

The Rise of Islamic Movements

by Saparudin Saparudin

Submission date: 16-Jun-2023 08:28AM (UTC+0800)

Submission ID: 2116941889

File name: Contemporary_Islamic_Education_in_Lombok,_East_Indonesia_1.pdf (344.26K)

Word count: 8091

Character count: 48273

The Rise of Islamic Movements and Dilemmas for Contemporary Islamic Education: A Study in Lombok, East Indonesia

Saparudin

Universitas Islam Negeri Mataram, Indonesia
(Corresponding Author)

Arhanuddin Salim

Institut Agama Islam Negeri Manado, Indonesia

The present research aimed to analyze the increasing ideological control of religious groups on Islamic education practices in the presence of control by the Ministries of Religious Affairs and Ministry of National Education in East Lombok, Indonesia. A qualitative approach, as a cognitive framework, was used to examine the contemporary dynamics of Islamic education. Furthermore, data was collected through in-depth interviews, observations, and documentation. The results indicated that the strengthening control of religious groups over Islamic education posed a dilemma, as it must fulfill the ideological, religious, and general science curricula of the religious groups, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the Ministry of National Education. Balancing these competing curricula can be challenging, and the results indicated that the ideological control of religious groups tended to be stronger than that of the two Ministries. This trend is a result of the growth of local, national, and transnational religious groups since the onset of democracy in Indonesia in 1998. It is therefore recommended that proper state policies be developed to enhance the quality and competitiveness of Islamic education in the development of religious science.

Keywords: *Islamic Movements, Islamic Education, Curriculum.*

Introduction

Indonesia is one of the largest Islamic states in the world, where the number of Muslims is estimated to be 229 million people or 87.2% of the total population of 263 million (Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia, 2022). There are thousands of Islamic educational institutions with various types and levels. According to the Ministry of Religious Affairs data in 2022, there are 340,169 Islamic educational institutions in the form of *diniyah*, Islamic boarding schools, madrasas, schools, and universities. The number of students in these institutions is 13,883,555 (Kemendiknas RI, 2022), but Islamic education has not yet obtained a stable position. The strengthening of democratization, with the reform era that has been implemented since 1998, is expected to impact the improvement of the quality of Islamic education, but the problems faced are increasingly diverse and complex.

The democratization process, as analyzed by Ikhwan (2018), Bruinessen (2013), Meuleman (2011), and Hefner (2009), contributed to intensifying the development and competition of religious groups. The ideologies of local Indonesian religious groups are Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Wathan (NW), and transnational, including the Salafi group,

Jama'ah tabligh, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, and the Ikhwan al-Muslim group. They take advantage of Wiktorowicz (2004) as a structural opportunity by making Islamic educational institutions a container for the mobilization of resources to develop their ideologies. Even though Islamic educational institutions have long been integrated into the national education system, they remain a place of ideological contestation (Saparudin, 2017b).

The conditions above imply the occurrence of rivalry among religious groups where Islamic educational institutions are placed as the main arena for ideological competition. Islamic educational institutions are used to inculcate indoctrinated perspectives that not only teach claims of truth and salvation but also blame and insult the beliefs and practices of one group against another. Saparudin (2022), Ebrahimi et al. (2021: 71-76), and PPIM UIN Syarif Hidayatullah & Convey Indonesia (2017) stated that the practice of Islamic education contains an attitude of intolerance towards differences in understanding and nuances of violence in addressing differences. This is reinforced by the exclusive-ideological perspectives of teachers, teaching one opinion without presenting others, criticizing different opinions and practices of worship, and even teaching negative stereotypes towards other groups. This indoctrination brings exclusive, radical, and violent perspectives to the practice of religious education.

The stronger ideological interests above place Islamic education under the control of three institutions, namely the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), the Ministry of National Education (MoNE), and religious groups, which offer expectations, scientific expectations, and ideological expectations. These expectations are manifested in their respective curricula that Islamic educational institutions should carry out. Islamic education should conduct three curricula with three different expectations simultaneously. This condition impacts the heavy burden of Islamic education in realizing good quality compared to non-Islamic education.

The contemporary challenges include increased competition among religious groups, which leads to stronger ideological control over Islamic education. This control is more influential than MoRA and MoNE control. This is different from previous research, which has identified issues such as state cooptation of Islamic education (Bin Jamil, 2022; Siraj, 2019), low quality of Islamic education (Fadillah et al., 2021; Sunhaji, 2017; Ulfat, 2020), debates over the relationship between religious and non-religious knowledge (Akrim, 2022; Elisabeth Jackson & Lyn Parker, 2008) and issues of secularism (Imron Rosidi, 2022; Kotaman, 2022; Qadir, 2013) faced by Muslim community. However, the contemporary issue is the ideological competition among Islamic groups, with educational institutions as their main instrument. This is because 91% of Indonesia's education is private (Kemenag RI, 2022), almost entirely affiliated, and under the control of Islamic groups.

Based on empirical research, strengthening religious group control puts Islamic education in a dilemma. Islamic education should fulfill the ideological, religious, and general science curricula of the religious group, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the Ministry of Education and Culture. Fulfilling one curriculum while neglecting the others can weaken its position, but achieving all

simultaneously is difficult. Since the 1998 reform, there has been a tendency for ideological control by religious groups over Islamic education to strengthen more than MoRA and MoNE control. This is reinforced by the increasing influence of transnational Islamic groups, which leads other religious groups to intensify their ideological content in educational practices.

This research aims to analyze how Islamic education is organized under the control of religious groups, the MoRA, and MoNE simultaneously, as well as its impact on the dilemma of Islamic education practices. The analysis is conducted on three educational institutions as a case, namely Abu Hurairah Mataram Madrasa, Muallimin Madrasa, and Muhammadiyah Senior High School, organized by the transnational Salafi group, local organization Nahdlatul Wathan (NW), and Muhammadiyah group. These three religious groups have different ideologies systematically constructed within each educational institution. The area used as a case is Lombok, where these three religious groups have social tensions and even conflicts at the local level.

The Research Context: Democracy and the Rising of Religious Movements

Democracy implemented since the 1998 reform has affected the dynamics of religious life in Indonesia (Bruinessen, 2013; Hefner, 2013; Robert W. Hefner, 2009). This is marked by the growth and rise of various movements with their respective local, national, and global ideological identities. The presence and development of transnational Islamic movements such as Salafi (Muthohirin et al., 2022), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Jama'ah Islamiyah, and Tarbiyah - Ikhwan al-Muslim in various regions further strengthen this tendency. Moreover, previously unknown religious movements such as the Forum for Communication of Ahlu-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah (FKASWJ), Lasykar Jihad, and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) have gained momentum (Azra, 2013). The collapse of the new order in 1998 contributed to intensifying competition for religious authority among these groups (Saparudin, 2022), where cross-state interests in planting ideological influence also played a role (Suharto, 2018).

The change in the political system marked by the regulations creates a democratic climate in Indonesia. The creation of Law Number 9 of 1998 on Freedom of Expression is an important basis for the development of religious movements. An important aspect of this law is freedom of expression in public, becoming a human right guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The freedom of every citizen to express their opinion publicly manifests democracy in the order of social, national, and state life. This is in line with Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, which states, "Freedom to associate and assemble, express thoughts verbally and in writing, and others shall be determined by law".

The regulation provides openness and equal opportunity for all groups, including religious groups, to associate and express their beliefs in the public sphere. This openness is considered a structural opportunity for religious movements to convey political aspirations and movements widely. The opportunities suppressed and restricted by the government before the 1998 reform mobilized resources to develop and strengthen their existence (Wiktorowicz, 2004). Moreover, access to financial resources from the Middle East is becoming more open and widespread as

carried out by Salafi groups towards several Saudi Arabia Charities (Jahroni, 2020; Liow, 2011; Saparudin, 2017b).

Most Islamic groups consider democracy to be comfortable with Islam. According to Azra (Azra, 2006), Indonesian Islam, dominated by moderate Muslims, has taken root deeply, hence, transnational Islamic-fundamentalist movements may experience developmental difficulty. Religious groups that oppose democracy consider this system, not in line with Islamic teachings (Maksum, 2017). However, they have gained space to move freely since Indonesia adopted democracy.

The strengthening of internal struggles within the Muslim community represented by religious groups impacts the increasingly diverse ideological patterns and orientations of educational institutions. Islamic boarding schools, madrasas, and schools are not only created in response to local Indonesian conditions, as organized by Muhammadiyah, NU, and NW, but also by educational typologies that have affiliations with transnational religious ideologies such as Salafi education, Integrated Islamic Schools of the Tarbiyah Ikhwan al-Muslim group, Shi'ah education, and Jama'ah Tabligh educational institutions. Salafi is one of the religious movements that has grown rapidly since the reform (Muthohirin et al., 2022; Suharto, 2018). The development marks a new trend of Islamic movements in Lombok. Even though a minority compared to NU, NW, and Muhammadiyah in this region, Salafi has shown significant growth. This is indicated by the increased number of educational institutions affiliated with the Salafi group (Saparudin, 2020). The condition reflects that Islamic education in Lombok is not monolithic regarding institutional or ideological aspects.

Method

This field research sought the contemporary dynamics of Islamic education in East Lombok, Indonesia. Therefore, a qualitative approach was considered a relevant cognitive framework for the research process (Spaulding et al., 2013). Data collection was carried out through in-depth interviews, observations, and documentation. Interviews were conducted with leaders of Islamic organizations such as NW, Salafi, and Muhammadiyah, who organize Islamic education institutions, schools/madrasas leaders, Islamic religion teachers, student representatives, the MoRA, and MoNE in Lombok. Informants were selected purposively by ensuring to have relevant knowledge and capacity. Furthermore, documentation was used to collect data on policies, regulations, and curricula in Islamic schools from the MoRA, MoNE, religious groups, religious textbooks, sources, teaching materials, media, methods, magazines, and newspapers. Observations were used to collect data on the implementation of the three curricula, the learning process, extracurricular programs, and various religious-social activities.

The analysis technique used is based on the method formulated by Milles and Huberman, where analysis begins with data collection, reduction, presentation, and conclusion or verification (Miles et al., 2014). In the analysis, a sociological perspective examines the effects of relations, interactions, and contestations (Michael S. Northcott, 2001) between religious groups to

construct ideological identities in the education process. Meanwhile, the social movement theory formulated by Glenn E. Robinson (Glenn E. Robinson, 2004) and Quintan Wiktorowicz (Wiktorowicz, 2004) strengthened the analysis. According to Robinson and Wiktorowicz, the movement theory emphasizes social groups as the unit of analysis in explaining collective action. The analysis focuses on changes in political structure, structural and social resource mobilization by religious groups, and cultural framing formulated and disseminated by religious groups. This theory is also used to analyze the implementation of the three curricula.

Findings

1. Islamic Education Under the Ministry of Religious Affairs

The Ministry of Religious Affairs is the agency that manages Islamic education institutions. There are 83,540 educational institutions from kindergarten to Senior High School level and 688 universities under the control of the MoRA (Kemenag RI, 2022). According to their status, 91% of these Islamic education institutions are private, and only 9% are state-owned (Kemenag RI, 2022). Almost all of these private Islamic education institutions are organized by religious groups. Furthermore, religious groups that organize formal education should obtain permission from the Ministry of Religious Affairs. One of the main requirements for obtaining this permission is the willingness to implement the curriculum set by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the religious groups organizing the education.

Before the creation of the Joint Decree of Three Ministers (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Religious Affairs, and Minister of Home Affairs) in 1975, Islamic education institutions were fully under the control of the MoRA and religious groups. At this stage, the curriculum of Islamic education focused 90% on the mastery of religious knowledge because its orientation was to produce ulemas. However, after the issuance of the Joint Decree, there was a significant change in the Islamic education curriculum, with 30% and 70% religious and general contents (Muhammad Zuhdi, 2005). This composition has been maintained until now. The MoRA, the MoNE, and religious groups control religious, general, and ideological contents, respectively.

Table 1. Ministry of Religious Affairs Curriculum
(Curriculum, 2019)

No.	Subjects	Number of Hours
1	<i>Aqidah Akhlak</i>	2
2	Al-Qur'an Hadith	2
3	Fiqh	2
4	History of Islam	2
5	Arabic	3
6.	Religious Local Content	2-6

 Total

13 - 17

As registered religious education institutions in the MoRA, all madrasas are required to implement the curriculum above. According to the National Education System Law 20 of 2003, these five subjects are equated with those offered by the MoNE. The MoRA Decree Number 183 of 2019 on the Madrasa Curriculum stated that Arabic, which was only 2 hours, is now increased to 3 hours of class per week. Similarly, the local religious content that was only 2 hours is now expanded to 2-6 hours of class per week. This means the total subjects in the Ministry of Religious Affairs curriculum are six, ranging from 13 to 17 hours per week. Therefore, these five subjects become the determining components of students' graduation. The subjects are tested nationally through the National Standard Madrasa Final Exam, which the MoRA directly manages.

Based on the curriculum content above, Islamic education institutions are expected to create a religious community and experts. MoRA curriculum aims to form students who understand and practice Islamic values and become religious experts with a broad, critical, creative, innovative, and dynamic outlook within the framework of enlightening the nation (Government Regulation Number 55 of 2007 about Religious Education). This aim highlights the high social and religious expectations towards Islamic education institutions. However, the community is increasingly pessimistic and no longer hopes that formal Islamic schools such as madrasas can create religious experts or ulemas as expected. It is impossible to create potential religious experts with only 30% mastery of religious knowledge (in the curriculum), including Arabic.

2. Islamic Education Under the Control of the Ministry of National Education

The MoNE is the agency specifically handling non-religious education. Religious and educational institutions demanding recognition from the MoNE should register and agree to implement the curriculum offered. Islamic schools under the control of the MoRA are also registered with the Ministry of Education and Culture (National Education System Law, 2003).

At the beginning of Indonesia's independence in 1945, Islamic education faced political discrimination and was not recognized as part of the national education system. This ended in 1975 with the issuance of a Joint Decree of three Ministers, Number 6 of 1975 (Azyumardi Azra, 2006; Hefner, 2013) and reinforced by the National Education System Law of 1989, which recognizes the existence of Islamic education. However, this recognition is still limited because it is not followed by specific budget policies (Minarti et al., 2022). In 2003, with the creation of Law Number 20 of 2003 on the National Education System, Islamic education was recognized by the state and fully integrated into Indonesian National Education.

Legally, Islamic education receives recognition and is equated with national educational institutions with the issuance of several decrees. Madrasas are further referred to as public schools with religious characteristics. Institutionally, Islamic education is officially under state control through the MoRA and MoNE. Since 1994, madrasas graduates can continue their studies at higher education institutions. However, graduates of non-Islamic educational institutions can

continue their studies in Islamic institutions. This integration also expands job opportunities for alumni of Islamic education in various fields, including the military and police, which were previously unacceptable for madrasas alumni. Therefore, Islamic education should change and adjust its curriculum to fulfill the demands of the National Education System Law. The integration into the national education system has significant implications for changing its curriculum and orientation. To receive recognition, Islamic education institutions are required to implement the Ministry of National Education curriculum by incorporating at least 70% of non-religious subjects. This requirement changes the structure of the madrasas curriculum to 70% and 30% of non-religious and religious subjects. Therefore, like public schools, madrasas are equated and recognized as part of the national education system. Students and alumni can access educational institutions under the Ministry of National Education.

Table 2. Ministry of National Education Curriculum for Senior High School/*Madrasah Aliyah* (Curriculum Revision for High School, 2013)

No.	Subjects	Number of Hours
1	Civic Education	2
2	Indonesian	4
3	English	4
4	Mathematics	4
5	Physics	2
6	Biology	2
7	Chemical	2
8	History	1
9	Geography	1
10	Economy	2
11	Art and Culture	2
12	Sociology	2
13	Physical, Sports, and Health Education	2
14	Information and Communication Technology	2
15	Foreign Language Skills	2
16	Local Content	2
17	Self-Development	2
	Number of Hours	38

As part of the national education system, all madrasas are required to implement the above curriculum. Therefore, in madrasas education, the MoNE curriculum becomes the core because the portion of lesson hours is 70% of the time provided. This is carried out in the hope that madrasas alumni will master scientific and technological knowledge to compete globally (Muhammad Zuhdi, 2005). Based on this goal, the MoNE expects that madrasas alumni will have the mastery of knowledge to compete amid modernization (Fadillah et al., 2021), not religious experts as expected by the MoRA. Furthermore, madrasas, which created religious experts or

ulemas, are now general education institutions with religious characteristics for alumni with general knowledge. This condition leads madrasas students not optimal in achieving religious and general knowledge competency. This is because it is difficult to achieve success in two different curricula at the same time.

3. Islamic Education Under the Control of Religious Groups

Besides the MoRA and the MoNE, most Islamic education is controlled by religious groups. In other areas of Indonesia, since the reform in Lombok, various religious groups have emerged and contributed to the creation of diverse ideologies in Islamic education. Some religious organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Hidayatullah, Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute, Indonesian Mosque Council, Jama'ah Tabligh, and Salafi movement exist in the area (H. Bashori A. Hakim, 2014). Even though the religious practices of NW and NU are dominant, the Lombok community is not stagnant and monolithic by slowly showing an openness to different Islamic practices. Lombok community's acceptance of the Salafi movement indicates this trend. Although not institutionally established, the Salafi group's strong Islamist militancy now shapes the religious dynamics of the community (Muthohirin et al., 2022; Saparudin, 2020). Meanwhile, schools affiliated with Salafi are continuously supported by Saudi Arabia (Jahroni, 2020) to develop and impact religious and social change in Lombok.

The general religious belief pattern of the Muslim community is a traditional Islam affiliated with NU and NW. This is traditional because of its accommodating attitude toward local culture expressing religious beliefs and practices (Jeremy Kingsley, 2010). As the main mainstream Muslim group, NW has a strategic role and contribution in shaping and determining the behavior and religious beliefs of the Sasak, the indigenous people of Lombok. By claiming to be the developer and guardian of the *Ahl-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* ideology, NW has become the dominant group regarding the number of followers and educational institutions. Furthermore, Hamdi (Hamdi, 2011) noted that there are more than two million followers of this organization, with 1088 educational institutions at various levels, with the largest in West Nusa Tenggara (NW Regional Manager, 2021).

Supporting ideological needs, religious groups use structural opportunities (Robinson, 2004) by organizing formal schools. Muhammadiyah, as the initial driver of integration into the national education system, has inspired other groups to have and organize formal schools. The Salafi movement kept its distance (Quintan Wiktorowicz, 2000) and offered a new strategy by integrating its educational institutions into the national education system. Meanwhile, three educational institutions, namely Muhammadiyah, NW, and Salafi, are formal schools. They run curricula from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Culture, and the religious group.

The dominant position of NW is facing a serious challenge from the Salafi group, a puritan movement that claims to be a supporter of the salaf manhaj (pure Islam free from shirk and

bid'ah practices) ('Abd al-Salām al-Suhaimy, 1423). Growing and developing amidst resistance from the mainstream NW group, Salafi schools are a new trend in Islamic education in Lombok (Saparudin, 2017b). Abu Hurairah Madrasa is a Salafi educational institution that has contributed to the development of the Salafi movement in the area and also to a change in the perception of the Lombok community about the conservative stereotype. The growth in the number of students, reaching 2,309 (Ponpes Abu Hurairah, 2019), is a significant achievement and indicates an increase in community sympathy.

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah, which promotes the *tajdid* ideology, faces unease and dilemma in maintaining and preserving its identity despite the earlier development in Lombok compared to the Salafi movement. Due to the theological encounter between Muhammadiyah and Salafi and the ineffectiveness of ideology on formal school programs, many Muhammadiyah members tend to select Salafi schools for their children. Ultimately, while Salafi schools experience an increase, Muhammadiyah decreases in popularity. The Muhammadiyah Mataram school only has 390 students spread across four schools, far less than before 2005, when it had more than 1000, and over 97% were from non-Muhammadiyah families (Saparudin, 2017a).

The development of Salafi educational institutions with a puritan Salafi ideology has pushed NW and Muhammadiyah to disseminate and penetrate their respective ideologies more intensively. The ideology-based curriculum that has long been implemented is reinforced by creating several Islamic teaching books aligned with each religious understanding. The Al-Islam and Muhammadiyahness subjects in Muhammadiyah School, NW-ness in NW Madrasa, and Manhaj Salaf in the Salafi Abu Hurairah School are protections of the ideological curriculum translated into various religious extracurricular activities.

Table 3. Religious Ideology-Based Subjects

No	Subjects and Programs	Educational Institutions	Hours/Week
1	NWness Hiziban Book Studies WAPA	NW Madrasa	6
2	Al-Islam Muhammadiyahness Darul Arqom	Muhammadiyah Senior High School	5
3	Manhaj Salaf Aqidah Book Studies	Salafi Madrasa	8

Supporting the formation of ideological identities, each school has a student organization. The NW, Muhammadiyah, and Salafi school have the NW Student Association (IPNW), Muhammadiyah Student Association (IPM), and Intra Pondok Student Organization (OSIP). These student organizations play a role in shaping identity according to the religious ideology of the school. The school mobilizes them to strengthen the student leadership training process through various leadership training and religious study programs. These organizations contribute to instilling the religious ideology of each religious group in educational institutions.

Table 4. Student Organizations

No	Islamic School	Organization	Main Program
1	NW Madrasa	IPNW	Cadre Training, Religious Studies, and NW Organizational Development
2	Muhammadiyah Senior High School	IPM	Cadre Training, Religious Studies, and Muhammadiyah Organizational Development
3	Salafi Abu Hurairah Madrasa	OSIP	Control of <i>Manhaj</i> Implementation and religious studies

Some education experts have criticized the strong ideological control of religious groups in Islamic institutions in Indonesia. Syamsudin Anwar, head of the West Nusa Tenggara Education Council, argued that the diverse ideological identities are the antithesis of Islamic Education offered by the government through the MoRA. The Islamic Education content shows a tendency to prioritize certain beliefs. However, according to Syamsudin Anwar, the number of lesson hours with religious content should be reviewed by considering students' capacities and psychology. Students study the MoRA and the MoNE curricula to improve their mastery of science and technology (Syamsudin Anwar, Head of Education Council, January 2, 2021). But, in fact, economic, employment and skills issues are not adequately included in the curriculum. This is in contrast to western countries which are more economy and employment oriented (Toghyani Khorasgani et al., 2023).

Besides ideological issues, schools and madrasas organized by religious groups, according to Syamsudin Anwar, have not received the same attention as those organized by the government. The inequality in facilities and the quality and welfare of educators and education staff affect the community's evaluations and choices. Therefore, private Islamic schools and madrasas are still the second choices for those who fail to enter state schools (Syamsudin Anwar, Head of Education Council, December 12, 2020). Based on the National Exam results, not a single Islamic school has

made it into the top ten in the science field in West Nusa Tenggara. Only a few madrasas and Islamic schools students excel in the social field (National Exam Results in 2015-2019)

Reflecting on the reality above, ¹ **to improve the quality of Islamic education**, according to Imam Suprayogo, it is time for Islamic education to free itself from ideological biases and position as a more objective, rational, empirical academic institution. This is important because there has been a shift in the community's orientation, specifically in urban areas. Ideology is not a basis for determining educational institutions but rather a more pragmatic need that can answer their life demands (Suprayogo, 2007). This is reinforced by Minako Sakai (2012) on the contemporary Islamic community's religious orientation trend. According to Sakai, the emergence of new media for seeking religious knowledge, such as the internet, film, video, online media, and other print media, tends to be more functional for the new generation of Indonesian Muslims. Furthermore, 50% of Muslims seek religious knowledge through print and online media. As the authority of religion, formerly held by elites or figures, declines, emotional attachment to religious groups is no longer required.

A strong ideological content of the curriculum has an impact on learning patterns in Islamic schools. This condition leads religious teachers to be trapped in indoctrinating religious teachings without developing students' critical attitudes. There is a contrast between teachers' expectations to instill religious values and students' expectations to gain open-mindedness in learning (Kimanen, 2019). The ideological control can hinder the development of students' critical thinking skills and creativities. Saada, N. & Magadlah, H. (2021) pointed out that Islamic education practices in both Western and non-Western societies still use a conservative paradigm, where teaching materials are taught with an indoctrinative approach. In this context, policies in curriculum development should emphasize religious teachers to apply the Higher Order Thinking Skill (HOTS) approach in classroom teaching, so that the religious education in Islamic schools contribute to building a society that is able to adapt to global challenges (Kosasih et al., 2022). A significant curriculum reform is needed so that Islamic education is more contextualized with the problems faced by society.

Discussion: The Dilemma of Islamic Education

Based on the three controls from different institutions, Islamic schools face a dilemma. To gain state recognition, Islamic schools have to implement the MoNE's curriculum, and to maintain their religious identity they have to implement the MoRA's curriculum. On the other hand, because they are organized by religious groups, these Islamic schools have to implement the ideological curriculum of the religious groups. Being integrated in national education system, they should improve and achieve the quality of science knowlwgde (non-religious subjects) according to the MoNE standards. As Islamic educational institutions, Islamic schools should improve the quality of religious education according to the MoRA standards. As an educational institution organized and controlled by religious groups, Islamic schools should also succeed in ideological subjects according to the religious groups standards. Balancing these competing curricula can be challenging, and the results indicated that the the Islamic education in which the

threefold expectations should be met at the same time, namely ideologies of the Islamic groups, the religiosity of the MoRA, and non-religious sciences of the MoNE.

Table 5. Curriculum distribution, main purpose, and number of study hours

No	Curriculum	Purpose	Number of Hours/Week
1	Ministry of Religious Affairs curriculum	Preparing Human Resources who are experts in Islam (Ulema)	13 - 17
2	Ministry of National Education curriculum	Preparing Human Resources who master Science and Technology	38
3	Religious Group Curriculum	Prepare ideological cadres of religious groups	6,5

Table 5 shows that Islamic schools have to implement 57 to 63 lessons per week, which come from the MoRA curriculum of 13 to 17 lessons; the MoNE curriculum of 38 lessons; and the ideological curriculum of religious groups of an average of 6.5 lessons. The MoRA and religious group curricula are only required for Islamic schools, while the MoNE curriculum is required for non-religious schools as well as Islamic schools. This means that Islamic schools have the heavy burden of implementing three curricula in the same time, while non-religious schools only run the national curriculum from MoNE. The table illustrates the distribution of learning hours in the Senior High School curriculum as a case in point. At this level, the number of subjects and learning hours is greater, and the control of religious groups is stronger compared to primary and junior secondary schools.

Based on the curriculum distribution and number of study hours, Islamic education has a heavy burden compared to general education, which only implements one the MoNE curriculum. The first burden is that Islamic schools are required to successfully fulfill the government's curriculum due to their integration into the national education system. The second burden is, Islamic Schools are required to contain the Islamic religious curriculum (*Al-Qur'an Hadith, Fiqh, Aqidah Akhlaq*, Islamic History, and Arabic for madrasas) as a consequence of Islamic educational institutions. The third burden, Islamic Schools, should carry out the ideological curriculum offered by religious groups. Students are prepared to become Islamic religious experts, scientists, and ideological cadres of religious groups. In other words, Islamic education does not only struggle between academic and religious expectations, as shown by Azra (2006) but also ideological expectations. Imam Suprayogo claimed that the extent of this burden makes it difficult for Islamic educational institutions to attain a high level of quality (Suprayogo, 2007). Comparing Islamic Education with General Education (non-Islamic schools) which is fully under the control of the MoNE, the quality of madrasas and Islamic schools is still very low. This can be seen from the ranking of the 2016-2020 National Examination in the field of science at the Senior High School level, not a single Madrasa and Islamic School is included in the top 10.

Even though Islamic schools have experienced modernization for a long time, it still insists on their position as a forum for ideological contestation of religious groups. Democracy has contributed to the intensification of ideological competition between religious groups within Islam in education. This is possible because the global access provided by the reforms is utilized and influences the spread of educational institutions of transnational Islamic groups that are ideological (Bruinessen, 2013). The development of transnational Salafi ideology supported by Saudi Arabia (Jahroni, 2020; Muthohirin et al., 2022) offers formal educational institutions, influencing the rise of the religious groups' ideological spirit, Muhammadiyah and NW to strengthen their existence (Saparudin, 2020). In this condition, madrasas and Islamic schools are positioned as a stage for religious group contestation.

The conditions above have implications for the occurrence of rivalry between religious groups. Islamic educational institutions such as madrasas and Islamic schools tend to serve as a place for indoctrination, teach claims of truth and safety, and affirm one group to another. Saparudin (2022), Mansoureh Ebrahimi et al. (2021: 71-76), PPIM UIN Syarif Hidayatullah & Convey Indonesia (2017) showed that the practice of Islamic Education contains an attitude of intolerance towards differences in understanding and contains nuances of violence in addressing differences (Maulana, 2017). This indoctrination brings exclusive, radical, and violent narratives into the practice of religious education (Abdallah, 2019). The condition impacts conflicts between religious groups in Lombok (Saparudin, 2022).

The indoctrination tendency has implications for students' thinking patterns. Students are not used to different ways of thinking, easily blame religious beliefs and practices, and are prone to be provoked by exclusive perspectives. They are instilled with views of truth and safety claims for their group and misleading others. This condition strengthens the view that the practice of religious education in schools tends to contain radical views. According to Louis Althusser, students are expected to become ideological apparatuses (Althusser, 2014), militant cadres of each religious organization, and master religious knowledge and general science. Logically, strengthening existing ideology requires an *apparatus* to enable its running, propagation, and maintenance. Ideological cadres produced by Islamic education become troops that move to ensure the sustainability of religious organizations amid the contestation of various movements that are increasingly complex.

Even though there is ideological competition, it does not mean that Islamic education managed by religious groups opposes the state. For example, in Islamic education in Pakistan and Afghanistan, most religious groups reject educational policies issued by the state (Inamullah et al., 2010). In contrast, under state control, Islamic education tends to have a single ideological identity in Brunei Darussalam (Bustamam-Ahmad & Jory, 2011) and Malaysia (Bin Jamil, 2022). Providing space for religious groups to organize education under their respective ideologies reflects democratization and the existence of a mutual relationship between the state and Islam, although it still raises problems (Bryner, 2013). This condition negates the findings of Hüseyin Kotaman (2022), Imron Rosidi (Imron Rosidi, 2022), Tuna Mustafa (2011), Bekim Agai (2007), and

Arif Subhan (2012) where the modernization of Islamic education has an impact on secularization, which makes Islamic educational institutions lose ideological identity.

The analysis above shows that the content of the Islamic education curriculum in Indonesia is no different from some other Muslim countries that emphasize ideological, social and cultural orientation. In Iran for instance, the curriculum is not oriented towards the needs of employment, community development and economic improvement (Toghyani Khorasgani et al., 2023). While education reform in the country has taken a top-down approach, it has been hampered by low education budgets and teacher quality, and limited time for English language development (Gholaminejad & Raeisi-Vanani, 2021). This is one of the factors of the backwardness of Islamic society in responding to global challenges.

Conclusion

Islamic education in Indonesia has been recognized by the state and integrated into the national education system. Both the MoRA and MoNE are responsible for providing curricula for Islamic education. However, as religious groups have developed since democracy began in 1998, the curriculum has become more intensive and widely used. This situation has implications for the changes in the development of Islamic Education in Indonesia, marked by a strengthening of content and ideological orientation. Moreover, the increasing control of religious groups has posed a dilemma for Islamic Education as it must simultaneously fulfill the requirements of three curricula. Completing one curriculum at the expense of the other can weaken the position, but fulfilling all is also difficult. The ideological control of religious groups tends to become stronger compared to the two ministries when compared.

As an Islamic educational institution, the quality of its religious education should be improved and maintained. However, with only 30% mastery of religious knowledge in the MoRA curriculum, it is difficult to achieve the output of religious experts. Therefore, national education madrasas and Islamic schools are also required to be successful in mastering non-religious sciences. As an educational institution organized by religious groups, Islamic education should also be successful in producing ideological cadres to develop and maintain the sustainability of religious groups. Finally, it grapples between scientific, religious, and ideological expectations. Under these conditions, an appropriate state policy is needed, where Islamic education is of high quality with global competitiveness. Further investigation into the state's laws and regulations regarding Islamic education is needed to resolve the dilemma. This research has not specifically covered the aspect of how teachers implement such a heavy curriculum in the learning process in the classroom, and its impact on students' lives in responding to global challenges. This is a pivotal important aspect for further research.

References

- Abdallah, A. (2019). State, Religious Education, and Prevention of Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia. *Studia Islamika*, 26(2). <https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v26i2.12204>
- Akrim, A. (2022). A New Direction of Islamic Education in Indonesia: Opportunities and Challenges in the Industrial Revolution Era 4.0. *Edukasi Islami: Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, 11(01), 35. <https://doi.org/10.30868/ei.v11i01.1799>
- Althusser, L. (2014). *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. Verso.
- Azra, A. (2006). *Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context*. Solstice Pub.
- Azra, A. (2013). Distinguishing Indonesian Islam Some Lessons to Learn. In K. van D. Jajat Burhanuddin (Ed.), *Islam in Indonesia Contrasting Images and Interpretations*. ICAS/Amsterdam University Press.
- Azra, A. (2006). "Pendidikan Islam Indonesia dan Tantangan Globalisasi: Perspektif Sosio-Historis" (Indonesian Islamic Education and the Challenges of Globalization: A Socio-Historical Perspective). In D. A. Jajat Burhanudin (Ed.), *Mecetak Muslim Modern Peta Pendidikan Islam Indonesia* (pp. 3–4). RajaGrafindo Persada.
- Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia (Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics), (2022). *Statistik Indonesia Tahun 2022* (Statistics of Indonesia in 2022). <https://www.bps.go.id/publication/2022/02/25/0a2afea4fab72a5d052cb315/statistik-indonesia-2022.html>
- Bekim Agai. (2007). Islam and Education in Secular Turkey: State Policies and the Emergence of the Fethullah Gülen Group. In M. Q. Z. Robert W. Hefner (Ed.), *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*. Princeton University Press.
- Bin Jamil, A. I. (2022). Country report: Religious education in Malaysia. *British Journal of Religious Education*, 44(2), 200–208. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2022.2029170>
- Bruinessen, M. van (Ed.). (2013). *Contemporary developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn."* Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Bryner, K. (2013). *Piety Projects: Islamic Schools for Indonesia's Urban Middle Class* (Dissertation). Columbia University.

- Bustamam-Ahmad, K., & Jory, P. (Eds.). (2011). *Islamic studies and Islamic education in contemporary Southeast Asia*. Yayasan Ilmuwan.
- Ebrahimi, M., Yusoff, K., & Ismail, R. (2021). Middle East and African Student (MEAS) perceptions of Islam and Islamic moderation: A case study. *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, 11(1), 55–80. <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v11i1.55-80>
- Elisabeth Jackson, & Lyn Parker. (2008). Enriched with Knowledge”: Modernisation, Islamisation and the Future of Islamic Education in Indonesia. *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, 42(1), 21–53.
- Fadillah, H., Trisnamansyah, S., Insan, H. S., & Sauri, S. (2021). Strategy of Integrated Salaf Curriculum in Madrasah Aliyah to Improve the Graduates’ Quality. *Journal of Education Research and Evaluation*, 5(4), 656. <https://doi.org/10.23887/jere.v5i4.33007>
- Gholaminejad, R., & Raeisi-Vanani, A. (2021). English Language Teaching in Iranian Mainstream Schools: Pedagogical, Societal and Government Policy Environments. *Issues in Educational Research*, 31(1), 111–129. <http://www.iier.org.au/iier31/gholaminejad.pdf>.
- Glenn E. Robinson,. (2004). Hamas as Social Movement. In Quintan Wiktorowicz (Ed.), *Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory A Social Movement Theory Approach*. Indiana University Press.
- Hakim, B. A. (2014). *Wawasan Kebangsaan Kelompok Salafi Di Nusa Tenggara Barat: Studi Kelompok Salafi Di Pondok Pesantren Daarusy-Syifaa’* (The National Insight of Salafi Groups in West Nusa Tenggara: A Study of the Salafi Groups at The Daarusy-Syifaa Islamic Boarding School). *Harmoni*, 13(2), 70–86. <https://jurnalharmoni.kemenag.go.id/index.php/harmoni/article/view/127/110>.
- Hamdi, S. (2011). *Politik Islah: Re-Negosiasi Islah, Konflik, Dan Kekuasaan Dalam Nahdlatul Wathan Di Lombok Timur* (The Politics of Islah: Re-Negotiating Harmony, Conflict, and Power Within Nahdlatul Wathan in East Lombok). *Jurnal Kawistara*, 5(3). <https://doi.org/10.22146/kawistara.3902>
- Hefner, R. W. (2013). The Study Of Religious Freedom In Indonesia. *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, 11(2), 18–27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2013.808038>

- Hefner, R.W. (2009). Making Modern Muslims the Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia. In Robert W. Hefner (Ed.), *Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia* (pp. 55–98). University of Hawai Press.
- Ikhwan, H. (2018). Fitted Sharia in Democratizing Indonesia. *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 12 (1), 17. <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2018.12.1.17-44>
- Inamullah, H. M., Hifazatullah, H., Sarwar, M., Khan, N., & Sultan, K. (2010). Reforming The Madrassah System Of Education In Pakistan. *Contemporary Issues in Education Research (CIER)*, 3(4), 43. <https://doi.org/10.19030/cier.v3i4.196>
- Jahroni, J. (2020). Saudi Arabia Charity and the Institutionalization of Indonesian Salafism. *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, 58(1), 35–62. <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2020.581.35-62>
- Kingsley, J. (2010). *Tuan Guru, Community and Conflik in Lombok Indonesia* (Dissertation). Melbourne Law School The University of Melbourne.
- Kemenag RI (Indonesian MoRA). *Data EMIS (Education Management Information System) 2022*. <https://emispendis.kemenag.go.id/dashboard/?smt=20202>
- Kemenag RI (Indonesian MoNE). *Curriculum Implementation Guidelines for Madrasahs in 2019*. https://sumsel.kemenag.go.id/files/sumsel/file/file/1PENGUMUMAN17/k_KMA_NOMOR_184_TAHUN_2019_TENTANG_PEDOMAN_IMPLEMENTASI_KURIKULUM_PADA_MADRASAH-dikompresi_pdf-20190911134221.pdf
- Kemenag RI (Indonesian MoNE). *Government Regulation Number 55 of 2007 about Religious Education*. https://simpuh.kemenag.go.id/regulasi/pp_55_07.pdf
- Kemendikbud (Indonesian MoNE (2018). *Revisi Kurikulum 2013 Pendidikan Nasional Untuk SMA/MA (National Education Curriculum Revision for High School)*. <https://jdih.kemdikbud.go.id/sjdih/siperpu/dokumen/salinan/Permendikbud%20Nomor%2036%20Tahun%202018.pdf>
- Kemendikbud (Indonesian MoNE). *National Education System Law Year 2003*. <https://luk.staff.ugm.ac.id/atur/UU20-2003Sisdiknas.pdf>

- Kemendikbud (Indonesian MoNE). *National Exam Results in 2015-2019*.
https://hasilun.pusmenjar.kemdikbud.go.id/#2019!smp!capaian_nasional!99&99&999!T&T&T&T&1&!1!&
- Kimmanen, A. (2019). Truth Claims, Commitment and Openness in Finnish Islamic and Lutheran Religious Education Classrooms. *Issues in Educational Research*, 29(1), 141–157.
<http://www.iier.org.au/iier29/kimmanen.pdf>.
- Kosasih, A., Supriyadi, T., Firmansyah, M. I., & Rahminawati, N. (2022). Higher-Order Thinking Skills in Primary School: Teachers' Perceptions of Islamic Education. *Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies*, 9(1), 56–76. <https://doi.org/10.29333/ejecs/994>
- Kotaman, H. (2022). Comparison of Impact of Secular and Religious Education on Children's Factuality Judgements and Problem Solving Strategies. *British Journal of Religious Education*, 44(3), 336–347. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2021.1879015>
- Liow, J. C. (2011). Muslim Identity, Local Networks, and Transnational Islam in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces. *Modern Asian Studies*, 45(6), 1383–1421.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X11000084>
- Maksum, A. (2017). Discourses on Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: A Study on the Intellectual Debate between Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 11(2), 405.
<https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2017.11.2.405-422>
- Maulana, D. (2017). The Exclusivism of Religion Teachers: Intolerance and Radicalism in Indonesian Public Schools. *Studia Islamika*, 24(2), 395–401.
<https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v24i2.5707>
- Meuleman, J. (2011). Dakwah, competition for authority, and development. *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia*, 167(2–3), 236–269. <https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-90003591>
- Michael S. Northcott. (2001). "Sociological Approaches". In Peter Connolly (Ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Religion*. Continuum International Publishing Group.
- Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldaña, J. (2014). *Qualitative data analysis: A Methodological Sourcebook* (Third edition). SAGE Publications, Inc.

- Sakai, M. (2012). Preaching to Muslim youth in Indonesia: The dakwah activities of Habiburrahman El Shirazy. *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, 46(1), 9–31. <https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/ielapa.984276315482506>
- Minarti, S., Rohimiya, F. S., & Wardi, M. (2022). The Distinctive Character In The Modernization Of Islamic Education Through Curriculum And Learning Management. *Pedagogik: Jurnal Pendidikan*, 9(2), Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.33650/pjp.v9i2.4419>
- Muthohirin, N., Kamaludin, M., & Mukhlis, F. (2022). Salafi Madrasas: Ideology, Transformation, and Implication for Multiculturalism in Indonesia. *Fikrah*, 10(1), 81. <https://doi.org/10.21043/fikrah.v10i1.14380>
- Ponpes Abu Hurairah. *Data Siswa Tahun 2019* (Student Data in 2019).
- PPIM UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, & Convey Indonesia. (2017). *“Api dalam Sekam” Keberagamaan Muslim Gen-Z Survei Nasional tentang Keberagamaan di Sekolah dan Universitas di Indonesia* (Religiousness of Gen-Z Muslims National Survey on Religiousness in Schools and Universities in Indonesia), Jakarta.
- Qadir, A. (2013). Between secularism/s: Islam and the Institutionalisation of Modern Higher Education in Mid-Nineteenth Century British India. *British Journal of Religious Education*, 35(2), 125–139. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2012.717065>
- Rosidi, I. (2022). From Political Parties to Cultural Organizations: Indonesian Islamic Movements during the New Order. *Journal of Al-Tamaddun*, 17(1), 43–53. <https://doi.org/10.22452/JAT.vol17no1.4>
- Saada, N., & Magadlah, H. (2021). The Meanings and Possible Implications of Critical Islamic Religious Education. *British Journal of Religious Education*, 43(2), 206–217. DOI: [10.1080/01416200.2020.1785844](https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2020.1785844).
- Saparudin. (2017a). *Ideologi Keagamaan dalam pendidikan diseminasi dan kontestasi pada madrasah dan sekolah islam di Lombok*. Onglam Books.
- Saparudin. (2020). *Berkembang di Tengah Resistensi Reproduksi Apparatus Ideologi dalam Pendidikan Salafi di Lombok* (Thriving Amidst Resistance: Reproduction of Ideological Apparatus in The Salafi Education in Lombok). Mataram: Sanabil.

- Saparudin, S. (2017b). Salafism, State Recognition and Local Tension: New Trends in Islamic Education in Lombok. *Ulumuna Journal of Islamic Studies*, 21(1), 81–107.
<https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v21i1.1188>
- Saparudin, S. (2022). *Desakralisasi Otoritas Keagamaan Tuan Guru Purifikasi Salafi Versus Tradisionalisme Nahdlatul Wathan* (Desacralization of the Religious Authority of the Tuan Guru: Salafi's Purification Versus Nahdlatul Wathan's Traditionalism Doctrine). *Khazanah: Jurnal Studi Islam Dan Humaniora*, 20(1), 25.
<https://doi.org/10.18592/khazanah.v20i1.6384>
- Siraj, F. M. (Corresponding A. (2019). Anti-Democracy Policy of The Indonesian "New Order" Government on Islam in 1966-1987. *Journal of Al-Tamaddun*, 14(2), 75–87.
<https://doi.org/10.22452/JAT.vol14no2.7>
- Suprayogo, I. (2007). *Quo Vadis Madrasah: Gagasan, Aksi & Solusi Pembangunan Madrasah* (Quo Vadis Madrasa: Ideas, Actions & Solutions for Madrasa Development). Yogyakarta.
- Spaulding, D. T., Lodico, M. G., & Voegtle, K. H. (2013). *Methods in Educational Research: From Theory to Practice*. Jossey-Bass.
- Subhan, A. (2012). *Lembaga Pendidikan Islam Indonesia Abad ke-20: Pergumulan antara Modernisasi dan Identitas* (Indonesian Islamic Educational Institutions in the 20th Century: The Struggle between Modernization and Identity). Jakarta: Kencana.
- Suhaimy, 'Abd al-Salām (2002). *Kun Salafiyyan 'alā al-Jaddah* (Be a True Follower of Salafi), Darul Minhaj.
- Suharto, T. (2018). Transnational Islamic Education in Indonesia: An Ideological Perspective. *Contemporary Islam*, 12(2), 101–122. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-017-0409-3>
- Sunhaji, S. (2017). Between Social Humanism And Social Mobilization: The Dual Role of Madrasah in the Landscape of Indonesian Islamic Education. *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 11(1), 125. <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2017.11.1.125-144>
- Syamsudin Anwar. (2020, December 12). *Head of Education Council* [Personal communication].
- Syamsudin Anwar. (2021, January 2). *Head of Education Council* [Personal communication].
- Toghyani Khorasgani, A., Rahmani, J., & Keshtiaray, N. (2023). Curriculum and Economic Development: A Comparative Study of Secondary Education in Iran and G7 Countries.

Issues in Educational Research, 33(1), 390–413. <http://www.iier.org.au/iier33/toghyani-khorasgani.pdf>

- Tuna, M. (2011). Madrasa Reform as a Secularizing Process: A View from the Late Russian Empire. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 53(3), 540–570.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417511000247>
- Ulfat, F. (2020). Empirical research: Challenges and impulses for Islamic religious education. *British Journal of Religious Education*, 42(4), 415–423.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2020.1711513>
- Wiktorowicz, Q. (Ed.). (2004). *Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach*. Indiana University Press.
- Wiktorowicz, Q. (2000). The Salafi Movement in Jordan. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 32(2), 219–240. doi:10.1017/S0020743800021097.
- Zuhdi, M. (2005). The 1975 Three-Minister Decree and the Modernization of Indonesian Islamic Schools. *American Educational History Journal*, 32(1), 36–43.

Saparudin, is currently a lecturer in the Department of Islamic Education, Faculty of Education and Teacher Training, Universitas Islam Negeri Mataram (State Islamic University of Mataram) East Indonesia. He holds a doctorate from the State Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia. He specialises in Islamic education and sociology of religion with a focus on sociological contemporary in education.

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8392>

Email: saparudin@uinmataram.ac.id

Arhanuddin Salim is a lecturer of Religious Education and Interfaith Dialogue in Faculty of Education and Teacher Training State Islamic Institute (IAIN) Manado, Sulawesi, Indonesia. His research interests include interfaith dialogue, multiculturalism, and gender in Islamic education.

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0523-1935>

Email: arhanuddin@iain-manado.ac.id

The Rise of Islamic Movements

ORIGINALITY REPORT

2%

SIMILARITY INDEX

2%

INTERNET SOURCES

2%

PUBLICATIONS

0%

STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

1

repository.uin-malang.ac.id

Internet Source

2%

Exclude quotes On

Exclude matches < 2%

Exclude bibliography On