Global Salafism Study of Roel Meijer’s Views

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Abstract
This study aims to understand Roel Meijer’s thoughts regarding Salafism, focusing on terms, doctrines, and their relation to politics and violence. Before 9/11, Salafism had not received significant attention from scholars. However, after this incident, Salafism and Wahhabism became important topics because they were related to political movements and violence in the name of religion. The method used in this study is Library Research with the Factual Historical Model, which examines the substance of the text that contains the thoughts and ideas of the figures as religious works as contained in the thoughts and works of the figures. Based on Roel Meijer’s study, global Salafism originates from the inspiration of Wahhabism, founded by Muhammad bin ‘Abd Wahab. Wahhabism has a doctrine of returning to the Koran and al-Hadith, purging monotheism from various polytheism, accepting jihad, and rejecting taqlid. The term “Salafi” refers to two groups, Salafi da‘wah groups that are oriented towards improving individual, family, and community structures through da‘wah and education, and Salafi groups that have the same goal but are politically inclined and tend to use violence, which is referred to as Salafi jihadis. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of Salafism, its doctrines, and its relation to politics and violence.

Keywords: Politics, Violence, global Salafism, Salafism and Wahhabism

INTRODUCTION
Roel Meijer explained that the term Salafism had not become a serious concern before the heroic bombing of the famous WTC twin buildings on 9/11, except for the classical or early modern periods. While academically, fundamentalism began to be discussed when Anwar Sadat was murdered in Egypt in 1981 (Roel Meijer, 2009). It’s just that very few scholars study Salafism, letting it become a global phenomenon except Gilles Kepel or Reinhard Schulze. Gilles Kepel used the term jihadi Salafism, which he explored in 1998, to describe the Salafi movement, which began to develop violence through the slogan “jihad” during the mid-1990s. According to him, jihadi Salafism is a combination of respect for the holy texts in the most literal form of understanding and a commitment to jihad against America as its main target (Muzammil, 2013).

Another scholar who studies modern Islam globally is Oliver Roy, who analyzes Salafism as part of neo-fundamentalism. Oliver Roy groups the Salafism movement with other movements, such as Hizb al-Tahrir (Huda, 2011). Salafism or Wahhabism is also studied specifically in several countries such as Saudi Arabia (Al-Rasheed, 2008) as part of its history, in Pakistan, when Aḥl al-Hadith and Deoband showed their activity (Meijer, 2009), in Afghanistan (Wagemakers, 2016), in Egypt (Rofhani, 2015), in Palestine (Amer, 2015), in Nigeria (Morier-Genoud, 2022), in Southern Thailand (then the English edition, n.d.), in Malaysia (Malik, 2017), and Indonesia (Krismono, 2017). When the Salafist movement penetrated the West around the 1990s, such as in France (Adraoui, 2020), England (Muthohirin, 2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Pratama, 2023), Sweden (Olsson, 2020), Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia (Kursani, 2018). The Salafism movement is starting to get

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attention in academic circles, but research on Salafism is still very local or extensive in scope, and most are associated with radicalism. Most of the research is done by anthropologists, and its relationship to global movements is unclear. But everything changed after the September 11 tragedy. Since then, many people have written about Salafism and Wahhabism, some of whom have equated Wahhabism with violence. Many more neutral academic studies examine and challenge key assumptions about Salafism.

The study of Salafism is considered important because, as explained by Quintan Wiketowicz, historical reality has changed Islamic ideals as rahmatan lil alamin for the world community to become a threat to world peace (Wictorowicz, 2011). From the explanation of previous research, many questions arise around global Salafism. For example, how are the doctrines instilled and developed by this movement so that it has appeal? How does this relate to politics and violence? What makes the term Salafism so difficult to define its ambiguity and fragmentation? Even though this movement has clear characteristics, it is not a homogeneous movement but, especially in this modern era, has become a movement mixed by tendencies that tend to be contradictory in every different area. To get answers to this anxiety, the author analyses Roel Meijer’s thoughts in the book Global Salafism Islam’s New Religious Movement.

This research is a Library Research study with a Factual Historical Model, which examines the substance of texts that contain the thoughts and ideas of figures as religious works as contained in the thoughts and works of the figures. Based on the scientific field, this type of research is religious research, namely the academic study of religion and diversity (Suprayogo & Tobroni, 2001). This study uses a historical approach to religion, which views religion and religiosity as historical products. Through this approach, the author derives a fact and reconstructs the process of genesis: change and development. Through history, we can trace the origins of situations that gave birth to a character’s thoughts, opinions or attitudes. Through history, one can also identify the religious stereotypes of a person or a group and their attitude towards other parties (Abdullah, 1989). Primary research data comes from Roel Meijer’s thoughts and writings in a book entitled “Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement”, while secondary data comes from other scientific works in the form of books, articles, papers and narratives that discuss religious thoughts, opinions and attitudes. The character who became the object of research.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Roel Meijer

Figure 1. Roel Meijer
Figure 1 shows the figure of Roel Meijer, a thinker on global Salafism who is famous for several of his works. Presentation of Roel Meijer’s life history at the beginning of the discussion in order to identify his figure and thoughts about global Salafism. The author has tried to get as much information as possible about his figure, but there are not many references that the author can access. The author only found a small amount of data, as written at the end of the book GLOBAL SALAFISM Islam’s New Religious Movement as contributors. Some of it was obtained via the Internet. During his studies, Roel Meijer studied history at the University of Amsterdam, 1995 he was awarded a PhD at the same university with the results of research entitled The Quest for Modernity: Secular Liberal and Left Wing Political Thought in Egypt, 1945-1958 (Routledge/Curzon, 2002) (Roel Meijer, 2009).

Meijer is an emeritus (retired) Arabist and professor of Middle Eastern history at Radboud University in Nijmegen, Netherlands, senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute, and head of Middle Eastern Arab studies at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam (IISS) (Roel Meijer, 2009). His main field of study is the Islamic movement. He has studied Islamic movements in Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. He was also a post-doctoral Fellow at the International Institute for Islamic Studies in the Modern World (ISIM) in Leiden from 2004-2008. In 2008-2010, he was entrusted with leading a research project on Salafism funded by the Dutch Organization for scientific research (NWO), Production, Distribution, Consumption, and Transformation of a Transnational Ideology in the Middle East and Europe focused on Saudi Arabia, Arabian.

He is also considered an experienced editor, having edited several books, including; Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Authenticity in the Middle East (Meijer, 2014), Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth; Between Family, State and Street (Meijer, 2000), and (co-edited) Iraq in Chaos; A Clash of Visions on a Humanitarian Disaster (2007, in Dutch), and most recently Global Islam: A New Islamic Movement, published in 2013 (Meijer, 2009).

The Historical Roots of Salafism

The word Salafi, according to Abu al-Fadl Muhammad Ibn Manzur, is a form of attribution to the word al-salaf. The word al-salaf means “a person who preceded or lived before our era” (Anwar, 2018). The terminological meaning of al-salaf referred to here is the generation of the first three centuries after the Prophet’s death, namely the Prophet’s companions, then tabi’i, and tabi’ tabi’i (Nirwana, 2015). In contrast, some scholars add the label al-Salih (becoming salaf as-Salih) to provide a distinguishing character from our other predecessors who lived after tabi’i, tabi’ tabi’i.

So a Salafi is someone who claims to follow the path of the companions of the Prophet. tabi’i, tabi’ tabi’i in all aspects of their teachings and understanding. In other words, a Salafi is a person or group who understands Islam and practices it by following the example of al-Salaf al-Salih (Meijer, 2009).

As explained by Bernard Haykal, this Salafism movement refers to the literalist movement of Ahl al-hadith during the Abbasid dynasty, which concentrated on efforts to study the Sunnah of the Prophet as a means to cleanse Islam from additional teachings originating from outside Islam to return to the basic teachings of Islam originating from Islam. al-Qur’an and as-Sunnah by way of ijtihad (Meijer, 2009). Therefore, they criticized blind obedience to the four schools of Islamic law. Thus, Salafism in understanding Islamic teachings includes scripturalist and textual groups. They claim that literalist patterns of understanding produce understanding that is not contaminated by human subjectivity. In the 4th century, there were similarities between ahl al-hadith and Hanbali
followers, so in the end, the term ahl al-hadith referred to the scholarship of Ibn Hanbal (Muzammil, 2013).

Sometimes the term Salafism or Salafi understanding is often interpreted interchangeably with Wahhabism. This is according to Khaled Abou El-Fadl, as referred to by Sadek Hamid because Wahhabism has hijacked the language and symbols of Salafism so that the two are practically indistinguishable. Against this fusion, Abou el-Fadl calls it “Salafabism”.

Bernard Haykel explained that the salaf claimed themselves to be al-ta’ifah al-mansurah or a group that was always helped and won by Allah SWT. and al-firqa an-najiyah, namely the group that Allah saved from hell. They are also known as ahl al-hadith and atsar because they adhere to the hadith and atsar when many people use reason (Meijer, 2009).

The figures who contributed to the emergence of Salafism as a doctrine include Ahmad bin Hanbal (780-855), and Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyah (1263-1328). In the 18th century, the doctrine of Salafism bestowed the emergence of the Wahhabism movement in Najd, Central Arabia, which was initiated by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd Wahhab (1703-1792). Ibn ‘Abd Wahhab tried to concentrate on reforming society so that it returned to the teachings of Tawhid. ‘Abd Wahhab considered that the community was lost and deviated and was in the mire of ignorance. One of the ways to achieve salvation and regain past glory is by reaffirming the teachings of Tawhid and returning to the Qur’an and Sunnah.

Ibn ‘Abd Wahhab was more inclined to Ibn Taymiyah than Ibn Hanbal. He wanted to name people who did not follow the doctrine of monotheism as infidels/kuffar or apostates who could be fought by way of jihad against them. But the common thread that connects Ibn ‘Abd Wahhab with Ibn Hanbal is evident from the orientation of both literal and textual thoughts. The most recent study explains that preventing superstition and proselytizing is the essence of the Wahhabi mission (Meijer, 2009).

In other areas, such as Yemen, a reformist named Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Shawkani (d.1834) appeared, who re-understood the sources of law by directly using the Qur’an and hadith based on ijtihad. During Ibn ‘Abd Wahhab Shah in India, Wali Allah (1703-1762) launched a reform program that rejected taqlid and customs and only concentrated on studying hadith and the Koran. Deabond School opened in 1867, near New Delhi, taught hadith and rejected the rational studies of law, logic, and philosophy because they thought they were based on imperfect rationality.

Furthermore, at the end of the 19th century, also appeared in the Arab Middle East, the reformist Salafi movement, which was commanded by several thinkers, including; in Egypt Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), in Persia Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) and in Syria Rashid Ridha (1865-1935), in Egypt Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). The basic difference between the two movements is that the second group emerged as a response to the cultural, political and economic threats of the West but still considered the West as a model. In contrast, the Wahhabi movement emerged as a movement aimed at purifying the doctrine of shirk, bid’ah and expressions of other traditional religions. And in the 20th century, when Wahhabism was associated with the West, they rejected everything that smelled of the West and did not even accept Western technology (Meijer, 2009).

On the other hand, even though they were scripturalists, these thinkers were not literalists at the end of the 19th century. They try to find all the answers in this life through the hadith, as was done by Ibn ‘Abd Wahhab. However, except for Rashid Rida, who later became an admirer of
Wahhabism, they believed that returning to the basic sources of Islam was not contrary to acceptance of Western models of competition, Western education, or learning English or French.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) was the founder of Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in Egypt and Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi (1903-1978), founder of the Jama’at al-Islami party in Indo-Pakistan, introduced a movement of thought that seeks to define Islam as a political ideology against other major political ideologies such as socialism. At a time when the West colonized Islamic territories, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun and Jama’at al-Islami emerged with their renewal ideas that wanted the glory of the Islamic Ummah to return as it had experienced during the caliphate. Therefore they emphasize that the current decline of the Muslim Ummah is due to the weakness of solidarity and brotherhood among the Muslims.

The two organizations experienced significant developments from these efforts and had broad influence in the Arab region, although they sometimes experienced ups and downs. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, which started and was strong in Egypt, spread to Syria, Sudan, Jordan, Kuwait and other Gulf countries, forming a movement like Pan-Arab Islam. This is supported by the role of Sayyid Qutb, who has phenomenal and influential works that are references for Islamists worldwide, namely Ma’alim fi al-Tariq.

Next, the Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun organization gave birth to several radical offshoot groups such as Hizbut Tahrir, Islamic Jihadi, Jama’ah Islamiyah, and Jama’at al-Tafkir which were responsible for the murder of Anwar Sadat. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun also inspired the actions of other Islamist groups, such as Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) in Algeria. This combination is then labelled as the current Salafi jihadi, driven by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Yusuf al-Uyairi, Salih al-Fawzan bin Fawzan (b. 1935), and others. They want changes to be carried out immediately in revolutionary ways. This group faced non-jihadi Salafis led by Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914-1999), Muqbil Hadi al-Wad’ii, Ibn Baz, and others who wanted peaceful ways to create Islamic civilization (Muzammil, 2013).

Meanwhile, those usually associated with Salafi groups in Indonesia are called Habib Riziek Shihab with his Islamic Defenders Army, which has now changed to the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Ja’far Umar Thalib with his Jihad Warriors, and Abubakar Baasyir with the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI). His.

Regarding the jihadi Salafi, as explained above, many are influenced by the jihad doctrine coined by Sayyid Qutb, one of the leaders of Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. His views on the legitimacy of fighting an ungodly government regime have influenced many Islamic struggle groups. The existence of jihadi mobilization to Afghanistan during the invasion of the Soviet Union (1979-1989) expanded the spread of Sayyid Qutb’s jihad thoughts. From here, the idea of jihad developed in various Muslim countries through armed struggle groups (Muzammil, 2013).

The Doctrine of Salafism

As explained by Roel Meijer, there are four principal doctrines of Salafism inspired by Wahhabism (Meijer, 2009). First, the doctrine related to the Wahabism program returns to the basic sources of Islam, the Koran and hadith, which factually follow (taqlid) the Hanbali school of fiqh. Although this issue relates to doctrine, it has strong political implications. The reformist Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914-99), one of the most influential figures in modern Salafism, was the first to explain this contradiction in Wahhabism. Stephane Lacroix proves that al-Bani was influenced by late 19th-century liberal Salafism, which rejected sheikh grave worship and taqlid and promoted ijtihad. But
in reality, al-Bani was more radical than the reformers in studying hadith as the main point of his reform movement, which led him to science.

Second, the doctrine related to regulating relations between believers and non-believers (believers and outsiders/non-believers). Wahhabism's contribution to Salafism lies in its harsh treatment of foreigners and non-Wahhabi Muslim sects. The principle of loyalty and denial/rejection (wala' wa al-bara') emerges from this. Non-Wahhabi areas are named as al-bilad al-mushrikin the land of idolaters. In practice, they assumed that territories outside of themselves, such as the Ottoman Empire, could be fought for being considered non-believers. This doctrine resurfaced in the first quarter of the 20th century when Wahhabi fanatics such as the Ikhwan attempted to spread Wahhabism in Iraq. Meanwhile, in the second half of the 20th century, an important figure in the mufti of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Baz, ordered Muslims not to salute/greet non-Muslims and strengthen their hatred towards them.

Third, the third example of the Wahhabi doctrine that has influenced Salafism and has become radical is the labelling of Shi'ah as bid'ah. Wahhabism blames Shi'a for two doctrinal reasons; (1) The Shi'ah venerate the Imam as the most perfect person. (2) Shi'ah rejected the legitimacy of three of the four khulafa'arasyidin (who ruled in 632-661), and similarly, they rejected the companions of the Prophet and the authenticity of the hadith which was the mainstay of Wahhabi/Salafi teachings.

Fourth, the final example of Wahhabi ambiguity passed on to modern Salafism is the practice of hisba (Huda, 2011), ordering the good and forbidding the evil (al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa nahi 'an munkar). Although this practice has been going on for a very long time, having been practised during the Abbasid period (750-1258) and considered by Ibn Taymiyyah to be the culmination of jihad, it was revived by Wahhabism to emphasize its hard moral attitude towards society and correct deviations. Such as smoking tobacco, worshipping sacred places, and other forms of polytheism.

Identity and Empowerment

Commenting on this theme, Roel Meijer explained that the Salafism movement could hook people who are humiliated and oppressed, disappointed people, migrants who are discriminated against, or people who are politically pressured into a new identity as al-firqah al-najiyah who directly get the privilege of special access to the Most Righteous. Thus, the Salafism movement can seize their challengers' hegemonic power, such as parents, elites, the state, or the dominance of cultural and economic values from the global capitalist system (Meijer, 2009). Salafism is more than the Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Hizb al-Tahrir, in that they can empower individuals by providing models of truth and universal alternative social actions, even in a passive form of rejection of the existence of religion, culture, and political systems.

Oliver Roy emphasized that based on the universal qualities possessed by the Salafist movement, it does not have territorial coverage and does not have cultural character. This can be a model of great strength in identifying oneself in a new virtual community. However, the real strength of the mobilization capacity of the Salafism movement, as stated by Haykal, lies in its ability to treat its opponents roughly morally. Likewise, Muhammad Ali Adroui emphasized that the basic strength of the Salafism movement lies in its ability to say, "We are better than you". Statements like this reflect that they have superior feelings over others (Meijer, 2009).

Examining the "sense of superiority," the feeling of superiority shown by Salafism, Roel Meijer suggests six dimensions (Mu'ammar & Hasan, 2017). First, explicitly, Salafism is not a revolutionary
movement that directly opposes the status quo by claiming to bring it down with a foreign ideology such as Marxism. However, Salafism claims to establish superior moral codes by purifying existing structures at the individual, family and societal levels. Like many other reformist movements, they are opponents with a conservative name. Second, his empowerment comes from his claim to the intellectual superiority of religious knowledge that Muslims must possess. Third, Salafism prepares its followers with a strong identity, that is, with a striking appearance to be different from other groups. Fourth, Salafism allows its followers to identify themselves much more easily with the wider community to enhance its universal pretensions. This differs from most countries oriented towards the concept of brotherhood. Fifth, Salafism is active even though it appears to be silent. Salafism strengthens its followers by encouraging them to participate in Salafi missions and preaching actively. Thus, Salafism directly has a social function in terms of showing its superiority and pushing it into private and public areas in the sense of wala wa al-bara‘ and hisb, or even in a tougher term by participating in jihad. Sixth, like other religious movements, Salafism has the extraordinary advantage of ambiguity and flexibility. Even though Salafism claims to be clean and firm in its doctrine and strives for purification, as explained above, Salafism is still flexible in practice. Its ambiguity allows its followers to support the rulers or reject them politically.

The Political Dimension of Salafism

There is no doubt that the relationship of Salafism to politics is one of its enigmatic, subtle, and fascinating aspects. As mentioned earlier, this form is a central dilemma in Salafism. Traditionally, politics within Wahhabism has taken the form of advice the ulema delivers to behind-the-scenes actors. Political arrangements for officials of this kind are commonplace in Saudi Arabia, although slight changes have occurred. The main problem of modern Salafism is how to act non-politically in world politics, where media attention is very crucial. Political Islam has become a mass movement, and the Western public is highly suspicious of it and is often seen as intolerant and terrorist.

What makes this very difficult is the strength of the Salafi group’s faith, the sense of mission it imparts to its followers, and the energy and activity of its generation with a strong identity. With the help of Saudi Arabian educational institutions (charity organizations and universities) supported by the Saudi state, this sense of mission has acquired a transnational dimension.

Related to this political dimension, according to Roel Meijer, there are three forms of salafist political systems that are played: (1) quietist and discrete (declaring calm, but acting politically throwing slander), (3) openly activist by calling for political reform activities openly by calling for political reform (Roel Meijer, 2009).

When salafist groups openly propagate politics, they take shelter under the banner of Islamic politics (Islamism) of Muslim brotherhood, as is the case with the al-Shawwa movement in Saudi Arabia or Jama’ah Islamiyyah in Egypt. Although this is often the case, the appeal of Salafism lies in the purity of their rejection of the world, and one of the weak aspects of Salafism is its weakness in political vocabulary. According to them, the most important political activity is taking the form of violence and jihad. However, Salafism prepares certain concepts and practices that can be transformed into political instruments, such as the principle of loyalty and denial of al-wara‘ wa al-bara‘ and calling for good and preventing the evils of amar bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an munkar.
Global and Local Salafism

Roel Meijer explained that Salafism was not a unified movement. Salafism has a different genealogy of conditions, each having a historical trajectory and a combination of local and transnational networks. The most prominent transnational networks are networks driven by Nasir al-Din al-Albani and Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi’i institutionalized by Madhahilist in Saudi Arabia and networks driven by Muqbil Hadi al-Wad’ii in Yemen. Furthermore, this network branched out in several countries, such as Salafism in Indonesia, led by Ja’far Umar Thalib as the first line, Bale in Ethiopia as the second line, and French Salafists as the third line.

The existence of Salafism can be considered a global affair, as we can see from the following events: First, when the mufti of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Baz, issued a fatwa justifying the Saudi Arabian government’s policy of allowing the deployment of American troops in Saudi Arabia in 1990-1991 (1990-1991) (Roel Meijer, 2009). This fatwa shocked Muslims, especially all the transnational Salafi networks worldwide, from Ahl al-Sunnah in Bale, Ethiopia, Ahl al-Hadith in Pakistan, to organized Salafi groups in JIMES UK and Indonesian Salafi group led by Ja’far Umar Talib. Second, when the war broke out in Bosnia, Salafi groups from all over the world flocked to jihad there, including British Salafi groups like YMO and others. Third, the Saudi government supports various political movements in Afghanistan, separatist movements in Southern Thailand, separatists in the Moro Philippines and other Islamist movements spread across the Islamic world.

Androui points out that French Salafism has adopted a post-modern attitude towards capitalism, individualism, marketing and acceptance of material success. De Koning also explained that Nederland Salafi women are trying to achieve a modern identity that is neither Dutch nor traditional Moroccan style (Pall & de Koning, 2017). Bonnefoy shows the success of Muqbil al-Wadi’i in Yemen, who, with his abilities, managed to get out of the clutches of Saudi Arabia, which became his rival. Likewise, in Egypt, Jama’ah Islamiyah succeeded brilliantly in installing the principles of Salafi hisba as a revolutionary activist program (Bonnefoy, 2011). In Iraq, Zarqawi was able to mobilize the sectarian dimension of Salafism and control the sectarianism that widened the gap between Sunnis and Shi’is in certain situations related to the American invasion and the ongoing civil war (Meijer, 2009).

Locally, it is clear that the development of some movements is severely hampered. For example, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Salafism cannot break through the domination position of Hamas. In Bale, ethnonational or nationalist religious forces prevent youth from moving. In Afghanistan, the rigidity of Salafism severely damaged its prospects in traditional circles. It seems that where local traditions are still quite strong, individualism is not developing, or where the struggle for ethnic nationalism is still quite prominent, then Salafism will not have strong enough roots. Salafism can exist if it can win the hearts of the people, or nationalist movements fail, or national struggles can be linked to wider global struggles, or the struggles are compatible with identity politics in Western Europe (Meijer, 2009).

From this explanation, global Salafism has diverse, contradictory, ambivalent, and fragmented forms. It performs according to local variations. It is clear that no country, not even the Salafi school itself, can control the general trend of people, goods and information and even the most recent differences in Salafism are caused by differences in books, videos, tape recorders, or through news television.
CONCLUSION

As explained by experts, there is indeed a little difficulty in understanding Salafi terminology because it is religious terminology. Still, the fact is that it also intersects with politics and violence. Therefore, there are two categories of Salafi groups. First, Salafi da’wah groups aim to improve individual, family and community structures through da’wah and education. The representation of this first model Salafi group can be seen in the Salafi group led by al-Albani, Muqbil Hadi al-Wadii, Ibn Baz, Muhammad Ibn Surur bin Zayn al-’Abidin, and others. Second, the Salafi group has the same goals as the first group but tends to be political and does not hesitate to commit violence. Usually, this group is called Salafi jihadi. Included in this group is a combination of Ikhwani jihadi and Salafi jihadi. Such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Yusuf al-Uayr, Salih al-Fawzan bin Fawzan, Abdullah Azam, Mullah Umar and Osama bin Laden.

While global Salafism, as explained above, was inspired by Wahhabism, the school founded by Muhammad bin ‘Abd Wahab, who has a doctrine of returning to the Qur’an and al-Hadith, purging monotheism from various shirk, accepting jihadi, and rejecting taqlid. The figures who inspired the birth of Salafism included Ahmad bin Hanbal and Taqiuddin ibn Taymiyah, and were strengthened in Wahhabism by Muhammad bin ’Abd Wahhab. Apart from that, there was also a Salafi reformist movement at the end of the 19th century by thinkers such as Muhammad Abd al-Haram in Egypt, Jamaluddin al-Afghani in Persia, and Rashid Ridha in Syria, Hasan al-Banna, the founder of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, was born to respond to the currents of Western secularism in Egypt, Sayyid Qutb, leader of the Egyptian al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Abu A’la al-Maududi founder of Jama‘ah Islamiyyah, and Taqiuddin al-Nabhan Founder of Hizb al-Tahrir who wants the return of the Islamic Caliphate in the world Islam. Wallahu a’lam.

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