Comments for the Editor

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Participants [Edit](#)

- Saparudin Saparudin (saparudin)

Messages

Note	From
Dear Editor	saparudin 2022-11-16 12:10 PM

I am writing to submit our manuscript entitled, "Ideological Framing, Mosques, and Conflict: Bargaining Position of Salafi Movement in Lombok, East Indonesia" for consideration for publication in IJournal of Al-Tamaddun.

Because our findings could be explicating the dynamics of local Salafi movement in the discourses of the contemporary global Islamic movement, they are likely to be of great interest to the vision scientists, researchers, and lecturers who read your journal.

This manuscript describes original work and is not under consideration by any other journal.

Thank you for receiving our manuscript and considering it for review.

We appreciate your time and look forward to your response.

Kind Regards,

Saparudin

Notifications

×undefined

[JAT] Editor Decision

2023-01-15 09:36 AM

Saparudin Saparudin (Corresponding Author); Emawati:

We have reached a decision regarding your submission to Journal of Al-Tamaddun, "Ideological Framing, Mosques, and Conflict: Bargaining Position of Salafi Movement in Lombok, East Indonesia".

Our decision is: Revisions Required

1. Please confirm the latest title.
2. Revise the language aspect, take this paper to language editor and send us proof of editing.
3. Follow the format of the journal as mentioned in the submission guidelines.
4. Revise all issues mentioned by the reviewers.
5. Highlight all changes in different colour or use track changes while revising the paper.
6. Cite any relevant articles from this journal and other scopus journals wherever appropriate.
7. Reupload the paper once revision has been completed.

Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor

m_roslan@um.edu.my

Reviewer B:
Recommendation: Revisions Required

Overall evaluation of the article

The issue and reading perspective offered by the author of this article is interesting and novel. The author focuses on the role of local salafi dynamics in the midst of ideological contestation of religious groups. He found that Middle East financial support was not the main reason for the development and existence of Salafi in Lombok, but the ability of the salafi elite to package an ideological framework and disseminate it in mosques made salafi increasingly victorious.

Weaknesses:

the author need to add relevant research results and improve keywords and other elements as in the the original review file

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Reviewer D:
Recommendation: Revisions Required

Overall evaluation of the article

The theme is very interesting and focused on a certain ideology and religious understanding that is in the minority group

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Weaknesses:

has not yet described the religious activities in detail of the people of Lombok, especially those who are Muslims who are considered different from the salafi diology

Revision Notes

×Close Panel

Participants [Edit](#)

- Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor (m_roslan)
- Saparudin Saparudin (saparudin)

Messages

Note	From
The blue texts are the result of revision based on the reviewer's notes	saparudin 2023-03-23 10:34 AM

Add Message

Notifications

×undefined

[JAT] Editor Decision

2023-06-01 12:22 AM

Saparudin Saparudin (Corresponding Author); Emawati:

We have reached a decision regarding your submission to Journal of Al-Tamaddun, "Ideological Framing, Mosques, and Conflict: Bargaining Position of Salafi Movement in Lombok, East Indonesia".

Our decision is to: Accept Submission.

1. Please confirm that this article has not been published elsewhere

2. Please send us proof of language editing for this article

Our team will be in contact with you should there is anything needed in the production process. We anticipate that this paper will be included in our next publication, Vol 18 No 1, 2023 (June issue).

As you may be aware, starting from 2021, the journal has introduced article processing fees (APC) for articles that have gone through reviewing process and are accepted for publication. Therefore, please arrange payment of USD250 within seven days of this decision.

Payment can be made through UM e-pay portal at the following link: https://epay.um.edu.my/epay/home.

Once you open this payment website, you can use a search form. Please search for **Journal of Al-Tamaddun**. Click on the journal and follow the instruction on the website, which you will be asked to log in or register as a new user to be able to complete the payment.

Please send us the proof after the payment has been made. Many thanks for your cooperation.

Looking forward to hearing from you.

Best,

Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor

m_roslan@um.edu.my

_____

Journal of Al-Tamaddun

Manuscript for copyediting

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Participants _Edit_

- Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor (m_roslan)
- Saparudin Saparudin (saparudin)

Messages

Note	From
I am attaching the manuscript for copyediting Saparudin_Copyedting .docx	saparudin 2023-06-06 06:45 AM

Add Message

Ideological Framing, Mosques, and Conflict: Bargaining Position of Salafi Movement in Lombok, East Indonesia

Abstract

Salafi movement is a transnational Islamic group that draws on mosques to mobilize its adherents and promote its ideological framing. The differences in understanding and practicing religious rituals and worships between the Salafi and mainstream Islamic organizations (Nahdlatul Ulama, NU, and Nahdlatul Wathan, NW) have triggered tensions and social conflicts during the construction of new Salafi's mosques. This study aims to analyze how Salafi strengthens its existence amid the conflicts by disseminating its ideological framing through its new mosques on the Island of Lombok, Indonesia. Grounded in the theory of social movement as the cognitive framework, this study argue that although the ideological framing propagated by Salafi through its mosques fueled social conflicts, it became the strategy for bargaining position amid the mainstream Muslims in Lombok. The emergence of the conflicts was used as the reason for the Salafi group to build new mosques or take over the pre-existing mosques. However, this condition does not undermine Salafi as a minority and a new emerging Islamic group; instead, it empowers the bargaining position of the transnational Islamic group in its own right. For Salafi, owning and controlling the holy places is the opportunity to mobilize collective actions and its social proponents to disseminate the *Manhaj Salaf* ideology. This study contributes to explicating the dynamics of local Salafi in the discourses of the contemporary global Islamic movement.

Keywords: *Ideological Framing; Mosques; Manhaj Salaf; Salafi.*

Introduction

Salafi is one of the transnational Islamic movements deemed as a new school of Islamic thought by the local communities in Lombok, Indonesia. Although little is known about its initial penetration into the island, it has burgeoned along with the other transnational Islamic movements since the Indonesian reformation in 1998.[1] It has contributed to the emergence of a new paradigm in the diversity on the island of Lombok. This Islamic movement remains a minority group and gains resistance from the mainstream traditional Islamic groups, such as Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Despite this, it perpetually grows and resonates through the districts on the Island.

Amid the negative stereotyping and resistance to the NU and NW group, the Salafi movement continues to gain public attention, as evidenced by the mushrooming of Salafi

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[1] Robert Hefner, "2. Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia," in *Making Modern Muslims*, ed. Robert W. Hefner (University of Hawaii Press, 2017), p. 55–105, https://doi.org/10.1515/9780824863463-004; Martin van Bruinessen, ed., *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn"* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013); Hakimul Ikhwan, "Fitted Sharia in Democratizing Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Islam,* 12, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): p. 17, https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2018.12.1, p. 17-44; Johan Meuleman, "Dakwah, Competition for Authority, and Development," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia* 167, no. 2–3 (2011): p. 236–69, https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-90003591; Abdul Basit, "The Ideological Fragmentation of Indonesian Muslim Students and Da'wa Movements in the Postreformed Era," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 6, no. 2 (December 1, 2016): 185–208, https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v6i2. p. 185-208.

mosques and schools and its escalating number of adherents every year. The growth of Islamic schools based Salafi, such as Abu Hurairah, Ubay bin Ka'ab and Imam Syafi'i in Mataram; Abu Zar al-Ghifari, and Abu Abdillah in West Lombok; al-Sunnah, al-Manar, al-Shifa', Anas bin Malik and Jamaludin in East Lombok; and Abu Darda in Central Lombok[2] indicates the proliferation of its movement.

Growing in the mid of the mainstream Islamic group, NW and NU, the Salafi movement situates mosques as the primary media and networking. There is a multitude of strategic movements in the mosques used as the basis for preaching its theology: First, regularly carrying out mobile Islamic teachings from one Salafi mosque to the others; secondly, mobilizing its adherents from one congregation to the others; third, *disseminating* 15 to 20 Islamic preachers and teachers into various local congregation, mosques, and local government's offices under the auspices of a particular preaching team.[3] This preaching technique is conducted mainly in the area where the number of adherents remains sparse. Hence, all the Salafi mosques look crowded when conducting congregations, although its adherents remain limited. This way may convince the people that Salafi has an increasing number of followers.

Situating mosques as the basis of movements has theological and sociological implications. Bogdana Todorova,[4] Nubowo,[5] and Chaplin[6] mention that mosques are regarded as sacred places where Islamic rituals are regularly practiced. Abdulllah, the chairman of Ponpes (Islamic boarding school) Assunnah Bagek Nyake East Lombok, claims that there have been about 90 Salafi-based mosques in East Lombok since the last fifteen years. Although the number is not significant compared to the total number of mosques on the island of Lombok,[7] it will continue to escalate following the support of Saudi Arabia and its intense and success of the ideological framing in the region.

Salafi preaches distinctive Islamic teachings from that of the mainstream Islam generally practiced by Muslims on the Island of Lombok. It offers the puritanical mission of Islam and claims that the Islam practiced by the mainstream local Muslims have been distorted by the local culture. With this regard, Salafi propagates the doctrine of *tahzir*, isolating self from the local Muslims who practice any religious actions and worships unjoined by the Qur'an or prophetic teachings (bid'a).[8] Consequently, they cannot control any religious activities in local mosques, forcing them to build their own, although geographically close to the nearby local mosques. Jajang states that this is the way the

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[2] Saparudin, *Berkembang Di Tengah Resistensi Reproduksi Apparatus Ideologi Dalam Pendidikan Salafi Di Lombok* (Mataram: Sanabil, 2020).

[3] Jajang Jahroni, "Saudi Arabia Charity and the Institutionalization of Indonesian Salafism," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 58, no. 1 (July 3, 2020): 35–62, https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2020.581.35-62; Leonard C. Sebastian, Syafiq Hasyim, and Alex Arifianto, eds., *Rising Islamic Conservatism in Indonesia: Islamic Groups and Identity Politics*, Politics in Asia (London ; New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2021).

[4] Institute of Philosophy and Sociology – BAS and Bogdana Todorova, "Monitoring of the New Identities (Salafi and Sunni) in Islam and the Role of Social Conflicts," *Research Result. Sociology and Management* 7, no. 1 (March 30, 2021), https://doi.org/10.18413/2408-9338-2021-7-1-0-1.

[5] Sebastian, Hasyim, and Arifianto, *Rising Islamic Conservatism in Indonesia*.

[6] Chris Chaplin, "Imagining the Land of the Two Holy Mosques: The Social and Doctrinal Importance of Saudi Arabia in Indonesian Salafi Discourse," *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, December 15, 2014, 217-236 Pages, https://doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-2014. p. 2-6.

[7] Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat, Mataram: 2017, p. 223.

[8] 'Abd al-Salām al-Suhaimy, *Kun Salafiyyan 'alā al-Jaddah* (Madinah al-Nabawiyah: tp, 1423), 99-100; Mizan Qudsiyah, *Kaidah-Kaidah Penting Mengamalkan Sunnah* (Jakarta: Pustaka Imam Asy Syafii, 2013), p. 50; Nāshir ibn 'Abd al-Karīm Al-'Aql, *Islāmiyah Lā Wahabiyah* (Saudi: Dār al-Fadlīlah, 2007), p. 35.

Salafi averts conflicts.[9] For that reason, it is not surprising that each sub-village on the Island of Lombok has several mosques with distinctive religious practices and teachings. The label of "Masjid Salafi" (Salafi mosque) or "Masjid Wahabi" (Wahabi mosque) is often confronted against the mainstream local mosques. These holy sites are sacred to express an identity that involves the power and authority of specific religious groups.[10]

The puritanical attitude of Salafi as manifested in the separation of the mosques from the local Muslims has its social resistance. The ideological framing propagated by the Islamic group in the mosques has fueled religious conflicts, mainly burst during the building of their mosques. The findings from previous studies, focus-group discussion, and media indicate that there have been at least twenty-one religious conflicts that primarily involve Salafi mosques in the last fifteen years. The religious violence also brings about the destruction of houses of its adherents and their exclusion from the mosques. The worst consequence is the break off social and familial relationships that often involve the family members between their parents and children, and siblings, and not to mention divorces[11] which recently become a new phenomenon.

Despite fueling the conflicts, the ideological framing upheld by the Salafi through its mosques successfully and effectively attract a large number of new followers. The claims as a puritanical Islamic group, enjoined by the Qur'an and Hadith, the prophetic attitudes and preaching, encapsulate that confronting against them means hating the prophet Muhammad PBUH. These and other ideological framings, including the normative arguments taken from the Qur'an and hadith, tantalize its new followers.

The existing literature provide some explanations for the growth of Salafi Movement. Jahroni,[12] Chaplin,[13] Liow,[14] Noorhaidi,[15] and Wiktorowicz,[16] opined that the financial supports of the Saudi kingdom are the significant driver of Salafi development. They regard that the Saudi Arabia funding as the primary reason for the growth of the Salafi in Indonesia. Fauzan and Fata's finding suggest that by using local figures as the preachers, Salafis are growing steadily.[17] According Indonesian historical

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[9] Jahroni, "Saudi Arabia Charity and the Institutionalization of Indonesian Salafism.", p. 44

[10] Yulia Eka Putrie, Widjaja Martokusumo, and Bambang Setia Budi, "Defending Spaces, Preventing Conflicts: The Politics of Identity Representation in the Nahdliyin Mosques in Malang Raya," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 14, no. 1 (June 1, 2020): 26, https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2020.14.1. p. 26-50.

[11] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, "Report Part Title: The Anti-Salafi Campaign in Aceh" *IPAC Report,*" 32, October 6, 2016; Saparudin Saparudin, "Salafism, State Recognition and Local Tension: New Trends in Islamic Education in Lombok," *Ulumuna* 21, no. 1 (June 30, 2017): p. 81–107, https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v21i1.1188; Faizah Faizah, "Pergulatan Teologi Salafi Dalam Mainstream Keberagaman Masyarakat Sasak," *Ulumuna* 16, no. 2 (November 7, 2017): 375–402, https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v16i2. p. 183.

[12] Jahroni, "Saudi Arabia Charity and the Institutionalization of Indonesian Salafism."

[13] Chaplin, "Imagining the Land of the Two Holy Mosques."

[14] Joseph Chinyong Liow, "Muslim Identity, Local Networks, and Transnational Islam in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces," *Modern Asian Studies* 45, no. 6 (November 2011): p. 1383–1421, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X11000084.

[15] Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Salafi Madrasas of Indonesia,"in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand, and Martin Bruinessen, van, eds., *The Madrasa in Asia : Political Activism and Transnational Linkages* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), https://doi.org/10.5117/9789053567104.

[16] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The Salafi Movement in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, no. 2 (2000): 219–40, http://www.jstor.org/stable/259592.

[17] Pepen Irpan Fauzan and Ahmad Khoirul Fata, "Madjlis Ahli Soennah Garoet: Local Islamic Puritanism Movement and Its Roles in West Java during the Colonialism Era of 1926 – 1942," *Journal of Al-Tamaddun* 17, no. 1 (June 30, 2022): p. 141–55, https://doi.org/10.22452/JAT.vol17no1.11.

context, Imron Rosidi stated that the growth of Islamic movement, including the Salafi, are influenced by the tentions between Muslim intellectuals and secular intellectuals.[18]

The abovementioned studies ignore the role of the local dynamic of the Salafi amid the ideological contestation of more complex religious groups. However, this study does not refute the pivotal role of Saudi Arabia on the thrive of the transnational Islamic group, but it advocates that the Islamic group's financial support from the Middle East is not the primary cause of its development. Grounded in the theory of social movement coined by Glenn E. Robinson[19] and Quintan Wiktorowicz,[20] this study argues that the ability of the Salafi elites to establish the ideological framing propagated through its mosques is the determinant of its thriving. Although Salafi propagated ideological framing through its mosques that stoke up the religious conflicts, it becomes an effective strategy for bargaining position amid the mainstream Muslims in Lombok. The rise of the conflicts allows the Islamic group to build new mosques or use the pre-existing mosques. Possessing and controlling the mosques is the critical strategy for the Salafi to disseminate their ideology of *manhaj salaf* (Salaf doctrin and method) and mobilize their social proponents.

The Dynamic of Salafi in Lombok

The initial start of the Salafi movement on the Island of Lombok remains unknown due to the paucity of the studies or discourses of the Islamic group, and it is also regarded as a relatively new reality compared to the pre-existing Islamic organizations as NW, NU, and Muhammadiyah. The investigation that traces its genesis on the island relates to the late Tuan Guru Husni in Bagek Nyake East Lombok as the prominent figure who initially introduced Salafi in Lombok in 1989.[21] Tuan Guru Husni is an Islamic scholar who was brought up in a family affiliated with NU. His father was a charismatic and respected Islamic preacher. He spent his youth studying and teaching in Mecca. Because of his deviant teaching, his parents strongly condemned him when introducing the Salafi ideology. As a result, he was not allowed to do preaching until his father's death.[22]

The development of the transnational Islamic movement begins in Islamic education. Ponpes Al-Manar, established in 1989 by Tuan Guru Husni, is believed to be the first Islamic school-based Salafi, which becomes the center for producing cadres to date. Situated in Aik Mel East Lombok, Tuan Guru Husni is deemed the founding father who successfully promoted the Salafi foundations and movements in the region and aspired to develop new mosques and schools in various regions on the island.

"Around the 1980s, Tuan Guru Husni returned from Makkah, but he still did not introduced and preach the Salafi ideology. After his second arrival in 1990, he began to preach it to the local people making Aik Mel district the center of Salafi. Nonetheless, the social rejection and clashes thrust him to return to Mecca for the second time. However, a few days before he returned to Makkah, some of his followers from Suralaga begged him to stay and offered land to establish a boarding school and encouraged him

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[18] Imron Rosidi, "From Political Parties to Cultural Organizations : Indonesian Islamic Movements during the New Order," *Journal of Al-Tamaddun* 17, no. 1 (June 30, 2022): p. 43–53, https://doi.org/10.22452/JAT.vol17no1.4.

[19] Glenn E. Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement," in *Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

[20] Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Indiana Series in Middle East Studies (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 2004).

[21] Tuan Guru Manar, Salafi figure, September 7, 2020.

[22] Saparudin, *Ideologi Keagamaan Dalam Pendidikan Diseminasi Dan Kontestasi Pada Madrasah Dan Sekolah Islam Di Lombok* (Jakarta: Onglam Books, 2017).

Commented [Dell4]: The introduction is good, the author has presented overviews of previous research and stated the gap analysis and the new position he will offer

to continue his preaching. Consequently, he decided to stay in Lombok and continue his preaching of As-Sunnah".[23]

Although Salafi was first introduced in East Lombok, it soon gained rapid development in Mataram, West Lombok. The al-Hunafa Lawata Mataram Foundation fuels the growth of the Salafi movement in this area through the Aisyah Mosque. In 2002, the foundation established Abu Hurairah Islamic Boarding School. Between 2002 and 2006, this Islamic boarding school has successfully carried out formal education institutions of various levels and types, from kindergarten to high schools.

The construction of this Islamic Boarding School receives financial support from Middle Eastern donors and Saudi Arabia, particularly the Kuwait-based Ihya Al-Turath institution. Until 2017, at least Ponpes Abu Hurairah received Rp. 7.5 billion from this institution. The financing component is dominantly limited to physical buildings.[24] By the time of undertaking this study, there were 2.309 students enrolled in the Islamic school.[25] As an ideological movement, the development of Salafi in Lombok coincided with the common trend in Indonesia. LIPIA and the Ibn Saud Islamic University facilitated and graduated students who later became the cadres in the 1980s and gained wider opportunities after the fall of Suharto in 1998.[26] The openness of information and transportation promoted this movement onto Lombok island. The majority of the Salafi figures in the island graduated from both of the institutions. Concerning the essence of its teachings, Salafi has historical roots following the entry of Muhammadiyah in Lombok. Ruslan Nedy described that Muhammadiyah first penetrated the island in 1930;[27] since then, the issues regarding shirk, bid'a, and superstition became the objects of debate that framed Muhammadiyah as the Salafi movement at that time. Although the theological issues same as Salafi but Muhammadiyah has long embraced a progressive ideology, rather than a salafi. Muhammadiyah does not reject the modern nation-state, but instead embraces those elements that it perceives conform to Islamic values.[28] It indicates that the essence of Salafi ideology had far existed before its first introduction as an independent religious movement by Tuan Guru Husni. Recently, Salafists continue to develop their preaching strategies by formulating several ideological framings through their mosques.

Manhaj Salaf and Ideological Framing

Salafi movement declares itself as the legal adherents and preachers of the *manhaj salaf*, namely the doctrine that relates to the understanding and practices of Islam during the time of *salafal-saleh* (Prophet Muhammad PBUH, and his companions, *tabi'in*, and *tabi'in al-tabi'in*). This doctrine reflects the teachings of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Ahmad ibn Taimiyah, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, and recently promoted by Muhammad al-Uthaimin,

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[23] Sofyan, Salafi Figure, September 9, 2020.

[24] Fakhruddin, Head of Ponpes Abu Hurairah Mataram, November 9, 2019.

[25] Ponpes Abu Hurairah, Data Siswa Tahun 2019.

[26] Noor, Sikand, and Bruinessen, van, *The Madrasa in Asia,* p. 251; M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah Ke Indonesia* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005), p. 78; Hefner, "2. Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia, p. 56, 91.

[27] Ruslan Nedy, *Merajut Perjalanan Muhammadiyah Di Lombok Barat* (Lombok Barat: PDM Lombok Barat, 2009), p. 3-4.

[28] Zuly Qodir et al., "A Progressive Islamic Movement and Its Response to the Issues of the Ummah," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 10, no. 2 (December 21, 2020): p. 323–52, https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v10i2.323-352.

Abdul Aziz bin Baz, and Muhammad Nathiruddin al-Albani.[29] Manhaj salaf now becomes the legal ideology of Saudi Arabia government known as Wahabism- the school of thought referred to Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab.[30]

The Salafist elites promote the Manhaj Salaf doctrine through several ideological framings. First, Salafi is the only legitimate pure Islamic group that free from shirk (polytheism) and bid'a (heresy). They view that the Islam practiced by the mainstream Islam group in Lombok has been destroyed by the local culture and tradition, so it must be purified. This group established itself as a puritanical movement that aims to purify the Islamic communities. The Salafis movement identifies itself as the pure Islamic group, the correct Islam, and preaching movement enjoined by the prophetic guidance.[31] They even deem themselves as the blessed one protected from any shirk and heresy and subject to follow.[32]

Like other Salafi movements, the issue of bid'a becomes a theological term among the adherents used as a refutation and sociologically becomes a distinctive feature from other Islamic groups. One of the Salafi figures, Mizan Qudsiyah states that the term *bid'ah* as generally conceived by Salafists refers to any new religious innovations that contest the given Islamic principles, intentionally aimed to exaggerate the worships towards god.[33] Furthermore, the issue of bid'a is associated with the claim of righteousness and salvation that often contradict the mainstream understanding of Islam, which is more inclusive to the local culture. By basing themselves with the hadith of the Prophet "*man 'amila 'amalan laisa 'alaihi amruna fahua raddun*", the Salafists firmly believe in themselves as the agent of pure Islam.

Qudsiyah opines that bid'a is a concept or behavior in the principle of *manhaj salaf* refers to hatred, no empathy, exclusiveness, and unwillingness to listen and discuss with anyone of polytheist and heretics. All these are intended to guard themselves against listening to any misguided or false utterances that may uproot the tawhid. Based on this principle, it is forbidden for the followers to learn from other Islamic groups.[34]
"Hence, the primary criterion for the Salafists to disassociate themselves from someone else is heresy in that inside the heretics are the danger of heresy and evil deeds, not to mention being their friends can be poisonous. The heretics circumvent the practices of Sunnah (emulating the life of the prophet PBUH), while making the heresy as the sunnah and vice versa. Associating with them means death or at least sickness".[35]

Nonetheless, the doctrine of *manhaj salaf* does not justify all the heretics to receive equal treatment depending on the level of heresy. There are three levels of heresy in the concept of *manhaj salaf*: first, heresy leading to apostasy; second, the one causing great sins; and third, the one causing little sin. These categories influence the way the

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[29] Noor, Sikand, and Bruinessen, van, *The Madrasa in Asia..., 249-250*; Hefner, "2. Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia," p. 87-88; Media Tarbiyah, *Kompilasi Tiga Ulam Besar*, 10th ed. (Bogor: Media Tarbiyah, 2013).

[30] Mani' bin Hammad al Juhni, *Al Mausu'ah al Muyassaratu Fi al Adyan Wa al Madzahib Wa al Ahzab al Mu'ashirah*, 1 (Riyad: Daru al Nadawah al Alamiyah, 1417).

[31] 'Abd al-Salām al-Suhaimy, *Kun Salafiyyan 'alā al-Jaddah....*, p. 38-39; Wazarah al-Tarbiyah wa al-Ta'lim, *Al-Tauhid* (Riyad: Wizarah al-Ma'arif, 1999); Wazarah al-Tarbiyah wa al-Ta'lim, *Al-Tauhid Lisaf al-Awwal al-Thanawiya* (Riyad: Wizarah al-Ma'arif, 1999).

[32] Nāshir ibn 'Abd al-Karīm Al-'Aql, *Islāmiyah Lā Wahabiyah*, p. 35.

[33] Abd al-Razak Al-Dawish, *Fatāwa Al-Lajnah al-Daimah Lilbuhuthi al-'Ilmiyah Wa al-Ifta*, 2 (riyadh: Dār al-Nasiyah li Nashr wa al-Tauzī', 1317), 461; 'Abd al-Salām al-Suhaimy, *Kun Salafiyyan 'alā al-Jaddah..., 91-92*; Mizan Qudsiyah, *Kaidah-Kaidah Penting Mengamalkan Sunnah..,* p. 37.

[34] Mizan Qudsiyah, *Kaidah-Kaidah Penting Mengamalkan Sunnah,* p. 50.

[35] Jamaluddin, "Begini Seharusnya Memilih Teman," in MA Plus Abu Hurairah, *Media Madrasah*, 3, 2013.

Salafists interact with the presupposed heretics. With this regard, Qudsiyah states that any heretics explicitly preaching their heresy or heresy should be disobeyed, hated, and even excluded from social communication and interaction.[36] Then, Salafis firmly declare that any Muslims who practice heresy are apostates and placed in hell.

Secondly, For Salafists, denouncing their preaching means negating the Messenger of Allah. Because of this, they publicly and massively publish jargon through various social media, saying,"negating the salaf means rejecting Islam; loving them means loving Islam; hating them means hating Islam, even means hating the Prophet Prophet Muhammad".[37] Abdullah, another figure of Salafi, opines that Salafism is not a new Islamic school of thought or understanding, but it is Islam itself, which accords with the Qur'an and Sunnah, and the models exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad PBUH. For this reason, there is no room for Muslims to hate us, and it is a total fallacy for them to deny Salafism.[38]

Third, Salafi is the guardian and agent of the authentic tawhid. Consequently, Salafi claims themselves as the Islamic community that preserves and develops the true tawhid. Is movement is disclosed as the one that derives from the *haramain* (Meca and Medina), namely the holy and merciful cities where the prophet Muhammad originated and introduced Islam Abd al-Salam al-Suhaimy further claims that Saudi Arabia is *daulah salafiyah*, where the Salaf preaching is promoted, and where the leaders pertain to Salafism, and it is compulsory for them to underpin the holly book and Sunnah.[39] Hence, the concept of tawhid that they believe is the one introduced by the Messenger, his companions, and followers in his time.

To maintain the purity of Tawhid and Islam, Salafi formulates the doctrines, such as *tahzir*, *hajr*, and *wala' wa al-bara'*. *Tahzir* refers to the avoidance and self-isolation from those supposed to practice shirk and heresy.[40] In the Salafists' principle of *manhaj salaf*, it is incumbent upon them to hate, disassociate, ignore, and discuss with the heretics. It prevents them from listening to any heresy fatwa that may harm the faith. Based on this principle, learning from them is strictly forbidden. Qudsiyah further explicates that any heretics openly preaching their heresy should be denied, hated, and even isolated from social interaction and communication with them (*hajr)*.[41]

The concept of *hajr* is popular among the Salafists as a strong remark for negating heresy. This attitude is the antithesis of the danger of heresy. Hence, *hajr* for Salafi is not something exaggerating because heretics are deviant from the Islamic path modeled by the prophet Muhammad PBUH, his companions, and even some of those heretics can be categorized as infidels for the Salafists not to associate with them. Mizan firmly states that *hajr* is the primary characteristic of *ahl al-Sunnah* Ulema. This is also a consequence of the meaning of *ittiba'* connoting not only kneeling to the Sunnah of the prophet but also simultaneously abandon the heresy and act against any of its practices (*tahzir*).[42]

In addition to *hajr*, in Salafism is also known the concept of *al-wala' wal bara'*. *Al-wala'* is building the relationship with the religious people by taking care of them, helping them from their enemies, and living with them. Furthermore, *al-bara'* refers to

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[36] Mizan Qudsiyah, *Kaidah-Kaidah Penting Mengamalkan Sunnah,* p. 51.

[37] Abu Muslih, *Lebih Dekat Mengenal Manhaj Salaf* (Yogyakarta: tp, 1427 H).

[38] Abdullah, Salafi Figure, March 2, 2020.

[39] 'Abd al-Salām al-Suhaimy, *Kun Salafiyyan 'alā al-Jaddah,* p. 50-51.

[40] 'Abd al-Salām al-Suhaimy, *Kun Salafiyyan 'ala al-Jaddah,* p. 99-100; Nāshir ibn 'Abd al-Karīm Al-'Aql, *Islāmiyah Lā Wahabiyah,* p. 359; Mizan Qudsiyah, *Kaidah-Kaidah Penting Mengamalkan Sunnah,* p. 50.

[41] Mizan Qudsiyah, *Kaidah-Kaidah Penting Mengamalkan Sunnah,* p. 51.

[42] Tabloid Al-Furqon, "Metode Hajr Terhadap Ahli Bid'ah," V/ 1426, p. 29-34.

disassociating with the non-Muslims or evil-doers by hating, not assisting, isolating from them.[43] Similar to *hajr*, this concept is adopted to circumvent heresy, strengthen the unity among the adherents, including reviving the life following the *salaf al-salih*. A further implication of the *hajr* is disallowing the attendance of Salafists in any congregation of heresy in the case that they are unable to alter their heresy. Qudsiyah even stresses that anyone earnestly believing in this holiest path of Islam will be able to uncover the danger of sitting along with the heretics more than associating with the evil-doers who practice what is strictly forbidden by the god.[44] This doctrine encapsulates that heresy remains the central instrument of refuting and has complicated sociological implications.

The cultural framing propagated by Salafi as above is central in the realm of social movement. It obliges the religious movements, such as Salafi, to outspeak the claims against other Islamic groups' understanding and practices while simultaneously preparing the most suitable and righteous alternative.[45] This transnational ideological processes that are conducted by the Salafi influenced local social fragmentations.[46]

Responses of Mainstream Islam: Conflicts and Social Fragmentation

The propagation of ideological framing by Salafi immediately gains harsh responses from the mainstream Islamic organizations, NU and NW that have practiced the Islamic traditions, which Salafi supposed to be heresy. The spread of the doctrine of *manhaj salaf* is perceived to bring harm on the diversity of the Sasak community, the indigenous of Lombok Island. The claim of truth and salvation and refutation using the jargon "bid'a" and "*dlalalah* (deviant)*"* is seen as brave and provocative acts against the religious rituals and traditions of mainstream Islam. The different ideologies in the religious practices and the provision of ideological graming propagated by Salafi have sparked social conflicts on the Island of Lombok.

NW and NU view that the Islamic understanding brought by Salafi threatens the long-established diversity in the community. Salafi's claim of truth and salvation triggers social tensions and conflicts among the Muslims in Lombok. Since the emergence of Salafi in the 2000s, there have been about 21 conflicts that involve them and mainstream Islamic communities. In 2016, in Suela East Lombok, the Salafi mosque was destroyed by the mainstream Muslim communities. There was a dismissal of seven adherents of Salafi from their village in Batu Keliang Central Lombok in 2005. **S**ome of them were evacuated, and the local people burned down their homes. The destruction of Salafi Schools took place in the city of Mataram in 2006, not to mention the closure of mosques and the Islamic school of Ubay bin Ka'ab in Cakra Negara Mataram in 2015. The abovementioned riots prove that the ideological contestation had reached a high level,[47] where the ideological differences involve physical tensions.

On the other hand, local reactions to Salafi ideologies portrayed by various conflicts can also be understood as the efforts of the dominant groups NW and NU in maintaining their dominance. For example, H. Mahsun and H. Said are two current Salafi figures who graduated from an NW Islamic boarding school. Since the appearance of Salafi in 1990, some followers of the two Islamic groups have joined and even become preachers of the transnational Islamic group. After becoming a Salafi preacher, H. Mahsun was expelled by residents in his village and had not been involved in any

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[43] MA Abu Hurairah, "Al-Wala Wa al-Bara," *Media Madrasah*, June 2014, 4 edition, p. 26-27.
[44] Mizan Qudsiyah, *Kaidah-Kaidah Penting Mengamalkan Sunnah,* p. 54.
[45] Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism.., 16*; Glenn E. Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement."..., p. 116.
[46] Basit, "The Ideological Fragmentation of Indonesian Muslim Students and Da'wa Movements in the Postreformed Era."
[47] Antje Wiener, *A Theory of Contestation* (New York: Springer, 2014).

religious rituals at the local mosque. It also happened to H. Said. In 2006, the Bani Salih School, which he chaired, was destroyed by the local community. The two cases of expulsion and vandalism are examples of similar cases in other places on the Island of Lombok.

The tension between the Salafists and NW and NU also takes place within the family. Some people are not allowed to return home by their parents; years of not saying hello to their siblings; a husband and wife are forced to cut ties with their parents; the seizure of the burial rights of parents by their children; and various other forms.[48] Several cases show that there is a severance of family ties involving theological, ideological sentiments. It portrays that the penetration of religious ideology on the one hand and ideological ties exceeds the ties of family kinship. The patrilineal interaction pattern underlying Lombok kinship system accords with the more substantial penetration and ideological ties.

Responses to the thrive of Salafi can also be found on the textual discourses, such as in the preface section of Nahdlatul Wathan's Shield of Aswaja book by Abdul Aziz Sukarnawadi, Tuan Guru M. Sahrullah Ma'shum, and Tuan Guru Sholah Sukarnawadi. The two NW figures state as the beneath:

"Likewise, the role of Tuan Guru Zainuddin, founding father of NW, in maintaining the integrity of ahl Sunnah wa al-jama'ah is crucial. The Wahhabi sect (Salafi) which became the sworn enemy of *ahl Sunnah wa al-jama'ah* did not manage to escape from his attention. He declared that the *hizib NW*, 17 of the highest ranking anti-Wahhabi book be owned and imbued by all the adherents of NW. I had compiled a pocketbook entitled NW: No Wahabi. This book is nothing but a perfunctory shield to anticipate and prevent Wahhabi viruses from penetrating into NW environment. The antipathy attitude towards Wahhabis was inspired by the founder of this organization who strongly rejected Wahhabism, and based on the consensus of the scholars of ahl Sunnah wa al-jama'ah throughout the world Wahhabi ideology should be watched out for and even shunned from all servants of Allah and followers of the Prophet". [49]

The social tensions involving mosques and Salafi members do not only occur in Lombok but also in other religions for centuries. The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict also reports on the emergence of the anti-Salafi movement in Aceh. Salafism developed since the birth of democracy after the fall of the Suharto regime is considered contradictory to the mainstream understanding of Islam embraced by the majority of Aceh communities. Salafis are trying to gradually take over the role of Imam and various activities in several mosques in the region. To respond and anticipate this movement, the anti-Salafi group, the dominant Islamic group in Aceh, is trying to replace the Imams of the mosque and various religious activities that have recently begun to be controlled by Salafi clerics.[50] It is because Islam in Indonesia is different from the existing Islam in some Middle East countries. Indonesian Islam is engaged with local cultures, diversity of religions, ethnics, tribes, and languages may not be avoided. As its implication, Indonesian people have various mindsets, behaviors and religious expression.[51]

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[48] Saparudin, "Pemutusan Hubungan Keluarga Berdasarkan Afiliasi Lembaga Keagamaan" (Laporan Penelitian Dosen Muda, DP2M Dikti, 2007).

[49] Abdul Aziz Sukarnawadi, *Perisai Ke-Aswaja-an Nahdlatul Wathan Membedah 17 Literatur Anti Wahabi Rekomendasi Pendiri NW* (Yogyakarta: Samudera Biru, 2016), p. xi-xx.

[50] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, "Report Part Title: The Anti-Salafi Campaign in Aceh"IPAC Report.", p. 1.

[51] Basit, "The Ideological Fragmentation of Indonesian Muslim Students and Da'wa Movements in the Postreformed Era.", p. 189.

Identity fragmentation, along with its sociological implications above, is not a unique phenomenon for the people of Lombok. The involvement of the Salafi movement in the formation of transnational identities and efforts to construct religious authority, which led to Salafis vis-a-vis local communities, also occurred in various regions and countries.[52] The ability of Salafists to make use of mosques as a forum for the formation and dissemination of ideological identities results in the establishment of new formations in the religious culture of the Lombok community. Finally, even though it is accompanied by tension and even conflict from mainstream groups, the mosque has effectively become a vehicle for proponent mobility to empower the existence of Salafi groups in Lombok.

The rise of social conflicts above is not solely fueled by theological issues of religious differences, as some scholars advocate in general. It is also more likely to be triggered by a contest to form and confirm a Salafi existence amid mainstream Islamic groups. The theological differences between the groups are now turning into rivalries to control religious authority and society following the growing confidence of the Salafi group, which received ideological and financial support from several Middle Eastern donors in carrying out their preaching.[53] At the same time, NU and NW regard the development of Salafism as an ideological rival and a new threat. As the dominant groups that have long used tradition as an expression of Islam, NU and NW view that the refutation openly propagated by Salafi is a provocative attitude and ignores religious differences. Tensions become even more pronounced when many followers of these two major Islamic groups joined the transnational Islamic group. The exclusion of several mosques previously affiliated with the prominent Islamic groups, now under the control of the Salafi elites, adds more fuel to the contestation.

Controlling Mosques and Bargaining Position of Salafi

The ability of Salafi groups to make and use mosques as – what Robinson calls the basis of social mobility has contributed significantly to the dynamics of the transnational Islamic group movement in Lombok. Jajat Burhanudin states that this Islamic group successfully filled in the vaccum previously under the control of traditional Islamic elites. Religious studies in mosques, which used to be intensively and sincerely carried out by traditional Islamic elites, gradually lose their momentum.[54] This situation affords the Salafists group to fulfill the spiritual needs of the surrounding people. Some mosques previously affiliated with NU and NW have now been controlled under Salafi elites.

The Salafi movement successfully makes use of the mosques as the basis for their preaching and ideological networking. The ability to strategically position the mosques as media of preaching the salaf manhaj enables this movement to gradually and significantly influence the pattern and behavior of religious lives in Lombok which is because mosques are a place of worship and a site to sow certain ideologies to promote the existence of the Islamic group. Placing itself amid communal competition between religious groups-although ideologically and institutionally different from the mainstream religious concepts and movements in Lombok, such as NU and NW-the Salafi movement

> **Commented [Dell5]:** Analysis and synthesis are explained very well and sharply and correlated with the initial theory that was built.

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[52] Hayat Alvi, "The Diffusion of Intra-Islamic Violence and Terrorism: The Impact of the Proliferation of Salafi/Wahabi Ideologies," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 18, no. 2 (2014): p. 38–50; Nuhrison M. Nuh, "Kelompok Salafi Di Kabupaten Lombok Barat," in *Kasus-Kasus Aliran/Paham Keagamaan Aktual Di Indonesia*, ed. Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid (Jakarta: Puslitbang Kehidupan Keagamaan, 2009); Liow, "Muslim Identity, Local Networks, and Transnational Islam in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces"; Chaplin, "Imagining the Land of the Two Holy Mosques"; Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism*.

[53] Jahroni, "Saudi Arabia Charity and the Institutionalization of Indonesian Salafism"; Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*; Saparudin, "Salafism, State Recognition and Local Tension.", p. 95-97.

[54] Jajat Burhanudin, "Redefining The Roles of Islamic Organizations in the Reformasi Era," *Studia Islamika* 17, no. 2 (August 31, 2010), https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v17i2.466.

has also gained appreciation from the middle class of rural communities. These people regard Salafism as an alternative to their religious needs as it offers the concept of "Sunnah" to frame its preaching. Therefore, the growth of Salafi is inseparable from their control and taking over the mosques affiliated to NU or NW are Islamic groups. This phenomenon is explicated in the following section.

a. *Losing to Win: The case of Jamaludin Mosque Construction*

The quote "taking the challenges as the opportunities" can be used to portray the background of building the Mosque Jamaludin, one of the two mosques based Salafi built due to the two ideological contestations between the transnational Islamic group and NU in Bagek Nyaka East Lombok. Tuan Guru Manar, the mosque's founder, explicates that the building of this mosque is a product of the significant challenges of the Sunnah preaching in its initial period in this village. He describes that this happened during the early days of its introduction, especially in our father, Ustaz Husni, who confronted decisive refutation from the community. He was challenged and refuted at the Syamsul Palah Mosque (public mosque), particularly regarding Islamic worships. The Manhaj Salaf, which we believe to be a pure and authentic Islam, is seen as a new school of thought by the people and even deemed false Islamic teachings. The establishment of the Jamaludin Mosque was actually to avoid the conflict".[55]

As in several other places, the establishment of a new Salafi mosque can be seen as a preaching strategy – if not a contestation strategy, amid numerous challenges from mainstream Islam by establishing Jamaludin Bagek Nyake Mosque gaining the appreciation of the local community despite remaining as a minority group in this village. Through this mosque, under the guidance of Tuan Guru Manar's da'wah, the Salafi group freely and independently disseminates and implements the salaf manhaj according to their Islamic understanding. The mosque is the most crucial part of forming the religious-cultural identity of the people in this area. Tuan Guru Manar has a preaching reach in thirty mosques affiliated with Salafi teachings from hundreds of Salafi Mosques in Lombok.

Tuan Guru Manar further explained that Middle Eastern donors fully supported the construction of the Jamaludin Mosque under the auspices of the Ihyat al-Turats Foundation. All mosques affiliated with the Sunnah da'wah have the support of Saudi Arabia. It is not surprising that Sheikhs often visit Salafi Mosques from Saudi Arabia, both to observe the physical condition of the buildings, religious activities, and for the sake of preaching. The Ihya al-Turats foundation as a facilitator only requires a land area as a place of development, and then the construction costs and even the mosque management allowance are the foundation's responsibility. It can be ascertained that all physical buildings, educational institutions, and mosques scattered on the island of Lombok result from this institution's funding. Even more so, some teachers receive salaries and allowances from this institution, along with individual and institutional donors. Those whoeceive this salary are generally those in charge of institutions or mosques.[56]

The above conditions echo the finding that the development of Salafis cannot be separated from the support of Middle Eastern institutions and donors. Some Middle Eastern foundations, such as Rabitah al-Alam Islami.[57] Moreover, the International

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[55] Tuan Guru Manar, Salafi Leader, September 7, 2020.
[56] Abdullah and Syafi', Salafi figures, March 1, 2019.
[57] Noor, Sikand, and Bruinessen, van, *The Madrasa in Asia, 255*; Bruinessen, *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam,* ˆp. 51-52.

Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) has contributed.[58] Recently, several institutions, such as the Islamic Development Bank, the Saudi Ministry of Education, the King of Qatar and Kuwait, and private donors in the United Arab Emirates region, have been involved in this project.[59] The Ihya al-Turats institution, together with the Jami'iyah Darul Birr foundation, also actively provides financial support for educational institutions and mosques in various regions in the country.[60] So from time to time, the development of Salafi preaching shows continuous improvement.

b. Fighting to Win: The Case of Taking Over the Masjid An-Nur Bebidas

Bebidas Village is one of the villages in East Lombok which becomes the basis for the development of the Salafi movement. In this village, almost in all hamlets, a Salafi Mosque is separated from the local mosques in general. One of the prominent mosques that becomes the center of Salafi preaching is the Assunnah An-Nur Mosque in Lampit Hamlet. The Salafi group has taken over the mosque from the NU group.

Before the Salafi adherents took it over, the An-Nur Mosque was one of the public mosques for the Bebidas community, especially for the people of Dusun Lampit. All religious activities reflect traditional Islamic religious teachings as well as society in general. The celebration of various religious rituals and traditions is centered in this mosque. Mawlid traditions (Prophet birthday ceremony), sermons, congregational recitation, and various religious activities contribute to this mosque's religiosity. However, the emergence and development of Salafi groups that carry the issue of shirk and heresy diminish these religious activities, not to mention calling the practicers heretics and shunned.[61]

Following the increasing number of Salafi followers in this village, the Islamic group took over the mosque in 2012, and subsequently turned its name from An-Nur Mosque into the Assunnah An-Nur Mosque[62]. It depicts the importance of ideological identity embedded in places of worship. This mosque later became a center for the study and development of Salafis in the village of Bebidas. As in Bagek Nyake, Tuan Guru Husni has an important role in Bebidas village. Since he introduced Salafi in the 1990s, the Salafi movement has continued to gain appreciation despite several rejections from some people in Bebidas. Tuan Guru Husni slowly managed to recruit new followers by propagating the ideological framing "retuning to the Qur'an and Hadith", supported by normative arguments that everything Allah and His Messenger did not command is heresy, and heresy is misguidance, and misguidance in turn is hell.

The growing number of followers promotes the confidence of the Salafi congregation to preach and use the existing mosque as the basis of preaching. After successfully taking over Masjid An-Nur as described above, the clerics freely and openly conveyed the doctrine according to their understanding. While Bagek Nyake village, the Salafi group relented and built the Jamaludin Mosque, in Bebidas village, it was the opposite. The Salafi group managed to take over the existing mosque, which indicates that it gained more supports in the village.

c. Winning the Conflict: The Establishment of the Ummu Sulaiman Suela Mosque

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[58] Abdurrahman Wahid, ed., *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional Di Indonesia*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2009), p. 75.

[59] Liow, "Muslim Identity, Local Networks, and Transnational Islam in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces.", p. 382-421.

[60] Chaplin, "Imagining the Land of the Two Holy Mosques.", p. 225-226.

[61] Nawawi, Leader of Islamiyah Islamic Boarding School, Oktober 7, 2021.

[62] Amaq Ati, Manager of the Salafi Assunnah An-Nur Mosque, Oktober 21, 2021.

Suela is one of the villages in East Lombok that has Salafi followers. Although the number of Salafi followers remain small, they managed to take over one mosque. The history of the entry of Salafi teachings in Suela Village is not too long. The Salafi teachings were first introduced by the late Amaq Baiah, one of the Qur'anic teachers. He was influenced by Ustaz Syafi, a Salafi figure in Bebidas. Because he was comfortable with what he believed in, he finally decided to choose and be involved in the spread of Salafism.

Like the two villages above (Bagek Nyake and Bebidas), there was controversy in the early days of the Salafi congregation. The local community rejected its presence. Since the development of the Salafi, people have been distinguished based on their respective mosques. It found its culmination when there was a change in the name of the Sulaiman Mosque to the Umm Sulaiman Mosque by the Salafi group. The Umm Sulaiman Mosque was initially a Mushalla (small mosque), a waqf of a congregation founded around the 1987s. In general, the function of the Mushalla was only used for the five daily prayers and reciting Qur'an on a small scale. Several Islamic preachers from other villages led the religious activities in the mosque facilitated by Amaq Baiah and Ustadz Rusli. Ustaz Syafi, one of the Salafi figures, took the initiative to turn the prayer room into a mosque, later named the Umm Sulaiman Mosque.

Following his intention to strengthen his movement, Ustaz Syafi began constructing a mosque in 2014. Ustaz Rusli said there was rejection from the surrounding community because the teachings and religious practices that were carried out were seen as deviating from Islam. This condition led to the destruction of the Ummu Sulaiman Mosque.[63] The existence of the mosque is the only center for Salafi development in Suela although it is still a minority in this village. Rosyidi, Head of Suela Village, said that there is no reason to prohibit the existence of as-sunnah congregations, they are still the same religion, and their teachings do not deviate. Several Islamic organizations such as NW, NU, Muhammadiyah, and Salafis are equally developing. He emphasized that the conflict was more influenced by people's ignorance of Salafi teachings, which were considered new and heretical.

The success of Salafi in controlling several mosques provides rooms for its members to strengthen their existence. Indeed, mosque now turns into a place to express an identity that involves the power and authority of religious groups.[64] In addition to changing or adding names, Salafists also change or modify the mosque's design according to the name and construction of Salafi mosques in general. Through their mosques, the Salafi movement developed significantly and was actively involved in forming the structure and religious culture of the Lombok people.

The social tensions involving theological issues and ideological competition above reflect how mosques become a strategic position to gain the authority of the religious elite. The elites of religious groups seem to be united by the view that controlling or owning a mosque is an indicator of existence. Based on the above phenomenon, the Salafi movement succeeded in creating a new identity for the Muslim generation in Lombok despite the conflict with the NU and NW groups as the two dominant groups. The increasing conflict between followers contributes to finding social change and the religious culture of the community. This condition reinforces Bogdana Todorova's view that the stability of the social system is seen as a temporary balance of power, and conflict has a role as a mechanism to influence the new balance of power in society.[65]

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[63] Rusli, Manager of the Salafi Ummu Salamah Mosque, Oktober 21, 2021.
[64] Putrie, Martokusumo, and Budi, "Defending Spaces...", p. 38.
[65] Institute of Philosophy and Sociology – BAS and Todorova, "Monitoring of the New Identities (Salafi and Sunni) in Islam and the Role of Social Conflicts.", p. 4-9.

The ideological framing promoted by Salafis in various mosques is seen as a success even though it has triggered conflicts. It occurs because the Salafi leaders adjust their preaching strategies by taking into account the structural opportunities[66] namely structural changes in society and local opportunities. According to Nubowo this adjustment was carried out eclectically by combining local and transnational ideologies and preaching methods. Nubowo gave an example of the tendency of Wahdah Islamiyah, one of the Salafi groups in Makassar. Wahdah Islamiyah in its preaching in many ways uses the strategy of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Ikhwan al-Muslim tarbiyah.[67]

Based on the social movement theory formulated by Wiktorowicz, as one of the Islamic Movements, Salafi has succeeded in conceptualizing the collectivity of their followers to attract new followers. The mobilization of the congregation from one mosque to another is the primary indicator. In addition, the spread of cultural framing as practiced by the Salafis is an essential way in a social movement. Cultural framing requires religious movements such as Salafis to blame other groups' religious beliefs and practices, and at the same time, prepare alternative views that are considered the most acceptable or solutive.[68] Salafi claims to be the agent of pure Islam and authentic monotheism, while blaming other Islamic understanding and practices as heresy and *dlolalah* (deviant). Although the ideological framing propagated by Salafi through its mosques fueled social conflicts, it became the strategy for bargaining position amid the mainstream Muslims in Lombok.

Conclusion

> **Commented [Dell6]:** The conclusions are in accordance with the research purpose and reflect new findings

Mosques recently play broader roles, not only as of the worshiping site but also as a place of identity formation, ideological contestation, and the authority of the specific religious group. The growth of Salafi mosques driven by the resistance of the mainstream Islamic organizations, such as NU and NW, generates new phenomena on Lombok Island. Challenges and conflicts always resonate with the building and takeover of the mosques. However, with ideological framing that carries the claim of pure Islam and authentic monotheism campaigned through mosques, the Islamic group has continuously gained an increasing number of followers.

The phenomena show that although the ideological framing has triggered the conflicts, it is seen as a strategy for Salafi to gain the bargaining position amid the mainstream Muslims in Lombok. The rise of these conflicts encourages the transnational Islamic group to build new mosques or take over the pre-existing ones. For Salafists, owning and controlling mosques are an opportunity to establish collective action and social mobilization of proponents in spreading the ideology of the *salaf manhaj*. It indicates that there is a new explanation of the local dynamics of Salafi in the global discourse of contemporary Islamic movements.

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> **Commented [Dell7]:** The ratio of primary reference sources is quite good, up-to-date, you only need to refer to other relevant main research in the context of Indonesian salafi, such as Noorhaidi, "The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 1 (2007): 83–94. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/215898., Din Wahid, Nurturing Sala Manhaj and Abidin, Muhammad Zainal, and Yulia Hafizah. "Conflict and Integration in The Salafi-Wahabi Purification Movement in South Kalimantan." *Wawasan: Jurnal Ilmiah Agama Dan Sosial Budaya* 4, no. 2 (December 31, 2019): 191–201. https://doi.org/10.15575/jw.v4i2.6194.

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[66] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The Salafi Movement in Jordan.", p. 189-190.
[67] Sebastian, Hasyim, and Arifianto, *Rising Islamic Conservatism in Indonesia..,* p. 182-186.
[68] Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism, 15-16*; Glenn E. Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement.", p. 116.

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To: Saparudin Saparudin <saparudin@uinmataram.ac.id>, Emawati Emawati
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Saparudin Saparudin (Corresponding Author); Emawati Emawati:

The editing of your submission, "Ideological Framing, Mosques, and Conflict: Bargaining Position of Salafi Movement in Lombok, East Indonesia," is complete. We are now sending it to production.

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