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


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ARTICLE



The cost of leisure: the political ecology of the commercialization of Indonesia's protected areas

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ABSTRACT

Using the political ecology approach, we investigated the Indonesian government's decision to commercialize protected areas (PAs) and promote its tourism sector aggressively, and examined how this commercialization is enabled through various institutions and governing structures. We confirmed that the commercialization of PAs in Indonesia was an alternative accumulation, dealing with the crisis of capitalist accumulation. Our empirical finding showed that the commercialization of PAs in Indonesia had detrimental environmental and social impacts, such as deadlocks or monopoly or management, and environmental deterioration. This commercialization pattern was different from accumulation by conservation in other regions, such as Africa, where local people were deprived of their access to the means of production, consequently becoming laborers in the tourism industry. In Indonesia, local people were given access to resources; however, as these resources were of little value, they became laborers in the tourism industry. Further research is needed to test whether different patterns of accumulation by conservation also apply to other types of PAs in Indonesia, such as national parks and customary forests, including various coral reef conservation areas in remote and small islands used as tourist attractions.

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Introduction

In December 2019, *Post Magazine* issued an opinion article entitled 'Bruised Bali Faces a Looming Environmental Crisis – and Tourism is to Blame'. The publication illustrated how Bali, one of the most visited tourist destinations in the world, faces severe environmental problems such as water scarcity and waste management (Hutton 2019). Severe environmental problems have emerged in developing countries due to mass tourism development that neglects the carrying capacity of the environment – and this situation has worsened with inefficient tourism management in these countries (Nugroho et al. 2021; Holden 2017; Obrador 2017; Chong 2020).

Jelajah Pendaki, a magazine aimed at educating and providing information about mountain climbing in Indonesia, reported that the commercialization of Indonesia's protected areas (PAs), including mountainous regions was detrimental to the environment and people (Ridwan 2020). In addition to the environmental problems, deaths related to mountain climbing were also rising because of the relative lack of knowledge among people attempting to climb mountains and the ease of obtaining climbing permits (Cahyadi 2014; Ridwan 2020). Data showed that for the period from January 2015 to June 2019 in Indonesia, 101

accidents involving climbers occurred, with 18% of these accidents resulting in deaths. Regarding accidents leading to death, 51% of these deaths occurred due to a lack of equipment, hypothermia, or illness. Other accidents involved climbers getting lost (3%); in this case, the survival rate was 31%.

Despite facing much criticism, the Indonesian government remains determined to encourage the tourism industry, especially exploring PAs, despite their being susceptible to environmental deterioration (Kc, Ghimire, and Dhakal 2020; Ramesh and Rai 2017; Kinseng et al. 2018). The tourism industry is projected to increase with the growing middle class in developing countries, including Indonesia, consequently encouraging increased investment in the tourism sector (Kragelund and Carmody 2016; Hitchcock, King, and Parnwell 2008; Ying, Norman, and Zhou 2016). The number of international tourists to Indonesia from Asia and the Pacific has increased rapidly in recent years – from 7,475,050 in 2015 to 12,875,207 tourists in 2019. Visitors from Europe and America show an increasing trend as well – from 1,337,552 and 361,220 tourists in 2015, respectively, to 2,010,911 and 568,398 tourists in 2019, respectively (UNWTO 2021). The Indonesian government has adopted a relatively aggressive policy to support the

tourism sector by building infrastructure, opening new destinations, mass promotion of tourist areas, and by adopting the visa-free policy for tourists (Nugroho et al. 2021).

After the deindustrialization of Indonesia for the past 20 years, commercializing PAs has been a political savior (Pike 2020; Wang et al. 2012). The recent mass commercialization of PAs in Indonesia represents an effort to improve the employment rate after the massive deindustrialization process since the 1998 Asian economic crisis and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 (Rodrik 2016; Schlogl and Sumner 2020). Open unemployment in Indonesia from 2000 to 2020 ranged from 6% – 8% and did not show a significant decline, burdening other sectors, including tourism (Soesastro, Aswicahyono, and Narjoko 2006; BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia) 2020). In this period, Indonesia's economic development strategies included economic informalization and strengthening of the primary economic sectors, such as agriculture and tourism (Tadjoeddin 2016; Dahles, Prabawa, and Koning 2020).

To create a new mode of accumulation, the Indonesian government also allowed local people to access and take advantage of conservation areas, including PAs, forests, beaches, and mountainous regions, for tourism purposes (Prideaux and Cooper 2002; Nurrochmat, et al., 2017 et al. 2016). Since 2014, with President Joko Widodo's election and reelection, Indonesia has tended to implement populist policies that impacted conservation area management patterns (Mietzner 2015; Hellmann 2017). At the local level, populism manifests in giving authority to village governments to manage their natural resources to be commercialized for economic profits, including the commercialization of PAs. Small PAs, which are less profitable, such as beaches and mountaineering routes, are given to local communities.

The village government receives special allocation funds to carry out development, including direct investment in rural development programs such as business activities – and the commercialization of PAs is one of the investment targets (Iwan, Negara, and Rhesa 2018; Watts et al. 2019; Arifin et al. 2020). Under such a populist policy, the state has a strong legitimacy in increasing its revenues through pro-conservation activities that are claimed to be suitable for conservation of PAs. The central government fully opens the management of the tourism industry to the market by establishing tourism authority groups in areas that have considerable economic value, such as national parks and coastal areas, that are mostly PAs, and leave the poor revenue generating resources to the local people. The development of ecotourism is considered a new means of returning natural resource management activities to the market, resulting in the exploitation of the economic interests of certain groups (Duffy 2008).

Previous research on the commercialization of PAs for tourism has focused on its environmental viability and social impact on localities, and its contribution to local and national economies, in addition to livelihood issues and conflicts (Wall 1997; Das and Chatterjee 2015; Patti and Messina 2020). However, research on how the commercialization of PAs changes the pattern of local resources governance and its social dynamics at the micro-level is inadequate (Canavan 2017; Vaccaro, Beltran, and Paquet 2013). In this respect, we analyze the Indonesian government's decision to commercialize PAs and promote the tourism sector aggressively after the 1997–1998 financial crisis. The commercialization of PAs enabled through various institutions and governing structures was analyzed with the accumulation by conversation (AbC) theoretical orientation. As a case study, we investigated the commercialization of PAs for tourism, namely beaches and hiking trails, and the effect of the shift in governance, property arrangement, and institutional interactions on social and ecological conditions.

Theoretical background

One of the political ecology concepts arising amid the commercialization of PAs for tourism is AbC. This new accumulation pattern is employed by capitalists as an attempt to resolve the present financial crisis (Büscher and Fletcher 2015; Paudel 2016; Enns, Bersaglio, and Sneyd 2019). One of the simplest forms of AbC is to commodify PAs that were previously dedicated as conservation areas for tourism or other profit-generating activities. Hence, this tendency often consolidates with that of the capitalist state to deal with the crisis within the traditional accumulation mode (Kelly 2011; Vaccaro, Beltran, and Paquet 2013). As a political and economic process, AbC involves power beyond the traditional viewpoint, that considers the state as the central controller of social order. This process of accumulation is better explained by using the hegemony and legitimacy concept.

Marcinek and Hunt (2019) mentioned that the transformation of PAs into touristic areas constitutes a change in the function of PAs and can be deemed a political act designed to acquire and commodify nature. How is the accumulation process via commodifying nature conducted? Some countries introduce new resource governance within the existing management system that serves to: (1) expand the controlled area beyond its original scope, and (2) encourage the private sector to strengthen its control over the place (Fletcher 2019). Control expansion is carried out by building a new institution with greater authority to facilitate the commercialization process for traditional institutions, such as national parks or forest management units (Adams 2020). This institution is the new regulator as an extension of the government to

moderate the subsequent activities, that is, encouraging the private sector to invest in conservation areas to expand their control (Sæþórsdóttir and Saarinen 2016; Adams 2020).

However, in many cases, social boundaries created by state-centered narratives obscure the meaning of participation, exploit patrimonial structures, and authorize exploitative behavior to earn instant income (Patrick et al. 2015). According to Fletcher (2017), the government's steps in forming a management institution, encouraging private investment, and creating supporting rules for commercializing PAs are signs of AbC. State policy encouraging the commercialization of PAs for tourism is a form of hegemony, either by showing that this 'exploitation' is legitimate or by controlling the activities of all actors in this policy frame. Such hegemony will only work if it gets strong legitimacy for economic reasons and addresses environmental and cultural damage issues due to tourism (Lawrence, Wickins, and Phillips 1997; Ramesh and Rai 2017). Other scholars have found that governments use the development and conservation rhetoric to legitimize their commercialization of nature (Krott et al. 2014), and community participation (by means of a populist policy) is a source of such legitimacy in addition to logistical support (Williams and Philippe 2017).

Recently, the populist policy approach has been gaining ground worldwide (Passari 2020; Calléja 2020; Weithman 2020). In the Indonesian context, the ruling regime has tended to implement populist policies by formalizing farmers' access to large parts of forest areas since 2012 (Sahide, 2020; Fisher, Dhiaulhaq, and Sahide 2019). The state's monopoly on the management of conservation areas, especially state forest companies since the colonial period, has become one of tools for obtaining legitimacy for the new Indonesian government's populist policy by granting forest management rights to local communities. Using the above concept, the Indonesian government's strategy to build legitimacy by gaining public support in commercializing PAs by using empowerment of the local people and village governments as a populist policy will be discussed.

All actions of a populist policy place the people in focus. It is anti-elite, and emphasizes providing opportunities for people (McCarthy 2019). In this respect, we investigated how populist policies were implemented by the ruling government in Indonesia when the policy can potentially damage the environment and lead to social conflicts. In summary, analyzing the commercialization of PAs using the AbC theory enriched by the concept of populism policy in accurately explaining how all parties in this process are controlled via production as a condition for legitimate accumulation. By analyzing case studies of small-scale tourism development by local communities, we provide a more elaborate illustration of the commercialization of PAs.

Consequently, we criticize this commercialization process in terms of policies and management practices. Additionally, we test whether AbC in Indonesia, as an emerging economy, has theoretically the same pattern as that of commercializing PAs in other countries.

Materials and methods

The PAs in Indonesia are controlled by two state institutions: the Ministry of Forestry (MoF), that manages conservation forests located outside production forests, and the State Forest Company (SFC), that manages conservation forests located inside production forests. Our research mainly focused on coastal areas controlled by the SFC and mountain tracking routes operated by the SFC and MoF. These bodies commercialized PAs on a limited basis and cooperate with forest farmer groups (FFGs) in areas with small ecological impacts under social forestry programs in the past. At the local level, the government employed FFGs alone to deliver government programs related to forest policy and management. This changed after the reformation era in 1998, in which village governments and local investors started to be involved in forest management under the decentralization policy. Simultaneously, the increasing tourism economy in the last decade has pushed the central government to provide village tourism programs to boost the local economy. The programs allow village leaders to control potential tourism attractions that are located mainly in PAs.

Based on these considerations and to obtain a broad perspective on the commercialization of PAs in Indonesia, we analyzed small eco-tourism (SET) destinations – especially SET in coastal areas and some popular mountain climbing trails. The coastal areas under study are located in the Malang Raya region in East Java Province. This region is one of the new tourism industry centers supported by the central government outside Bali. The percentage of tourists visiting the new destinations reached 26.7% of the approximately 58.65 million tourists to Indonesia every year. The coastal area was represented by the southern regions of East Java, where small beaches had been extensively opened up for SET by the village government, the SFC, and FFGs in the last decade. We considered eight popular climbing trails for local and foreign tourists from other PAs, including Lawu, Semeru, Arjuno, and Ijen in East Java, and Sumbing, Sindoro, and Slamet in Central Java. These areas are part of a larger area managed by the local groups under the agreement and permission from the principal area manager, the SFC. [Figure 1](#) represents the map of the research areas.

Specifically, the SET areas under study are conservation areas used for small-scale tourism under the agreement and permission from the SFC under the




Figure 1. Map of the research areas.

social forestry scheme. The local groups, mostly FFGs, manage these areas. Thus, our SET analysis did not consider all PAs controlled by the SFC, highlighting only a small part of the PAs managed and concessioned to FFGs. Our case studies focused on the dynamics of the local resource management of the concessioned areas alone to ensure that these two commercialization forms are of a similar scale to compare their management methodologically. At this level, the actors involved intensively in management include tourism groups established by the village heads, informal groups affiliated with the village heads or the SFC, FFGs as initial managers, and investors. These actors build legitimacy and power to legitimize their actions in controlling specific natural resources.

This study employed three data collection methods: in-depth interviews, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation for climbing trails. Informed consent was obtained verbally before participation in interviews. This is because some interviewees considered the topic might lead to adverse impacts on their official position. In addition, many of research participants are illiterate or semi-literate. Quotes used in this article were translated by the first author who is a native Indonesian speaker.

We conducted in-depth interviews with the SFC officials, leaders of FFGs, and beach managers to collect data related to determine which party/parties have

the dominant role in controlling an area. The in-depth interviews were conducted to discover how the commercialization process occurred, starting from identifying the actors involved, their social interactions, the potential for conflicts and cooperation in the last decades, and the government's tourism development programs. We used semi-structured interviews to collect quantitative data, such as the number of workers involved in the commercialization process and their income, and data related to climbing accidents. The participant observation focused on exploring themes of changing governance resources, and their environmental and social impacts in various tourist attractions. Details of respondents including visitors to climbing trails and beaches, and the methods used to obtain responses are presented in Table 1.

Thematic analysis was employed to analyze the legitimization of access to PAs and control restructuring, actors' strategies, competition and conflicts, management changes, and ecological impact of commercialization of PAs. To unearth the detailed themes emerging in the community related to the commercialization process (Renkema and Schubert 2018; Riley and Wiggins 2019), we employed thematic categorization to map societal issues, particularly those related to the social process (Cope 2010). Themes such as government policies, legitimacy, actors' strategies, and social conflicts were categor-

Table 1. Categories of field research and number of respondents.

Respondents	Number	Methods	Notes	Role of actors	Collected data
SFC officials	10	In-depth interview	3 national and 7 local officers	Responsible for making an agreement	National policy on the commercialization of PAs and strategies at local and national level
Heads of FFGs	15	In-depth interview	2 groups in every tourism location	In charge of cooperation and mobilizing group members as well as negotiators with outside parties	History of the commercialization of PAs before and after the government introduced tourism programs; opinions on new actors, particularly investors and village governments
The village government officials	6	In-depth interview	1 head of the village government in every tourism location	Managing tourist areas utilizing natural resources around the village	Their opinion toward existing management of PAs, the management concept they offer to existing management, the national and regional support to tourism
Visitors	30	Semi-structured interview	10 visitors in every tourism location	A consumer (stating their opinion on the management of tourist destinations)	Their opinion toward new management and their opinion toward social and environmental impact
Porters and local guides History of the	6	Participant observation	commercialization of PAs before and after the government introduced tourism programs; opinions on new actors, particularly investors and village governments	2 senior porters and mountain guides per area	As members of the local community, their involvement can be a source of group legitimacy in managing tourism areas

ized. Subsequently, all the collected data were analyzed to form a conceptual explanation of the study problem. To support the qualitative analysis, we added data from official sources and surveys to construct the thematic analysis to explain the social processes in more detail.

Results

Formation of deadlocks and division of space in coastal areas

Since the 2000s, after the government encouraged villages to develop economic resources other than farming, the SFC and FFGs have opened more than 54 new beach destinations. These areas are mostly PAs that ideally must not be commercialized. Simultaneously, the southern road, connecting the four East and Central Java districts, has been built for easier access to beaches. Good roads are expected to attract more visitors to the sites. The high number of domestic tourists from Malang, a city with a population of 3 million people, and Surabaya, a city with a population of 10 million, have demanded alternative tourist attractions, such as extensive beaches. These infrastructure improvements began to attract foreign tourists since 2010, although the numbers were limited, primarily including backpackers and independent tourists.

Beach management started to be more open in 2005, when the central government encouraged villages with a scenic environment to develop new tourism destinations. In 2014, the central government designed a special program to develop tourism in villages by providing incentives to the villagers. Social conflicts usually occur after village governments request to take over existing tourist destinations managed by FFGs. The village governments often negate the existence of FFGs because they are neither considered as village representatives nor as representing the interests of the village community. FFGs are seen as a small group (we have previously published research on this topic). Tension often arises when each actor has political influence and persists in defending its position. While the district or regency heads, assisted by the police and army, have tried to solve such problems, they were unsuccessful. One of the village heads stated the following:

We have been trying, so many times, to negotiate with the SFC to change their partners from FFGs to groups formed by the village. However, the SFC disagreed. As long as the existing groups (FFGs) follow the contract, the SFC has no right to end the contract. Therefore, if things go wrong, we will do nothing—let FFGs and the SFC be responsible if threats or problems arise, such as fire or illegal activities.

In the past, the SFC did not involve village governments in opening beaches for tourist destinations because these PAs are entirely under the control and supervision of the SFC. However, due to the government's populist policy, village heads currently think that the SFC must allow the local community to manage PAs. Under a special agreement, villages can send a proposal to the SFC to utilize the surrounding PAs as tourist sites. However, the demand of village governments to make FFGs redundant and make them the sole collaborator with the SFC for tourism management has created conflicts. Although FFGs are legally acknowledged, the members are worried that they will no longer be involved in managing PAs. This situation is further complicated when investors also try to obtain concessions to manage the same areas.

As the SFC is a profit-oriented company, its selection of FFGs as its business partner is logical because unlike village governments, FFGs are not involved in political activities. The relationship between the SFC and FFGs is not limited to the management of PAs. FFGs have other responsibilities, such as conducting forest observations, infrastructure development, and the provision of workers for harvesting logs. This relationship will no longer exist if village governments are involved in managing PAs. Under the formal legal provision, this pattern does not violate the regulation of FFCs possessing the authority to not involve village heads in managing PAs. One district-level SFC manager revealed the following:

We prefer to cooperate with FFGs. We never involve village governments since it will involve too much politics than actual management. New heads, new MoU, new groups that may not be capable of managing tourism activities— will only cause problems.

This social conflict often ends in deadlocks, resulting in beaches having no formal managers because the conflicting parties stop performing their duties wholly. The deadlocks encourage illegal behavior from certain

Table 2. The distribution of each party's power and its respective impact on beach management.

The New Management Pattern	Forest Farmers Groups (FFGs)	State Forest Company (SFC)	Village Government	Investors	Notes
Deadlock	Weak	Strong	Strong	Weak	
Opening new beaches	Strong	Strong	Strong	Weak	When new beaches are available
Splitting up the beach	Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong	If the coastline is long enough
Sharing management	Strong	Strong	Weak	Strong	If the revenue is high
Unilateral takeover	Weak/strong	Weak	Strong	Weak	If FFGs are dominant but support the village government

parties when they fail to find a win-win solution. These groups, sometimes a group of criminals, are usually supported informally by the conflicting parties. These groups may cause more problems in the exploited area, in addition to the loss of visitors due to the legal uncertainty of the management of the area. Meanwhile, legally authorized parties, including the village government, SFC, investors, and FFGs, do not take over the management to avoid the unilateral potential legal consequences. Deadlocks may occur in coastal regions where the village government and SFC are dominant, and investors and FFGs are weak.

Opening a new beach may become a solution if each party insists on managing the coastal area under discussion. This generally occurs when profit-sharing from a tourist spot becomes impossible because of low revenue or because the existing tourist destination management is not amenable to changes. The opening of new tourist attractions occurs if FFGs, the SFC, and village governments are dominant, and unexploited beaches are available to be managed by new parties, usually village governments. Meanwhile, if a new location is unavailable, while joint management and revenue sharing are not approved, beach partition is the last option to avoid deadlocks. Meanwhile, management sharing can only happen if FFGs, the SFC, and investors are dominant, and village governments are weak.

Beach partition may be performed if the coastal area is large enough, especially if the area is naturally divided by corals cliffs or mountains; however, sometimes parties who manage the beach intentionally build borders. Although beaches are shared resources, in cases of conflicts, this is sometimes the best solution. Another consequence of this activity is the unilateral occupation of the beach by the locals, as they argue that generations of occupancy gives them the right to continue the occupancy. Occupancy has occurred in several beaches managed by the village community if the village government is powerful, while the SFC and FFGs are less powerful, or if FFGs are dominant and align with the village government. If FFGs are inclined toward the SFC in this case, a deadlock can occur. Conflicts over resource struggles end at the expense of natural resources, including intensifying exploitation through zoning, commercializing the remaining conservation areas for new destinations, and

Table 3. The number of casualties (including injuries, survivors, and deaths) in mountain climbing in Indonesia.

Accidents	Injured	Survivors	Dead	Missing
12	4	2	6	0
15	3	10	2	0
15	5	3	7	0
26	7	9	6	4
33	6	7	15	2
101	25	31	36	6
51	13	15	18	3

Sources: Ridwan (2020).

ecological damage resulting from management deadlocks. The distribution of each party's power and its respective impact on beach area management are presented in Table 2.

Human tragedy in rush on mountain climbing trails

From 25 October 2019 to 27 October 2019, our climbing group climbed Mt. Sumbing, located in central Java with a height of 3,363 m above sea level, via the steepest path from the east side of the mountain. This mountain has six routes and we took the one recently opened, which had become popular among beginners. I (the first author) was stunned by young climbers who used makeshift climbing equipment, wore only thin layers of clothes, but who managed to reach the top after staying overnight at an altitude of 3,363 m above sea level with average temperatures below 10°C. Two months earlier, we witnessed a similar situation while climbing Semeru, the most famous hiking destination in Java, with a height of 3,645 m above sea level. With simple climbing equipment, a group of young people survived for 3–4 days in the forest in freezing weather. The high public interest in climbing without adequate climbing equipment, knowledge, and skills is one of the causes of various accidents, disappearances, and even death during hiking. The number of casualties, including injuries, survivors, and deaths, during hiking is presented in Table 3.

Climbing and other adventure sports have become increasingly popular since the release of adventure movies such as *Vertical Limit* (2000) and *Into the Wild* (2007). While climbing had been pursued by only a few people in the past, it has become a trend among the millennial generation in line with the evolution of social media and social media promotion of climbing. The increasing demand for climbing tourism among millennials and the government's desire to generate revenue has resulted in accidents and deaths of enthusiastic young people who lack the proper skills and equipment. A management staff member of Raung's climbing trail, the most challenging mountain trail in Java, stated the following:

In 1995, mountaineers were mostly nature lovers and student activists who were concerned about nature conservation. With the boom in mountain hiking, coupled with the publicity of Raung's challenging mountaineering routes, we started to see many commoners who were inexperienced climbers. In 2012, Raung's popularity increased among the youth, and approximately 100 people hiked the route on weekends; this number was even higher during long holidays, and we had to limit the number of mountaineers.

Similar to coastal areas, the increasing popularity of mountain climbing and the subsequent impact on the local economy encourages new actors such as private

Table 4. The distribution of each party's power and its respective impact on the management of climbing routes.

The New Management Pattern	Old Group Management	FFGs	SFC	Village Government	Notes
Deadlock	Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong	When opening new routes is not impossible
Opening new climbing routes	Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong	When opening new routes is possible
Sharing management	Weak	Strong	Weak	Strong	The management of climbing routes is carried out in cooperation

investors and village governments to become involved in managing mountain trails. The entry of new actors who have received legitimacy from the central government to manage natural resources around their villages often triggers conflicts with existing managers. Nearly all mountainous areas are controlled by three groups: the SFC for managing production forests, the regency or provincial government for managing protected forests, and the village governments to facilitate community participation. Each party is vested with particular authority that is often contradictory, since each party promotes its own interests. Before the central governments encouraged villages to develop tourism in 2014, village governments only focused on obtaining income from parking areas, restaurants, other supporting businesses, and employment at tourist sites. FFGs and conservation groups could accept this limited role of villages to earn money since village governments used the public spaces belonging to the villages.

After the rise in the number of climbers and commercialization of climbing trails for tourism, the central government granted authority to the village governments to invest in and exploit the mountain climbing trails. Conflicts arose when the government started to grant large funds to villages to develop rural tourism, including opening up *desa wisata* or tourist villages by taking over the management of the existing tourist areas. Because the existing tourist sites are located around the mountaineering routes, the village governments started to lobby the existing tourist sites' management to join the village's new business. One of the village heads stated the following:

They (the old managers and management team) will get much assistance [by our involvement], such as building roads or other infrastructures, since villages can become investors. They are just afraid that we, village heads, will control them—well, it is impossible for us to do so. Still, we insist that they cooperate because our main goal is to develop tourism and promote local people's welfare.

As a result of the conflicts, three patterns emerged in the management of mountain trails after the central government encouraged villages to develop tourism: deadlocks, opening of new climbing routes, and shared management. First, deadlocks occur when all actors hold the same level of influence, and when

opening up new mountaineering routes is impossible. Deadlocks can result in an uncontrollable number of mountaineers, and with villagers opening up their base camps with minimal management practices. Since no party is in charge of checking the mountaineering routes and ensuring that each mountaineer follows the hiking standards in this scenario, more fatal accidents may occur. An ex-manager of a mountaineering route, who quit his job because of conflicts with the village government, stated the following

'We were blamed for the last two deaths of mountaineers within the last two months, while the village government escaped responsibility'.

Second, in the case of deadlocks, sometimes new mountaineering routes are opened when the old routes' management refuses to cooperate with other parties, especially with increasing number of tourists. If the deadlock is informal, the new route is usually managed better than in the case of a formal deadlock. Opening a new climbing route is an option when each village directly adjacent to a mountainside has mutual rights to utilize these resources. Communities often continue to open new climbing routes despite the high risks for hikers, such as landslides, cliffs, and other possible causes of accidents.

Third, shared management or management sharing takes place when the existing managing body and the SFC are not significant, while FFGs and the village governments are dominant. Shared management of mountain trails is different from that of beaches, where sharing occurs if the village governments are less powerful and FFGs, as the existing managers, are dominant. A management staff member of a mountain trail confirmed the following:

We do not mind cooperating with the village government if they do not have any intentions to take over our position. We can share the profit, and we can make an agreement on that—the most important thing is mutual benefit. We understand that we use many village assets in doing the management, so we understand if the village asks for compensation, as long as the amount is acceptable and they appreciate our position as the pioneer in the business.

Shared management also occurs if the management receives sufficient profit and needs new investors, in addition to the trust they receive from the

Table 5. Strategies of actors to obtain control of and access to natural resources.

Types of PAs	Legitimacy			Strategy			Impact on Resource Governance
	State	Local people	Corporation	State	Local people	Corporation	
Coastal areas	Economic growth, the welfare of the locals, and rural development	Traditional claim and the welfare of the locals	Economic growth and employment	To invite investors and develop infrastructure	To claim access and control legally, illegally, and semi-illegally	To get concessions in certain parts of coastal areas	Deadlock: to open new beaches and to split beaches
Climbing routes	The welfare of the locals and rural development	The welfare of the locals and traditional claim	Less involved/ only porter groups	To promote village governments to management	To create tourism groups of primarily young people	To allow groups of hikers to use routes	In some instances, to open new routes prone to erosion

Source: Purnomo et al. (2019).

Table 6. Resource management patterns after the commercialization process.

Type of Management	Beach (no. of instances)	Climbing Routes (no. of instances)
Deadlock	5	1
Opening new climbing routes	Na	4
Sharing management	6	2
Opening new beaches	32	Na
Splitting beach	8	Na
Unilateral takeover	3	Na
Total	54	7

village governments. They interpret the weak position of the village governments as beneficial to them because it reduces the chance of a takeover. The situation is different from that of the beach areas – if the villages hold less power, then FFGs dominate. The distribution of each party's power and its respective impact on mountain climbing management are presented in Table 4.

Discussion

As a new mode of accumulation, the commercialization of PAs seems to reinforce Indonesian neoliberal policies in managing natural resources to deal with the stagnation or crisis in the industrial sector. This crisis encouraged the government's searching for new accumulation sources, and tourism is the most viable option for generating revenue for Indonesia. The establishment of the 10 new large tourist destinations, primarily located in PAs, increasing government expenditure for rural tourism, and massive campaigns to attract domestic and international tourists, is evidence that the strategy of commercialization of PAs was deliberately chosen.

In practice, the commercialization of PAs has been proven to have various adverse effects in social, economic, and ecological terms, marked by an increase in conflicts and uncertainty in natural resource management. The granting of access to resources to local authorities is not always smooth, because some areas

have been controlled by old actors who retaliate if their position is threatened. There is an exercise of power between actors in which the strong tend to monopolize the management of tourism in Pas. Inevitably, the natural environment faces the most adverse impact of this policy and the consequent conflicts. When conflicts occur, encroachment on PAs for developing new tourist sites occurs. New climbing routes are opened regardless of whether they have a negative ecological impact or are dangerous for climbers. In the absence of new resources, a deadlock or management vacuum occurs, creating even worse impacts for nature. Even in the best sharing management conditions, over-exploitation occurs to increase profits, consequently decreasing the quality of nature. The various types of natural resource management after the commercialization process are presented in Table 5.

Applying neoliberal policies for high-value PAs and populism for poor-value PAs is a possible option to legitimize the process of commercialization of PAs. A populist policy provides an opportunity for all stakeholders, especially residents and local governments, to maximize benefits from the available natural resources; however, this policy tends to be environmentally unsustainable (Cortes-Vazquez 2020). This proves that populist policies, with economic growth as the primary motive, have severely impacted natural resource management and sustainability (Krott et al. 2014). The natural resource management patterns formed after commercialization are listed in Table 6.

Therefore, the commercialization of PAs in Indonesia cannot be understood simply in terms of tourism supply and demand. It must also be understood in a broader context involving political ecology analysis since political power exists and is exercised between the parties involved in gaining formal access to and controlling these resources. The process of AbC in Indonesia does not evict farmers from the lands they have traditionally controlled. However, it provides them access to places of low economic value for tourism, especially in conservation areas. This finding

differs slightly the case of commercialization of PAs in other regions in the world where farmers are entirely restricted from engaging in the means of production.

Conclusions

The aggressiveness of the Indonesian government in encouraging the commercialization of PAs for tourism shows that neo-liberal policies are employed to deal with the crisis in the industrial sector. As a low investment is needed to develop the tourism industry, and as it has a significant positive impact on the economy, this mode of accumulation is adopted by Indonesia. This study also proves that the Indonesian government takes advantage of the tourism sector through the commercialization of PAs because it is an effective strategy to create a new mode of accumulation to deal with the stagnancy of other sectors. In other words, the commercialization of PAs for tourism is the most realistic choice for developing countries such as Indonesia, whose middle class is steadily increasing, providing a domestic market, and as tourists from other countries, such as China and India, keep flocking to the country for leisure activities.

Our two case studies revealed that the environmental and social impacts of this neoliberal policy are detrimental. It has created open and closed social conflicts that result in deadlocks or a monopoly of management, whether related to opening up new beaches, new climbing routes, or other attractions – and the natural environment is affected the most in such circumstances. The two case studies show that inequality of power and differences in interests between actors cause the new management structures to facilitate the actors' interests rather than making efforts to conserve nature. The government's encouraging village governments and other new actors to participate in managing PAs for tourism without considering the existing management structure causes social conflicts and damages natural resources, leading to various adverse effects in social, economic, and ecological terms. This is marked by an increase in conflict and uncertainty in natural resource management. Even empowerment activities at the local level that seem to be pro-conservation are nothing more than an effort to build legitimacy to strengthen the main objective of building new sources of accumulation to avoid financial crisis.

Simultaneously, granting concessions or opportunities for local communities to commercialize PAs on a small scale represents a populist policy to gain hegemony and legitimacy for commercializing PAs on a broader scale with more considerable investment. In Indonesia, the large-scale neoliberal policy at the macro level and populism at the micro-level accelerate the process. This differs slightly from cases in other countries where the appropriation of means of

production is carried out by force, sometimes even employing the military. In Indonesia, the government implements a populist policy by giving local people the right to commercialize PAs of little value to gain legitimacy. Our case study proves that populism is simply an attempt by those in power to increase their hegemony and build legitimacy, thus ensuring that they are free to exploit natural resources; empowerment is just a camouflage to gain community legitimacy to reap large-scale profits.

Additionally, this pattern differs slightly from accumulation by conservation in other regions, such as Africa. In Africa, local people are deprived of their access to production, consequently becoming laborers in the tourism industry. In Indonesia, local people are still given access to resources but these resources are of little value; thus, they end up becoming laborers in the tourism industry. This difference in this pattern is one of the reasons why the structural tension between the state and the community in Indonesia is relatively less as compared to other countries. Further research is needed to test whether different patterns of accumulation by conservation are also applicable in other types of PAs in Indonesia, such as national parks and customary forests, including various coral reef conservation areas used as tourist destinations on remote and small islands.

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