on analyzing problems caused by radicalization's pull or push factors. Therefore, this study drew on system theory and several grand theories regarding counter-radicalization and de-radicalization.

Previous studies have addressed the issue of radicalism on local, national, and international planes. For example, studies of radicalism in the West and Europe usually focus on tragedies involving "Islamic organizations or groups". Several names have

been attached to the radical organizations in the studies, such as Islamic radicalism, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremism, Islamic terrorism, ultra-conservative Muslims, militants, Islamist jihadists, or hardline Muslims. Referring to the studies by Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger, among the subjects of the radical organizations are Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (SGPC), the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) (Devin R. Springer, 2019).

In addition, several relevant studies on radicalism in Indonesia include Akh. Muzakki, *The Roots, Strategies, and Popular Perception Of Islamic Radicalism In Indonesia* (Muzakki, 2014); Syamsul Arifin, *Resisting the Growth of Radicalism in Indonesia* (Syamsul Arifin, 2014); AzyumardiAzra, *Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism* (Azyumardi Azra, 2016a); Masdar Hilmy, *The Politics Of Retaliation: The Backlash of Radical Islamists to de-radicalization Project in Indonesia* (Hilmy, 2014); Nasarudin Umar, *De-radicalization of Quranic and Hadith understanding*; and Masnun Tahir, *Discourse on National Fiqh in Combating and Preventing Radicalism in Campus Environments in NTB* (Tahir, 2015).

The studies above reveal that radicalism has been associated with three subjects: (1) certain Islamic groups; (2) Islamic boarding schools (Pesantren); and (3) someone who is supposed to be radicalized by national or transnational Islamic movements, such as *ikhwanul Muslimi* in Egypt, Hizbut Tahrir in Jordan, and ISIS in Iraq. It is based on the common belief that some Islamic organizations and pesantren are incubators of the ideology and actions of Islamic radicalism. For instance, Charlene Tan conducted a study on the Ngruki Islamic Boarding School led by Abu Bakar Ba'asir in Central Java. The finding showed that the Islamic school yielded prominent terrorists, such as Ali Ghufron (also known as Mukhlas), Muhammad Musyafak, and Asmar Latin Sani. It was also uncovered that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was strongly involved in several militant activities, such as the 2002 Bali and the 2003 Jakarta bombings (Panagia, 2009) (Charlene Tan, 2011). More specifically, in the context of Islamic higher education institutions in Lombok-NTB, particularly at UIN Mataram (the State Islamic University of Mataram), investigating the issue of radicalism remains critical because national and

transnational radical organizations, such as ISIS, also appeared in the region; for example, an ISIS member has been traced to Bima.

This research examines the roots and gateways of radicalism at the State Islamic University of Mataram. Hence, the current study aimed to fill the void and tried to differentiate between the origins and gateways, where the former relates to the causes of radicalism while the latter refers to the pathway that the ideology penetrates into the Islamic universities. Analogically speaking, it can be associated with theft cases, where the crime could take place because of poverty, hatred, or revenge. The thieves could enter the house through windows or doors, or they could be already in the house, as a proverb says, "a snake in the grass. After examining the roots and gateways, it then sought to explore the strategies for dealing with radicalism. It was directed to counter radicalism in the Islamic universities, following the terms "*counter-radicalization*" and "*de-radicalization*" In this case; *counter-radicalization* refers to the use of various preventive measures to help the students resist radicalism, which takes a multitude of forms, either in thoughts or actions. Meanwhile, *de-radicalization* pertains to the endeavor to diminish radical ideologies or perspectives among some of the students at UIN Mataram.

METHOD

This research is a type of qualitative research using a case study approach. The purpose of the study was to describe how radicalism entered UIN Mataram, the typology of student movements that have the potential for radicalism, and how the university responded to the problem. Data collection was carried out by observation, in-depth interviews, and literature reviews to reveal facts related to thinking, behavior, and student movements in relation to the seeds of radicalism at UIN Mataram. The data sources used are primary data sources and secondary data sources. Primary data sources were obtained through observations and interviews with informants. Meanwhile, secondary data sources are obtained from various writings and journal articles that are relevant to the research theme. In this study, the most important data collection techniques were participant observation and open and in-depth interviews. Research data is analyzed directly and gradually, according to the technical stages, based on the results of the meaning and translation of the reality found.

Theoretical Framework

The system approach in this study was based on the rationale that counter-radicalization and de-radicalization in Islamic higher education institutions can be seen from a single lens instead of from multiple perspectives or visible and invisible components of the Islamic institutions. In this context, the system approach covers all aspects of the educational system. Although all features are different, they share the same educational purposes as a system. One of the educational goals in the Islamic education sphere is to produce graduates who can promote harmonious social bonds as a core principle of Islam, disseminating and maintaining peace. Based on the rationales above, the following research questions guided the whole of this paper: What are the roots, forms, and typology of radicalism at the State Islamic University Mataram? Where are the gateways for radical ideology penetrating the university, and how do universities deal with radicalism using the system approach

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Typology of Radicalism at the Islamic University of Mataram

Along with constant social changes, the radicalization discourse in Indonesia is not only directed at specific Islamic organizations or pesantren but also at Islamic educational institutions, especially Islamic higher education (IHE). Based on the current situation, Islamic higher education is no longer sterile from the radical ideology. Previously, it did not receive little attention, but it has recently become a buzzword among many superintendents of Islamic universities, whether STAIN, IAIN, or UIN as radical groups have infiltrated them (Purwanto, 2017).

Concerning the radicalism movement at the Islamic University of Mataram, there are three types of radical groups, namely HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), Salafism, and KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia), the Islamic students' united movement. However, these organizations belong to radicalism in thoughts, not in action (Pirol et al., 2020). Ali Jadid opines that the members of the organizations were not only students but also lecturers. Since the opening of the Post-graduate program in 2010, radical group members were also prevalent in the education programs, either the Magister or Doctorate programs. With this regard, Nur Syam advocates that in 1980, many of the members of the radical Islamic organizations came from science and

technology education backgrounds (Suyanto et al., 2022). Nonetheless, radicalism also penetrates the Islamic higher education institution.

This corresponds to what Zakaria states that many radicalisms used to be in secular universities such as ITB (Institute of Technology Bandung) or UI (Indonesian University) in the 80s. Yet, it is currently making its moves toward Islamic universities, such as a Institute of Islamic education or Islamic universities. Similarly, Quddus also stated that secular universities produced more radical movements than Islamic universities because the former curriculum did not provide adequate comparative studies of Islam. However, the recent phenomenon shows that radical ideology and movements have made their way to Islamic higher education. In this context, Masnun, the Rector of UIN Mataram, asserted that the empirical evidence indicates that the Islamic radical movement has infiltrated almost all spaces or regions, including both students and lecturers from natural science or social sciences departments. It even penetrated UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, and one of the graduates had already planned bombings. He reasoned that they did not learn the whole concept of Islam. It indicates that radicalism has made its way into Islamic higher education. Their presence is like an iceberg, with much more ice underneath the water than on its surface.

Islamic higher education is expected to save its students or members from radicalism. Therefore, the discourses of radicalism should not be limited to Islamic boarding schools and secular or Islamic higher education institutions. They are also becoming the battleground of Islamic ideology, contesting moderates against fundamental or radical Islamic thoughts, and vice versa. Nonetheless, Muhdar stated that the radical groups are just ideological, not actional, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI) (the Islamic defense front), Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Laskar Jihad, JAMI, and Ikhwanusshafa, and so on.

In this context, it is interesting to quote what Azra stated as the following:

"These Islamic higher educational institutions undoubtedly play an important role in the modernization of Muslim society. Owing much to "rational" and "nondenominational" approaches to Islam, graduates of IAINs, STAINs, and UINs in general have been recognized by Indonesian society in general as having progressive, inclusive, and tolerant views of Islam. By contrast, many students and graduates of "secular" universities such as the University of Indonesia (UI) or Bandung Institute of

Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung/ITB) tend to be more literal in their understandings of Islam" (Azyumardi Azra, 2016b)

The following Table 1. Illustrates the types of radicalism adhered to by the students of UIN Mataram:

Table 1: Types of Radicalism Joined by the Students of UIN Mataram

Groups	Categories	Characteristics	Level/University
HTI (<i>HizbutTahrir Indonesia</i>) Despite prohibited, the ideology remains alive	<i>Radical Thought</i>	<i>In</i> Anti-Democracy Anti Pancasila Popular with <i>Khilafah Oriented</i> Big veil (but not burka) Exclusive in friendship Anti-Western countries Anti-moderate Islamic concept Anti-Liberal Islam Anti-Islam Nusantara Anti-Local Islam They only accept the unsophisticated of the Western world	Undergraduate
<i>Salafism</i>	<i>Radical Thought</i>	<i>in</i> Does not show off on campus A textual and literal understanding of Islamic scripts Decontextualizing the Islamic teachings Leaning toward the time of Khulafaurrasyidin as an ideal era <i>Anti-local tradition</i> in Islamic rituals Anti-moderate, liberal, and local concepts of Islam Wearing Burka Anti-West, West is	Undergraduate, Master, and Doctorate

			regarded as preaching infidelity They only accept the unsophisticated of the Western world	
KAMMI	<i>Radical Thought</i>	<i>in</i>	Show off in campus A textual and literal understanding of Islamic scripts Leaning toward the time of Khulafaurrasyidin as an ideal era <i>Anti-local tradition</i> in Islamic rituals Anti-moderate, liberal, and local concepts of Islam Big veil and some wear burka Anti-West, West is regarded as preaching infidelity They only accept the unsophisticated of the Western world	Undergraduate, Master, and Doctorate

The table above illustrates that there are no free regions from radical Islamic organizations' infiltration.(Nur Syam, n.d.). In the context of UIN Mataram, it is essential to cite what Faizah said as quoted "Fortunately, there is no radicalism in actions at UIN Mataram, but it needs to be anticipated.

Similarly, Abdul Quddus opined that studies on radicalism involving students at Islamic universities remain critical to anticipating any new movement model in Lombok. Lombok, especially UIN Mataram, has the potential to counter radicalism for two main reasons. First, the island is widely known for its moderate Islam, with the majority of the Sasak community belonging to the members of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Nahdlatul Wathan (NW). Second, most Islamic boarding schools on the island are aligned with the moderate schools of Islamic thought, such as Syafi'i (for NW) and the

four schools of thoughts (*arba'atu al-Madza*) for NU (Hanafy, Maliky, Hanbaly, and Syafi'i).

To look into the typology of radicalism at UIN Mataram, this study employed the classification method used by Rand Corporation, which classified typology into five stages: *sympathizers, supporters, activists, newcomers and the hard core*.




Figure I: Typology of radicalism based on the level of commitment coined by *Rand Corporation* (the RAND Corporation, 2010)

The figure above can be described as (a) *hardcore*, radical groups with deep radicalism. They are the ones who have long been involved in radical organizations and join in planning and committing violence. (b) *Activists* are relatively old members of radical organizations who are often engaged in violence but do not firmly adhere to the group. (c) *Newcomers*, new members of radical organizations. (d) *Supporters*, the members of the radical organizations whose lives are not *inextricably linked to* the organizations. They usually provide financial support. (e) *Sympathizers*, the members of radical organizations that are not actively involved in the organizations but identify themselves as having similar characteristics or ideologies to those groups. They passively assist the movement of radical organizations' by rejecting cooperation or sharing information with authorities. (the RAND Corporation, 2010).

Based on the above typologies, this study revealed that the typology of radicalism at UIN Mataram fell into two categories: *sympathizers* and *supporters*. *Sympathizers* mean they did not intensively and actively engage in the radical movement, but they passively assisted the groups as they shared similar characteristics.

They did not belong to newcomers or hardcore. They also belong to the category of *supporters* because they are not direct members of the radical groups and did not actively commit violence but provided them with financial support to some extent. This financial aid is not managed exclusively under specific terms but is termed “voluntary contributions”.

Drawing on the studies on radicalism at the international and national levels, the roots of radicalization sometimes differ from one country to another, and these roots are not only dominated by some Indonesian Muslims but also by other different states and religions. For example, Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger have explained some of the causes of radicalization in various countries (Devin R. Springer and James L. Regens, 2009) .

Concerning radicalism, the roots differ between push and pull factors. Furthermore, one relevant theory used to trace the origins of radicalism is the push and pull factor. The former refers to factors that encourage individuals to actively engage in radical ideology or actions. These driving factors include marginalization, inequality, discrimination, persecution, or perceptions of complaints against the environment, as well as historical and other socio-economic factors. "Pull factors" can be defined as factors that attract anyone to participate in a radical ideology or action (Zeynep Kaya, 2016). In such a context, both push and pull factors refer to anything that moves and pulls someone into radicalism, while push and pull factors refer to anything that pushes and pulls someone to stop or leave radicalism.

Several reasons related to the push and pull factors of radicalization in Islamic universities will be delineated on micro, meso, and macro scales. These factors indicate that no student is born radical, but radicalism is born because of social products and constructs. In this regard, Saparudin argues, it is generally acknowledged that no student is born with radicalism. It means that radicalized people are caused by many factors, both push and pull factors. Likewise, Quddus stated that radicalism in Indonesia did not emerge in a *vacuum situation*, but was influence by various factors, such as the economy, society, culture, politics, regions, and sects on both national and international levels. These are intertwined and have contributed to the thriving of radical ideologies. On the national level, the radical organizations that had been reluctant to show off have been brave enough and mushroomed since the fall of the New Order era under the

regime of Soeharto, leading to the reformation era and allowing freedom on behalf of democracy.

Another factor considered to be the root of radicalization in Islamic universities is religious affiliation. This affiliation refers to certain radical Islamic organizations, where radical students earn and develop the radical ideology. At UIN Mataram, this religious affiliation emerged as student involvement in HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), Salafy, and KAMMI. Andra stated that there are at least three radical groups of students at the Islamic university: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, KAMMI (Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union), and Salafy.

This religious affiliation plays a vital role in radicalization. Unlike HTI, KAMMI, and Salafy, there are two prominent Islamic mass organizations in Lombok: Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) and Nahdlatul Al-'Ulama (NU). Nahdlatul Wathan, founded on the island in 1936 by Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, is characterized by passionate followers of the Shafii school of thought. Members of this religious organization or affiliation comprise the majority of the people of Lombok. Its members were also found at the Mataram State Islamic University. One of the doctrines of this organization is that following Wahhabism is forbidden. It has the positive consequence of inhibiting any radicalization process. In addition, Nahdlatul Ulama, founded by K.H. Hasyim Asyari, accepts four schools of thought: Shafi'i, Maliki, Hambali, and Hanafi. Its adherents help disseminate inclusive and comparative Islamic ideologies without being trapped in the exclusive claim of a single truth.

Mulyadi, a student at PGMI UIN Mataram, opined that the affiliation of this radical group could be seen from several changes in clothing, behavior, family, understanding of Islam, textual understanding of Islam, infidelity toward others with different Islamic ideologies, attending religious seminars regarding Islamic radicalism, and visiting websites and watching videos of Salafism and radicalism.

Religious Understanding that Constructs Islamist Narrative

As previously stated, at UIN Mataram, there are at least three types of radical Islamic organizations: HTI, Salafy, and KAMMI. Despite their differences, they share some similar characteristics. These are evidenced by their ways of understanding Islamic teachings, which are usually textual and literal. This indicates that the students

at the Islamic university were driven by poverty and a lack of intellectuality, mainly religious ideology, to join the radical Islamic organizations.

This claim concurs with what Zuhdy asserts. He claims that the roots of radicalism are a lack of economic reason, poverty, a lack of intellectual property, and a comprehensive religious ideology. It also corresponds to some extent with what Jumarim describes: the economic factor is not related to radical organizations in the Islamic universities.

Furthermore, the ideological understanding is also influenced by other motives. This is relevant to what Azra stated: "*I would, however, argue that it is more political than religious. In some instances, the original motive could be religious, but the movements soon become very political*" (Azyumardi Azra, 2016a). In other words, there are various factors for infiltrating radicalism at Islamic higher education institutions, but it originates from misunderstanding religious teachings. In this regard, HM states that Islamic universities' radicalism is caused by local, national, and global factors, which are interrelated. The most determining factor, though, is a lack of religious understanding. Sarapudin also opines that, in some cases, the economy is not the primary motivation factor for the students to join radical organizations. Their ideological misconception is built on their understanding.

Religious understanding refers to how the students perceive Islamic teachings. It is evident in the two following accounts: (1) a literal understanding of certain Islamic teachings; (2) this model is then established in some internal and external groups, in this case, sects, religions, states, and so on. Among these constructs are: (a) internally, Islam is the only correct religion regardless of the context (*inna al-di na 'indalla hi al-islam*) and Muslims are the best mankind community as stated in the Al- Qur'an (*kuntum khaira ummatin ukhrijat linnasi*)

Their mission was to spread goodness *ma'ruf* and prevent *al-munkar*. Then, *al-munkara* is usually referred to in the West, particularly America. Externally, religions are not only conceived as a system of values but also as a symbol of identity. Regarding the notion of identity, belief often comes to the surface concerning "*minna waminhum*" (our group and their group). In this case, those less obedient or pious muslims become so oppressive that they defend their religion excessively (*ta'ashub al a'ma*). This is highlighted in the holy book of Quran "*kulluhizbinbima ladaihimfarihun*". This

condition is followed by the classification of *Mu'min* (believer) and *kafir* (unbeliever). Other Islamic verses used to support their claims are *man lam yahkumbima anzalalla hufaula ikahumu al-ka firun* (*Qur'an Al-Maidah* (5) : 44, n.d.), *man lam yahkumbima anzalalla hufaula ikahumu al-dzaa limun* and "*man lam yahkumbima anzalalla> hufaula ikahumu al-fasiqun*" (see *AlQur'an*, 44-45)

The students at Islamic universities also conceive these Islamic interpretations as the truth to justify their radical existence against others. This is known as "*control belief*," referring to the term coined by Charlene Tan. Tan claims that it influences people's perceptions of the world or realities, including their perceptions of others. These core beliefs are constructed through the natural processes of "*enculturation, education, socialization, and interactions with people and nature*" (Charlene Tan, 2011). On the other hand, Jonathan Russel and Haras Rafiq use the term "*Islamic Narrative*". Narration is central to radicalism, extremism, and terrorism. In its new form, the narrative regarding Islam often illustrates that the religion is being attacked and should be defended. In terrorism, this has been widely used to promote violence. In extremism, it is used to propagate values against human norms and rights. In contrast, in radicalization, it is used to exploit vulnerable people and recruit them to be the doers, possibly.

This is also in line with what Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, David, and N. Edger stress: that there are three elements to radicalism. One of them is the philosophical foundation that ignited the movement. It includes the viewpoint that the religion is justified, as well as the morals and ethics of ideology, not to mention terror. This is the core of the statement: *a set of broad philosophical foundations that provide the underlying rationale for the movement. Those philosophical foundations comprise the ideology's core religious, moral, and ethical justifications for action, including terrorism* (Ozzano, 2011) In this regard, Afdlal et al. argue that religious radicalism is usually driven by three motives: (1) the norm of doctrine, (2) attitude and understanding of the three issues, the implementation of Islamic law in the form of the Islamic State of Indonesia, and (3) *Khilafah Islamiyah* (*Khilafah Islam*) (Afadlal, 2005).

When it comes to Wahabism, Hedieh Mirahadi and Mehreen Farooq pointed out that three principles promote this Islamic group's intolerance and aggressive attitude. (a) The concept of Islam influenced by the local culture and traditions is conceived as *bid'a*.

(b) Takfiri, or infidelity, refers to the belief that Muslims are not non-believers or infidels and should not be killed if they practice Islam in a way that does not resemble the prophet's life. The non-believers also refer to the Jews, Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists. (c) Jihad, or the holy war (jihad fi sabilillah). For radicalists, jihad is a sacred war mandated by Islamic teaching. This is evidenced by the arrest of a radical Muslim who planned to commit a suicide bombing with his wife. He stated that Jihad means war as he referred to the Quranic verse “*kutiba 'alaikum al-qitau*” which is supported by another verse “*kutiba 'alaikum al-shiya mu*”. In Arabic, the word “*kutiba*” literally means “*what is written*”, but when it is followed by the word “*ala*”, it means obligation “*al-wujub*”. Therefore, he defined war against something contradictory to his belief as the mandate of Islam. This is also known as *da rulislam* and *daru al-harbi*. Viewed from the cultural perspective, Islamic radicalism is the product of the de-contextualization of Islamic teachings. In this regard, Gus Dur, cited in Syafii Anwar, advocated that two things drove the emergence of radical Islamist groups. (1) Militant Islamists are dissatisfied and isolated as a result of their lag behind the West and its penetration into the Islamic world; and (2) the lack of Islamic knowledge among young Muslims is oppressive (Nasaruddin Umar, 2014). (2) *Silting*, the lack of Islamic knowledge among the young Muslims (Nasaruddin Umar, 2014).

A Systemic Approach for Counter-Radicalization in UIN Mataram

Islamic educational institutions should counter-radicalism by developing curricula that anticipate the penetration of violent ideology in their education system. Because education is both abstract and concrete, efforts to counter radicalism necessitate the inclusion of Islamic teaching. This role is in line with the quote, “Nobody was born a terrorist.” Thus, in the theory of Islamic education, there is nativism and empiricism, which accord with the hadith of the prophet “*Kullu Mauluudin*”. The hadith signifies the role of the family, community, and formal educational environments regarding counter-radicalism. Some components are believed to have perished in the radicalization of Islamic higher education institutions.

There is no best solution to counter radicalization because it is highly dependent on national and international interests. Counter-radicalization in this context refers to the efforts of educational institutions to take preventive measures to protect ordinary people (Thoriquttyas et al., 2020). For this reason, the following soft measures can be

enacted by the Islamic higher education institutions. Leaders at Islamic higher education institutions could take the following steps: monitoring, conducting studies on radicalism on campus, holding dialogues, and stipulating policies to curb the spread of the radical ideology. Moreover, the campus has the right to prevent students from participating in any radical organizations that threaten the integrity of the Indonesian state. It is based on the government's policy in 2017 regarding mass organizations. In this regard, UIN Mataram seems to have taken several preventive measures: (a) disseminating friendly Islam or Islam Nusantara (local Islam) through various activities inside and outside the campus; (b) following up on government policies by paying serious attention to anti-Pancasila movements, especially HTI. The policies taken by UIN Mataram were in line with those of the Indonesian government to freeze HTI as an organization. Azra pointed out that radicalization has no place in Indonesia because it does not conform to the characteristics of Indonesian Islam known as *Wasathiyyah* (moderate).

Starting From Intangible Components:

The Values of Moderate Islam (*Wasathiyyah*)

It is acknowledged that violence has no place in Islamic values and teachings. In this case, the management of Islamic higher education is focused on disseminating the values to filter radicalism (promoting Islamic values that support peace), including tolerance, *tawassuth*, *tasamuh*, etc.

The intangible element of counter-radicalization is promoting peace and harmony based on the two primary sources of Islamic teachings, the Qur'an and hadiths, such as *rahmah* (love), *al musawah*, *taqwa* (*egalitarianism*), *ta'aruf*, *ihsan*, *tafahum*, *takrim*, *husnuzzon* (positive thinking), *tasamuh* (tolerance), *afw*, *maghfirah* (forgiveness), *sulh*, *ishlah*, *silah*, greetings, *lyn*, *'adl* (justice) (Zakiyuddin Baidhawiy, 2007). In line with this, Hameed el-Saed's unveiled steps of counter-radicalization, such as *religious rehabilitation, education and vocational training, psychological rehabilitation and social rehabilitation program, Family rehabilitation program, Physical rehabilitation, Post-care-release reintegrating and Activation and empowerment of the role of societies*.

These values portray Islam *Wasathiyyah*, referring to Quraish Shihab's thought, who defined *wasatan* as middle, moderate, and exemplary. The center allows humans to

be impartial toward the right and the left, leading them to justice. This perspective indicates that the concept of *wasattiyyah* is a condition or a prerequisite and not a goal (*ghayah*). In other words, this concept will produce objectives like justice and a non-discriminatory attitude that will embrace two or more individuals like "I'm yours, and you are mine," or a win-win solution.

Special Attentions on Frequently Misunderstood Concepts

Islamic higher education must emphasize teachings and materials prone to misconceptions and misinterpretations, such as the concept of jihad, *da-rul* Islam, *da-rul kufri*, the meaning of caliphate, and so on as well as providing comparative discourse. Additionally, it is essential to re-add Pride or Pancasila materials. This involves several solutions, for example, (a) the general education concept from the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education, global citizenship (UNESCO), de-radicalization of the holy book (Nasarudin Umar), deconstruction and reconstruction of Islamic teachings (Syamsul Arifin), promoting Islam Nusantara (moderates) as a characteristic of Indonesian Islam (Azyumardi Azra) or spreading Islam *Wasathiyyah* (MUI).

Masnun, the rector of the State Islamic University of Mataram (UIN Mataram), highlighted several methods to introduce moderation through the curriculum of UIN Mataram in particular and other Islamic higher institutions (PTKIN) in general, as follows:

- a. Re-conceptualizing materials like Islamic cultural history, this was previously dominated by the history of wars, battles, and attempts to defeat one another like the crusade story.
- b. Re-constructing the meaning of a common enemy, radical groups have assumed that a common enemy was built by the concept of Islam vs. infidel, or *daruslaam* vs *darul kufri/harbi*. Furthermore, the concept of *ukhuwwah* is not only *ukhuwwah islamiyyah* (brotherhood in Islam), but also *ukhuwwah insaniyyah*, *basyariyyah* or *wathaniyyah*, *ukhuwwah insaniyyah/basyariyyah*.
- c. Re-adding materials like civic education or Pancasila with modified methods, where it is not merely focused on indoctrination and memory, as stated in the Abu Dhabi Memorandum, which states that civic education is one practice to counter radicalization, involving the increase and expansion of curriculum emphasizing

civic education, civic responsibility, and human values (good practice 7) (Global Counterterrorism Forum, n.d.).

Ceasing Radical Indoctrination Through the “In the Wall Model.”

One method that requires modification is indoctrination. Over indoctrination, such as in the wall model should cease. It can be replaced by critical thinking, sociology, and anthropology in the study of theology. It is supported by the presence of the Islamic higher institution, which just converted from institute to university, enabling the realization of integrating science through the horizon of knowledge. In line with this, Kamarudin Hidayat classified the model of thought into exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism, universalism, and eclecticism (Adeng Muchtar Ghazaly, 2004) Hence, inclusiveness and eclecticism should be developed at UIN Mataram. It requires approaches beyond theology to unveil the truth, such as sociology, philosophy, etc.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes: *First*, radicalism at UIN Mataram was ideological rather than action, as evident by the presence of the so called radical Islamic movements on the campus, such as HTI, KAMMI, and Salafy. Although HTI has been banned, its ideology remains alive among its members. Furthermore, this study discovered the roots of radicalism on campus were influenced by an incomplete understanding of Islamic teachings that constitute control beliefs and Islamic narratives, affiliation to religious groups, and national or international political interests. *Second*, UIN Mataram's chairs faced a dilemma regarding preventing the penetration of the radical ideology. The preventive measures taken by the campus include using the system approach, from promoting moderate Islamic values to involving Islamic boarding schools and mass organizations, such as NW and NU. These include the absence of laws or regulations that strictly block the entry of the students' organization and ideology into the university, the disappearance of curriculum-based Pancasila and entrepreneurship, the freedom to access media, the freedom of academic expression, internal recruitment from seniors to juniors, and the campus environment on and around campus.

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