

## **KHILĀFAH IN THE VIEW OF NAHDHATUL ULAMA (NU), MUHAMMADIYAH, AND NAHDHATUL WATHAN (NW) ULEMA IN LOMBOK**

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### **Abstract**

*Indonesia is a multiethnic and religious state anchored in the five state principles, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. However, its stability has recently been disrupted by the emergence of khilāfah propagated by the banned Islamic organization, the Hizb al-Tabrir Indonesia (HTI). The concept of khilāfah proposed by the organization violates against the state's ideology of Pancasila. Such a phenomenon is of paramount importance to examine. Hence, this qualitative study aimed to explore the concept of khilāfah from the perspectives of Islamic ulema from the three prominent Islamic mass organizations, the biggest mass organization, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and Nahdhatul Wathan (NW) on the island of Lombok. Drawing on the data garnered from the observation, interviews, and documentation that analyzed suitable with its' substantiation of the writing. Finally, the findings of this writing showed that the three Islamic mass organizations generally denied khilāfah as a state system. NU firmly rejected the khilāfah system because it more likely pertained to extremism. For the same token, Muhammadiyah denied the concept, but welcomed it as a culture, while NW opposed it as being contradictory to the republic in that khilāfah belongs to the empire system.*

*[Indonesia merupakan negara multi-etnik dan agama yang dinaungi oleh Pancasila dan UUD 1945. Namun stabilitasnya sempat terganggu dengan*

*kemunculan wacana khilāfah yang dipropagandakan oleh HTI. Konsep khilāfah ini yang kemudian diperhadapkan dengan ideologi Pancasila dan menjadi fenomena yang penting untuk dielaborasi. Dalam artikel ini akan mengeksplorasi konsep khilāfah ulama dari tiga organisasi massa Islam, NU, Muhammadiyah dan NW di Lombok. Berdasarkan data yang dikumpulkan melalui observasi, wawancara dan arsip menunjukkan bahwa tiga ormas Islam tersebut menolak khilāfah sebagai sistem negara. NU menolaknya karena cenderung mirip dengan ekstremisme. Muhammadiyah juga menolaknya sebagai sistem tetapi masih bisa menerima sebagai budaya. Sedangkan NW menolaknya karena kontradiksi dengan sistem republik dan mirip dengan sistem kerajaan.]*

**Keywords:** *Khilāfah, Imāmah, Imārah, Nation, Agreement*

## **A. Introduction**

Indonesia is unique and attractive due to its diversity. As an archipelago, it comprises more than 13,000 islands stretching from the West to the East with a coastline of about 81,000 km long and inhabited by people with various ethnic, cultural, customary, and religious backgrounds (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Catholic).<sup>1</sup> In addition, its natural beauty and moderate, friendly, tolerant, and religious communities attract a large number of foreigners to visit the country comfortably. Indonesia gains a good predicate in terms of security due to the minimum cases of riots involving ethnic and religious groups despite being multi-culturally and religiously diverse. Moreover, the public awareness of the diversity has made Indonesia a unitary state framed under the three-word slogan ‘Bhineka Tunggal Ika’.<sup>2</sup>

However, there is a growing concern over the rise of the hardline group allegedly propagating the concept of the Islamic caliphate, which may threaten the unity of the nation. This is justified by the widespread of cases on social media. For example, many people rejected the preaching of Ustadz Abdussamad, one of the prominent Islamic preachers in an event

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<sup>1</sup> M. Daud Silalahi, *Pengaturan Hukum Lingkungan Laut Indonesia dan Implikasinya Secara Regional* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992), p. 66.

<sup>2</sup> See Parsudi Suparlan, “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika: Keanekaragaman Sukubangsa atau Kebudayaan?”, *Antropologi Indonesia*, vol. XXVII, no. 72 (2003), pp. 24–37.

during which the majority of the participants were supposed to be the supporters of Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a recently banned Islamic organization that fought for *khilāfah* as reported by the Chairman of the Presidential Advisory Council, Wiranto, in a news site. Three reasons for the banning of HTI as a legal mass organization in Indonesia include first, as a legal entity, this organization does not carry out a positive role in promoting the national goals. Second, its agenda strongly indicates that it opposes the objectives, principles, and characteristics of the five Indonesian fundamental state principles, known as Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as in Law Number 17 of 2013 regarding social organization. Third, the movements promoted by this organization often result in communal riots that lead to social disharmony and endanger the unity of the country.

The abolishment of HTI indicates the government's concern over the concept of the Islamic caliphate upheld by the Islamic organization in spite of the fact that the meaning of *al-khilāfah*, according to al-Dahlawi, is *al-Riyāṣah al-‘Āmmah* (general leadership) aimed to implement Islamic values by reviving the religious sciences, upholding the pillars of Islam, and realizing oneself as the representatives of the Prophet.<sup>3</sup> *Khilāfah* linguistically refers to a substitute, sultan or representative, leadership, and government. Meanwhile, terminologically, it is defined as the replacement of leadership for the Prophet Muhammad maintaining religion and regulating world affairs. According to *khilāfah*, it means a government structure whose implementation is regulated based on the Islamic law. It can also be called the Imamate ‘Uzma or the Emirate of Uzma. The holder of the power of the *khilāfah* is called the *khalīfah*, while the holder of the power of the Imamate is called the Imam, and the holder of the power of the Imamate is called the Amir. From these definitions, in essence, it indicates that the concept the *khilāfah* consists of people who manage and control the implementation of the Islamic shari‘a in certain region.

The implementation of shari‘a is supposed to be the essence of the *khilāfah* existence. With this regard, any media can be used as a means of propagating the system regardless of its terms. The Prophets

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<sup>3</sup> Wahbah al-Zuhaili, *al-Fiqh al-Islāmiy Wa Adillatuh*, vol. VIII (Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1992), p. 270.

obligation to carry out the vision and mission of Islam was followed by his successors known as *al-Khulafā' al-Rashidūn*, namely Abū Bakr, Umar, Ustmān, and Ali.<sup>4</sup> The *al-Khulafā' al-Rashidūn* played an important role in ensuring the implementation of policies that benefited the people in certain regions. Thus, if a country already has got someone who carries out this vision as what *al-Khulafā' al-Rashidūn* did for the peoples' benefits, it is supposed to have a caliph (leader). Therefore, the issue of the caliphate is not necessary to emerge.

The concept of *khilāfab* upheld by HTI drew multitude responses from the prominent Islamic mass organization, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and Nahdhatul Wathan. As a representative of NU, Banser publicly declared its disagreement against the concept of caliphate propagated by HTI.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah<sup>6</sup> and Nahdhatul Wathan did not openly address the issue.<sup>7</sup>

These distinctive reactions from the abovementioned Islamic mass organizations depict their different perspectives on the concept of the caliphate voiced by HTI. For that reason, this phenomenon is of paramount importance to investigate. Therefore, this study aims to delineate the views of ulemas from the three prominent Islamic organizations, "Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and Nahdhatul Wathan (NW) pertaining to the concept of *khilāfab* upheld by HTI and how it fits into the Indonesian government system. Thus, the research aimed to explore the thoughts or views of the ulemas of three aforementioned Islamic mass organizations regarding this concept of *khilāfab*, considering that these three organizations have a critical role, especially in Lombok, both in the religious, social and political spheres.

To meet the aforementioned objectives, this study drew on the theoretical concept beneath:

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<sup>4</sup> Nukhbah Min al-Ulamā', *Kitāb Usūl al-Imān Fi Dau' al-Kitāb Wa al-Sunnah* (Riyadh: Wazā'ir al-Shu'ūn al-Islāmiyah wa al-Auqāf Wa Da'wah Wa al-Irshād, 1999), p. 371.

<sup>5</sup> The incident about the Banser protest can be seen on TV One, thus becoming public consumption.

<sup>6</sup> There has been no mass media explaining about Muhammadiyah holding a protest.

<sup>7</sup> TGH Salimun Jihad, interview (11 Sep 2019).

### 1. *The concept of the Khilāfah*

The word “*khilāfah*” is the basic word (*maṣḍar*)<sup>8</sup> in Arabic which derives from the word «*خلف*» meaning to turn back, replace, lead,<sup>9</sup> which is also called *al-Imārah* (government), *al-Imāmah* (leadership).<sup>10</sup> Therefore, *khilāfah* is defined as a leader who is supposed to be the successor the prophet in the context of maintaining religion and politics of mundane affairs, as expressed by Imam al-Mawardi in the following expression:<sup>11</sup> “*Al-Imāmah maudū’ah li Khilāfah al-Nubuwwah fī Ḥarāsah al-Dīn wa Sīyāsah al-Dunyā.*” In line with that of al-Taftazani, Wahbah al-Zuhailiy advocates that the caliphate refers to the leadership in general following the prophet who managed the religious and political matters as cited in the following statement:<sup>12</sup> “*Al-Khilāfah Ri’āsah ‘Āmmah fī ‘Amr al-Dīn wa al-Dunyā khilāfah ‘an al-Nabīy Ṣallallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam.*” Similarly, al-Rāziy, as quoted by Rāshid Riḍā, slightly stresses that there is someone who takes care of religious and global issues as depicted in the following quote:<sup>13</sup> “*Ḥiya ri’āsah ‘āmmah fī al-Dīn wa al-Dunyā li shakhṣin wāhidin min al-‘Ashkhaṣ.*”

Based on these perspectives, the concept of *khilāfah* can be both general and private. The former (*ri’āsah ‘āmmah*) is defined as a government officer held by the public, while the latter refers to government management managed by a person. It requires ten conditions to become a caliph in the second category.<sup>14</sup> With respect to the Islamic

<sup>8</sup> Wazā’ir al-Auqāf wa al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyah, *al-Mausū’ah al-Fiqhiyah al-Kuaitiyah*, vol. VI (Kuwait: Dar al-Salasil, 2005), p. 196.

<sup>9</sup> Abū al-Qāsim Muḥammad bin Umar bin Aḥmad al-Zamahshariy, *Asās al-Balāghah* (Beirut: Darul Fikr, 1989), p. 122.

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/arar/%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9/>, Accessed 18 Sep 2019.

<sup>11</sup> Abul Hasan Al Mawardi, *Al-Aḥkām As-Sultāniyyah*, vol. 2 (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Azharīyah lil-Turāth : al-Jazīrah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzī’, 2016), p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> al-Zuhailiy, *al-Fiqh al-Islāmiy Wa Adillatuh*, VIII: 271.

<sup>13</sup> Muḥammad Rāshid Riḍā, *al-Khilāfah* (Cairo: al-Zahra’ li a’lām al-Arabiyy), p. 199.

<sup>14</sup> Ten requirements for a person to become a caliph, namely: 1. Male, 2. Sensible, 3. *Balīg* (Free), 5. Be fair, 6. Have the ability to see problems, 7. From Quraish, 8. Be brave, 9. Able to do *ijtihād* in the matter of *uṣūl* and *furū’*, and 10. Raising leadership is done by being trained by the expert al-Hil wa al-Aqd or appointed by someone before. Muḥammad bin Umar Bahraq al-Ḥaḍramiy al-Shāfi’iy, *Hadā’iq al-Anwār wa Maṭāli’ al-Asrār fī Sirāh al-Nabīy al-Mukhtār* (Beirut: Dār al-Hawi, 1998), p. 299.

law pertinent to the concept of caliphate, Imām al-Mawardi states that it is obligatory to be based on the *ijma* (consensus) involving people. al-Aṣim further questions such a remark saying whether it is obligatory according to reason or sharia<sup>15</sup> Imām Nawāwi, however, pinpoints that scholars generally agree that Muslims are supposed to have a caliphate as in the following quote:<sup>16</sup> “*Ajma’ū ‘alā annabu yajibū ‘alā al-Muslimīn naṣbu khalīfah.*” Ibn Ḥajar said: “They (the scholars) have practiced (agreed) that it is obligatory to appoint a caliph according to sharia, not reasons.”<sup>17</sup> Al-Asfarainiy also states that appointing a great leader is a collective responsibility or subject to the general consensus as depicted in the following:<sup>18</sup> “*Naṣbu al-Imām al-A’zham Farḍ Kifa’iyah.*”

## 2. Democracy

Democracy comes from Greek; ‘Demos’ which means population, and “cratos which means power.”<sup>19</sup> Based on this literal, the word democracy is defined as the power in the hands of the people. The democratic system shows that people who have power and sovereignty are applied in a form of government based on the values of freedom, equality (egalitarianism), brotherhood and justice, respect for human rights, protection, pluralism, tolerance, humanities.<sup>20</sup> Thus, the essence of democracy is the achievement of the interests of the people in various aspects of life in the form of sociality which is reflected in the basic rights of the United Nations (UN) and even in UN Human Rights and is recognized for maximum social, political, economic, cultural and social

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<sup>15</sup> Al Mawardi, *Al Ahkam As Sultaniyyah*, 2: 3.

<sup>16</sup> Abū Zakariya Yahyā bin Sharaf bin Murshi al-Nawāwi, *al-Minhaj Sharh Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim bin al-Ḥajjaj*, vol. XIII (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turath al-‘Arabiy, 1957), p. 305.

<sup>17</sup> Aḥmad bin ‘Alī bin Ḥajar Abū al-Faḍal al-Asqlāniy al-Shāfi’i, *Fath al-Bāry Sharh Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, vol. XII (Beirut: Dār al-Ma’rifat, 1957), p. 207.

<sup>18</sup> Shamsuddīn Abū al-Aun Muḥammad bin Aḥmad bin Sālim al-Asfarainiy al-Ḥambaliy, *Lawāmi’ al-Anwār al-Bahīyyah wa Sawaḥi’ al-‘Asrār al-Atharīyah li Sharḥ al-Durrab al-Muḍīyyah fi Aqd al-Firqab al-Marḍīyah*, vol. II (Damascus: Mu’assas al-Khafaqain, 1992), p. 416.

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/demos>, Accessed 18 Sep 2019.

<sup>20</sup> Mochamad Parmudi, *Islam dan Demokrasi di Indonesia: Perspektif Pengembangan Pemikiran Politik Islam*, Hasil Penelitian Individu (Semarang: IAIN Walisongo, 2014), p. 78.

recognition because it has been ratified by most countries.<sup>21</sup> Democracy can be considered as an effective way for the development of a country, including the state of Indonesia because, in the previous period, several kinds of systems had been applied in this country. The democratic system in Indonesia contains Islamic values because most of the population and leaders come from Muslims. This situation can also be called an Islamic government or a government system that accommodates Islamic values. In the Indonesian democratic government system, autonomous regions were formed to carry out the democratic process, to reduce government pressure, increase political freedom and the level of human welfare.<sup>22</sup> So, here, it can be confirmed that democracy is a way to uphold Islamic law and it shows too the equation system of *khilāfah* and democracy as a system, namely the equation can be seen as a path taken to uphold the teachings of Islam, because an idea can't work without a system that protects it, both physically and meaningfully. It is the core idea of *khilāfah* and democracy.

These two theoretical tenets were used to examine the perspectives of religious leaders from the above mentioned Islamic mass organizations, Nahdhatul Ulama', Muhammadiyah, and Nahdhatul Wathan on the island of Lombok pertinent to the concept of the caliphate as governance principle increasingly echoed on various occasions.

### ***B. Khilāfah According to Tuan Guru Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in Lombok***

Morphologically, the terms *khilāfah* and *khilāfah* are closely related. The former refers to the actor of leadership, while the latter pertains to the name to term the institution or governance. The writings of the figures involved in the polemic around this issue illustrate a profound understanding of the Arabic anatomy behind the two terms.<sup>23</sup> However, perhaps the root of the problem is not the caliphate or the caliph, but

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<sup>21</sup> Tobias Gombert and et al, *Buku Bacaan Sosial Demokrasi* (Jakarta: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2018), p. 7.

<sup>22</sup> Khalid Ibrahim Jinda, *Teori Politik Islam: Telaah Kritis IbnuTaimiyah Tentang Pemerintahan Islam* (Surabaya: Risalah Gusti, 1999), pp. 2–6.

<sup>23</sup> Muhsin Labib, 'Memahami Khalifah dan Khilafah', *Geotimes.id* (2 Apr 2019), <https://geotimes.co.id/komentar/memahami-khalifah-dan-khilafah>, accessed 22 May 2019.

the caliphate as a government system in the modern era. It is understood that the scholars agree to oppose the caliphate as a modern system of state governance. The Chairperson of PWNUNTB (NU branch in West Nusa Tenggara province) points out that people have three different views on the concept of *khilāfab*. First, hardline groups who highly support the system by all means regard it as the understanding and implementation of Islamic law, and any contradictive system, including the State of Indonesia (NKRI), would be deemed a polytheistic and infidel state.<sup>24</sup> These people also consider anything different from the Islamic law, not to mention anyone who has expertise on the Islamic law per se, would also be strongly condemned. The second category of people on this issue is those with democratic perspective. These people opine that there are three major democratic values, namely freedom, justice, and deliberation. This group was represented by the prominent national figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid<sup>25</sup> and Nurcholish, who regularly talked about democracy with reference to many Qur'anic texts, such as freedom and individual responsibility (Qur'an, 6: 94), freedom of experimentation (Qur'an. 18: 29), the attitude of wisdom (Qur'an. 16: 125), justice (Qur'an. 5: 58, 4: 135), and deliberation (Qur'an. 3: 159, 42: 38). These fundamental democratic values have become the fundamental messages in the holy book for the Muslims to apply in their daily lives. Nurcholish remarks that Islamic teachings do not direct Muslims to orient themselves to anything except for the communal goodness. This is

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<sup>24</sup> The foundation of Indonesia is unbeliever's ideology (Pancasila) which is regulated within democracy ideology, while democracy is unbeliever's ideology because it against Allah's law. b). In democracy, the decision is on the people's voice which against the Allah's law. c). There is command from Allah that every single Muslim has to obey to the law of Allah and his messenger and his leaders among Muslims (*ulil amri*). While the word of *ulil amri* refers to *khilāfab Islāmiyah* d) There is forbidding of Allah to obey to unbelievers or unbeliever's nation as stated in version of al-Quran, Al Furqan: 25. e) Indonesian nation is unbelievers' nation, so every single Muslim should refuse it, and forbidden to obey it as stated in verse of Allah in Qur'an, al-Baqarah: 2. Ahmed Widad, "Ustadz Ba'asyir: Indonesia Berhukum Thaghut, Umat Islam Dilarang Patuh", *VOA-ISLAM.COM* (Agustus 2013), <https://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesian/2013/08/15/26277/ustadz-baasyir-indonesia-law-thaghut-umat-islam-dilarang-patuh>, accessed 20 Aug 2019.

<sup>25</sup> Nihaya M, "Demokrasi dan Problematikanya di Indonesia", *Sulesana: Jurnal Wawasan Keislaman*, vol. 10, no. 2 (2016), p. 20.



measured by being universal humans contributing positively to the nature as a whole.<sup>26</sup> Another category of people viewing the concept of *kehalīfah* refers to the moderate party that accepts the caliphate in general, meaning that everyone can play a role as caliph (leader),<sup>27</sup> at least for oneself, and *kehalīfah*, which means a system for a country,<sup>28</sup> because the word caliph can vary from other designations, such as *amīrah*, *ḡa'īmah*, or *imamat*.<sup>29</sup>

They view *kehalīfah* as an event of succession of a leader in any forms, so whoever becomes a leader or ruler replacing the previous leader is a caliph in that the title *Khulafā' al-Rāshidīn* is given to people who are considered leaders whose names shift according to the times.<sup>30</sup> This includes the democratically elected leader (Shura) in a state system built based on the general consensus can be regarded as “Rashid caliph”. Its leadership can be called a caliph, including the president of the Republic of Indonesia as a general leader. This view is in line with the meaning of caliphate coined by Rasyid Ridha as follows:<sup>31</sup> “*Hia ri'āsah 'āmmah fī al-Dīn wa al-Dunyā liṣbaḡsin wāhidin min al-'Ashḡaḡ.*”

Hence, a leadership change is a common practice that anyone who meets the qualifications can hold.<sup>32</sup> In other words, the question of the caliphate as a system that will replace the Indonesian government system, such as democratic Pancasila, is irrelevant because it has been a final and non-negotiable state principle. Likewise, KH. Ma'ruf Amin advocates that the Republic of Indonesia has been fixed and final consensus of the past scholars and nationalists as the founding fathers of the state. Hence, any government system, including caliphate system, should by all means be rejected. He also pinpoints that the rejection of the *kehalīfah* system in the Republic of Indonesia does not necessarily require mutual

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>27</sup> Muhammad bin Ismā'īl Abū Abdillāh al-Bukhārī al-Ju'fīy, *al-Adab al-Mufrad al-Bukhārīy*, vol. I (Beirut: Dār al-Bisḡārah, 1989), p. 81.

<sup>28</sup> Nadirsyah Hosen, “Tidak Ada Istilah Khilafah dalam Al-Qur'an”, *NU.or.id*, <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/104263/tidak-ada-istilah-khilafah-dalam-al-quran>, accessed 20 Sep 2019.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Taufiq bin Abd al-'Azīz al-Sadiriyy, *al-Islām wa al-Dustury* (Madinah: Wakalat al-Maḡbu'ah wa al-Baḡh al-'Ilmiyy, 2003), p. 175.

<sup>31</sup> Riḡā, *al-Khilāfah*, p. 199.

<sup>32</sup> TGH Masnun Tahir, interview (20 Jun 2019).

agreement called “*Dār al-Mithāq*” (State of agreement), which was based on the word of Allah in Qur’an, 4: 92.<sup>33</sup>

The current vice president also explains by drawing on Quranic verse, which states that if a non-Muslim has a *mithāq* (agreement) with Muslims and who died because of the Muslims’ actions, the Muslims are compulsory to pay fine to his family. In other words, as usual, the agreement must, of course, be obeyed. Similarly, even though the agreement of the founding fathers who are non-Muslim believers, the outcomes must be maintained. Being highly pluralistic state, the unity of the Indonesian Republic as a nation is subject to be maintained.<sup>34</sup>

The concept of the caliphate being proposed currently is an extension of the international caliphate first coined by the Muslim Brotherhood congregation, founded in Egypt in 1928, and has subsequently been widely propagated by the Hizb ut-Tahrir congregation established in East Jerusalem in 1952, and recently echoed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria.<sup>35</sup> In the 1998 Indonesian reform era, the idea gained its momentum and increasingly promoted as a freedom of speech became justifiable. As a result, the campaign of this caliphate system became more intense and open, which could be seen from discourses and movements that aimed to uproot and replace the current state system.

In a similar vein, TGH Shohimun Faishol states that KH. Wahid Hasyim, son of KH. Hasyim Asy’ari, in BPUPKI (Investigative Body for

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<sup>33</sup> It’s meaning is: “And it is not proper for a believer to kill a believer (another), except because he is wrong (accidentally), and whoever kills a believer because he is wrong (let it) he frees a believing slave and pays for the diat that was handed over to his family (the murdered person. that), unless they (the family killed) give charity. If he (the slain) is from a group (disbelievers) for which there is a (peace) agreement between them and you, then (let the killer) pay the diyat that is given to his family (the murdered) and frees the believing slave. Whoever does not get it, let him (the killer) fast for two consecutive months to receive repentance from Allah. And it is Allah All Knowing, Most Wise.”

<sup>34</sup> “KH Ma’ruf Amin: Indonesia Negara Kesepakatan”, *nu.or.id* (2 Aug 2018), <https://nu.or.id/nasional/kh-maruf-amin-indonesia-negara-kesepakatan-GX5IT>, accessed 15 Oct 2019.

<sup>35</sup> Baidhowi, “Khilafah dalam Konteks Negara Pancasila”, *Seminar Nasional Hukum Universitas Negeri Semarang*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2016), p. 513, <https://proceeding.unnes.ac.id/index.php/snh/about>, accessed 19 Nov 2019.

Independence Preparation Efforts), approved Pancasila as the basis of the state,<sup>36</sup> which indicates that nation is looking for an ideal format to bridge all elements of the nation's children, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, and leaders assess the presidential election in post-independence Indonesia with the term "Quality al Amr al-Dlaruri bi al-Shaukah"<sup>37</sup> (choosing a leader due to the urgency). It seems that the alternative chosen by the founding fathers was on *qā'idah fiqhiyah*: "*Dar'u al-Mafāsīd Muqaddam* 'alā *Jalb al-Maṣālih*" (rejecting all damage and taking precedence over taking benefits).<sup>38</sup> Despite this, a large number of people denied the proposal that resulted in various rebellions against the legal government in several regions. About four rebellions have been reported since then, such as 1). Madiun Incident on the 18 September 1948; 2) Kartosuwiryo Rebellion on the 19 December 1948; 3). DI / TII rebellion in Central Java in 1949 – 1962; 4) DI / TII rebellion in South Sulawesi in 1957 and others.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, the NU's attitude towards the caliphate concept were based on several important points, namely:<sup>40</sup>

- *Al-Islām dīn shāmīl kāmil*, which means Islam is a perfect religion. It is impossible to miss the state and government issues from the agenda of its discussion,
- *Naṣb al-imām*, choosing a leader is an obligation in law, because human life will be chaotic (*fawdla / chaos*) without a leader, according

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<sup>36</sup> TGH. Sohimun Faisal, interview (22 Jun 2019).

<sup>37</sup> Khanza Aulia, "Polemik Penetapan Status Presiden Republik Indonesia Sebagai Waliyyul Amri Ad-Dharuri Bi As-Syaukah Pada Tahun 1952 - 1954" (6 Jun 2011), <http://khanza-aulia21.blogspot.com/2011/06/polemik-penetapan-status-presiden.html>, accessed 12 Jul 2019; Ahmad Muzammil, "Waliyy al Amr al Dlaruri bi al Syaukah", *CakNun.com* (Agustus 2016), <https://www.caknun.com/2016/waliyy-al-amr-al-dlaruri-bi-al-syaukah/>, accessed 12 Jul 2019.

<sup>38</sup> 'Ala'udīn Abi al-Ḥasan 'Ali bin Sulaimān al-Mardawiy al-Ḥambali, *al-Tabḥīr Sharḥ al-Taḥyīr fī 'Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, vol. V (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Rashd, 2000), p. 2239; Abd al-Raḥmān bin Abī Bakar al-Suyūṭiy, *al-Ashbāh wa al-Naẓḥā'ir* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Imiyah, 1981), p. 87.

<sup>39</sup> "Daftar Pemberontakan di Indonesia Pasca Kemerdekaan", <https://www.porosilmu.com/2016/12/daftar-pemberontakan-di-indonesia-pasca.html>, accessed 12 Jul 2019.

<sup>40</sup> "Khilafah dalam Pandangan NU", *NU.or.id* (20 Jun 2019), <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/55557/khilafah-dalam-pandangan-nu>, accessed 26 Jun 2019.

to the expression in the book of Ghazali, *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*<sup>41</sup>: “*Al-Dīnu wa al-Mulku Tau‘amāni, faddīnu ‘Aṣḥun wa al-Sulḥānu ḥārisun, Famā lā aṣala labū famahdūmun, wa mā lā ḥārisa labū faḍā‘iun.*” This expression is also supported by *Shayikh al-Islām Taqi al-Dīn Ibn Taimiyyah in as-Siyāsah al-Sbar‘iyyah fī Iṣḥāh al-Ra‘i wa al-Ra‘iyyah*.<sup>42</sup> “*Inna wilāyata ‘Amr al-Nāsi Min ‘Azhāmi Wājibāt al-Dīn, Iḥḥa Qiyāma Li al-Dīn Illā Bibā’*”

- a) Islam does not determine or even oblige a certain form of state and government system for its adherents.
- b) The *khilāfah* as a government system is a historical fact that was practiced by *al-Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn*. It is a model that fits well with its era; that is when human life is not yet under the auspices of nation-states. At that time, Muslims could live in one caliphate system. When humankind takes shelter under nation-states, the *khilāfah* system for Muslims worldwide loses its relevance.
- c) The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) is the result of a noble national agreement between the nation's founding fathers,
- d) Muslims should not get caught up in the symbols and formality of names that appear to be Islamic but must commit to the substance of everything according to the adage popular among the scholars: “*Al-Ibratu bi al-Jawābir Lā al-Maḥḥbar*” and “*Al-Ibratu bi al-Musammā Lā bi al-Ism*”

In addition, related to the view above, according to TGH. Gustiwang, the leader of LDNU (Da'wah Division of NU organization), *khilāfah* is not mandatory as assumed by HTI because Indonesia has its *khilāfah* in a different format, which is the state of Republic of Indonesia that facilitates the welfare and benefits for all as the foundation.<sup>43</sup> Another informant states that *khilāfah* supported by HTI is not flexible because the Islamic State has been divided into several territories, so the idea

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<sup>41</sup> Muhammad Abi Hamid Ghazali, *Ihyā' ulum al-dīn*, vol. I (Beirut: Dār al-Ma'rīfah, 1992), p. 17.

<sup>42</sup> Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymīyah, *al-Siyāsah al-sbar'iyah fī iṣḥāh al-ra'i wa al-ra'iyyah* (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1993), p. 129.

<sup>43</sup> TGH. Gustiwang, interview (22 Jun 2019).

of *khilāfah* is a utopia. However, in terms of language, Indonesia is *khilāfah* itself, so it is not pivotal for HTI to make an idea of *khilāfah* for the Indonesian state<sup>44</sup>. Similarly, TGH Zamroni, Katib Syuriah PCNU Central Lombok, supports that idea saying that Islam in Indonesia has been integrated with Pancasila as the foundation of the state because Indonesia has principles toward justice, security, prosperity, tolerance, and harmony to perform religious teachings in any aspects in accordance with “*maqāshid sharī’ah*” (religious purposes).<sup>45</sup>

Thus, of the four groups that have views about the caliphate above, the thoughts of the NU master teachers in Lombok seem to be more inclined towards the view of the fourth group that the *khilāfah* is a succession period of a previous leader. Anyone becoming the leader or ruler and replacing the previous leader is called the caliph. Therefore, referring to the denotation of the word *khilāfah*, regardless of the characteristics of the leader as long as he gets power democratically or forcibly, he is still labeled caliph. This group believes that the democratically elected leader (*Shūrā*) in a state system built on an agreement is a rashid caliph. Thus, the elected president of Indonesia is a caliph without establishing a caliphate-based state.

### C. *Khilāfah According to Tuan Guru Muhammadiyah in Lombok*

Ajat Sudrajat always uses two terms in his writings,<sup>46</sup> when discussing Islamic politics, namely *khilāfah* and Imamah.<sup>47</sup> Although taken from the same source, the Al-Qur’an, in developing political praxis of the Islamic world, this term is used by two groups that are considered politically opposite, particularly Sunnis and Shiites. Linguistically speaking, the word *khilāfah* in Arabic grammar is a verbal noun that requires an active subject or actor called *khilāfah*. Thus, it refers to a series of actions performed by a person, who is known as the caliph. Therefore,

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<sup>44</sup> M. Harfn Zuhdi, interview (23 Jun 2019).

<sup>45</sup> TGH. Zamroni, interview (23 Jun 2019).

<sup>46</sup> Ajat Sudrajat, “Khilafah Islamiyah dalam Perspektif Sejarah”, *Jurnal Informasi*, vol. 2, no. 35 (2009), p. 2.

<sup>47</sup> Diyā’a ad-Dīn ar-Rais, *Islam dan Khilafah*, trans. by Afif Muhammad (Bandung: Pustaka, 1985), p. 124.

Ajat Sudrajat argues that there will be no *khilāfab* without a caliph.<sup>48</sup> In addition, Ganai regards *khilāfab* as the successor of an individual or collective leader.

Meanwhile, the caliphate is technically referred to an Islamic government institution based on the Al-Quran and Sunnah. Subsequently, the *khilāfab* is a medium for enforcing din (religion) and advancing sharia. Based on this view, a new emerging concept proposes that Islam includes *al-Dīn wa al-Daulah* (religion and state),<sup>49</sup> where the two cannot be separated because of the state's role in maintaining the passage of religion.

It is understood that the word *khilāfab* itself comes from the root word *khalaḥa* (kh-l-f), which means replacing, following, or coming later has two plural forms, namely *khulāḥa* and *khalaḥ'if*.<sup>50</sup> With this regard, Quraish Shihab states that each meaning of the word accompanies or fits its context. For example, when Allah describes the appointment of Prophet Adam as caliph, the single word is used (Qur'ān, 2: 30), while when talking about the appointment of the Prophet David, the plural form is used (Qur'ān, 38: 26).<sup>51</sup> According to Quraish Shihab, the use of the singular in the case of Prophet Adam is quite reasonable because, at that time, there was no human society, especially at the level of ideas. This implies the involvement of someone other than Allah in the appointment. On the other hand, it can also be concluded that the appointment of a person as a caliph can be carried out by someone as long as it is still in the form of an idea. However, if it is to be actualized in real social life, it should involve public or community.<sup>52</sup>

From these two verses, some elements constitute one's caliphate. These include (1) the caliph, namely the person who is given the power or mandate; (2) the domain of power; and (3) the relationship between the caliph and the territory, as well as the relationship between the caliph

<sup>48</sup> Sudrajat, 'Khilafah Islamiyah dalam Perspektif Sejarah', p. 3; Ade Shitu-Agbetola, 'Theory of al-Khilafah in The Religio-Political View of Sayyid Qutb', *Hamdard Islamicus: Quarterly Journal of Studies and Research in Islam*, vol. 14, no. 2 (1991), p. 25.

<sup>49</sup> Shitu-Agbetola, 'Theory of al-Khilafah in The Religio-Political View of Sayyid Qutb', p. 59.

<sup>50</sup> Abū Bakar Muḥammad bin al-Ḥusain bin Duraid, *al-Isbtīqāq* (Cairo: Maktabah al-Khaniji, 1958), p. 127.

<sup>51</sup> M. Quraish Shihab, *Wawasan Al-Quran* (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), pp. 422–3.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

and the giver of power, namely Allah. Thus, a person's caliphate can be judged by the extent to which a caliph pays attention to the relationship of these elements. When a caliph practices all of his actions, then this is called *khalīfah*. In a more popular political context, the word *khilāfah* can mean government. Hence, *Khilāfah Islamiyah* means Islamic Government or, more precisely, a government-enforced based on Islamic law.

Subsequently, the problem that accompanies Islamic governance is its form. Some Muslim thinkers, referring to several verses in the Koran, opine that the form of government can take either the form of a kingdom or a republic.<sup>53</sup> To date, two forms have been adopted throughout the Islamic history, namely 1). The Islamic government lasted after the Prophet's death, called *al-Khulafā al-Rashidīn* (Abū Bakr, 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, Uthmān ibn 'Affān, and 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib), is perhaps equivalent to the republic in modern political concepts.<sup>54</sup> 2). The Umayyad, Abbasid governments, up to the Ottoman Turks, and Islamic governments in other areas, including Indonesia, were royal or monarchist in style.<sup>55</sup> The main characteristic of *Khulafā al-Rashidīn* is that power is not hereditary (heredity) and does not have a kinship to one another, while the subsequent government changes of power are hereditary, although not necessarily between father and son. It is also not uncommon for changes to occur based on how strong the influence of a member (prince) of the palace over the political vortex in the palace or the center of government, as depicted by al-Qur'an<sup>56</sup>:

“So by mercy from Allah, [O Muhammad], you were lenient with them. And if you had been rude [in speech] and harsh in heart, they would have disbanded from about you. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult them in the matter. And when you have decided, then rely upon Allah. Indeed, Allah loves those who rely [upon Him]

Likewise, in Al Quran<sup>57</sup>:

“And they respond to their Lord and keep up the Prayer. And they gather

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<sup>53</sup> Sudrajat, 'Khilafah Islamiyah dalam Perspektif Sejarah', p. 4.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> Muhammad Husein Haikal, *Pemerintahan Islam*, trans. by Adib Bisri (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1990), pp. 17–8.

<sup>56</sup> Qur'an, 3: 159.

<sup>57</sup> Qur'an, 42: 38.

amongst each other to conduct their affairs by mutual consultation. And they spend out of what We have given them as sustenance”.

With regard, Haikal opines that the two verses above have nothing to do with government, and neither do they describe the government system in details. The Prophet completely left this matter to the Muslims. The scholars then associated this fact with a hadith which means “you know better about your world affairs”.<sup>58</sup> The form of a government is closely related to the history, conditions, and events following certain nations. For instance, Britain is a kingdom state, while the United States is a republic. Likewise, with the experience of government in the Islamic world, in the first four caliphs, for example, the government tended to take the form of a republic, while the next period took the form of a kingdom. Today, countries in the Islamic world also have non-uniform forms. Some have taken kingdoms like Saudi Arabia, while Turkey and Pakistan embrace the republics and etc. It seems that these two forms of government can be adopted equally. However, the most critical issue is that the enforcement of Islamic law or Islamic principles that lead to the welfare of the people. The choice of this form of government is not so much different from the understanding of NU in general, and its ulema in Lombok about the concept of caliphate. The ulema of Muhammadiyah on the island also confirmed that the caliphate is one of the central teachings of Islam that derives from the Qur’an and al-Hadith in that a Muslim should not deny its presence. The establishment of the *kbilāfab* as a political institution and system has long been criticized, including by Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), Abduh (d. 1905), and Ali Abd Raziq (d. 1960), that the historical *kbilāfab* that existed after al-*Khulafā al-Rashidūn* was a kingdom, and Islam does not carry the concept of a particular form/system of government. Thus, there is no obligation to establish the caliphate as a political power within institutions. It is for that reason the concept of caliphate upheld by HTI is a kind of a political movement to oust the given power by changing the state system, and that it is not an agreement of the *jumbār ulamā’* (most of ulema).

The establishment of the caliphate as a political power the modern era is invalid and unrealistic because Muslim countries have been formed

<sup>58</sup> Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Ubaidillāh bin Muḥammad al-Salām, *Mir’atu al-Mafātīḥ Sharḥ Mishkāt al-Maṣābiḥ* (Banar al-Hindi: Idārah al-Buḥūst al-‘Ilmiyah, 1984), p. 344.



as nation-states in various forms or systems of government. For example, the Pancasila State is an agreement of the Indonesian nation as depicted by the 2015 Muhammadiyah Congress outcome that affirms the five basic state principles as “*Dār al-‘Ahdī wa al-Shabādah*” or the State of Agreement and Testimony.<sup>59</sup> All components of the nation must enforce it, and all forms of irregularities and violations against Pancasila must be condemned. The threats currently take many forms, namely religious political movements, such as the political caliphate, and other ideologies, such as communism, secularism, liberalism, capitalism, and extremism. The *khilāfah* as noble Islamic teaching should not be neglected, especially by Muslims. In this context, Din Syamsuddin then stated the need for a new, contextual interpretation of the meaning of the caliphate, especially in the context of the Republic of Indonesia, which is based on Pancasila.<sup>60</sup>

- The *khilāfah* can be understood to carry the unity and togetherness of Muslims nationally. In Indonesia, it is through the Indonesian Ulema Council/MUI, which can function as an umbrella organization for all Muslims.
- Globally, the caliphate has taken shape at the governmental level, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation / OIC, and at the ummah level, the World Muslim League (*Rābiṭah ‘Ālam Islāmīyah*).
- In the two manifestations of the caliphate, with the essence of the Islamic community / *ukhūwah Islāmīyah*, it is not allowed to deny, change, or replace the existing political and governmental system, namely the Pancasila State.

Din Syamsuddin further points out that the concept of the caliphate, which is mondial in nature, can be manifested in the form of unity and togetherness of Muslims in a plurality of skin colors, languages, and cultures that reflect a unified vision of life / global civilization based on Islamic values. In this case, the concept of khilafah can be applied by forming a mondial institution that unites all Muslims, such as the Vatican uniting Catholics worldwide. Catholics in any country are very submissive and obedient to the Vatican, without neglecting the national

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<sup>59</sup> “Din Syamsuddin: Antara Khilafah Modern dan Vatikan”, *Tribunnews.com* (15 Jul 2017), <https://www.tribunnews.com/tribunners/2017/07/15/din-syamsuddin-antara-khilafah-modern-dan-vatikan>, accessed 17 Jun 2019.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

system of each nation. He then proposed to Muslims, including Hizb ut-Tahrir, to transform their “caliphate ‘alamyah” into a form like the Vatican.<sup>61</sup> According to Din Syamsuddin, Muslims who want to form a mondial caliphate can imitate the Vatican by transforming the concept of a caliphate into a single institution without negating the national system of each country (although not all Muslims want to join). Despite this, Din Syamsuddin claims that it was not easy to realize due to the characteristics of Muslims, especially Sunnis, who are less centralistic and independent although the organization is extremely strong. He postulates that the caliphate and Pancasila are intertwined in that the Indonesian government should not exclude the components of caliphate.<sup>62</sup>

Muhammadiyah’s response to the issue of the caliphate in Indonesia can be seen from the results of the 2015 Muhammadiyah Congress, which emphasized the Pancasila State as “*Dār al-‘Abdi wa al-Shahādah*” or the State of Agreement and Testimony<sup>63</sup>, which was also

<sup>61</sup> Din Syamsuddin’s proposal was to the Muslim community and especially the Hizb ut-Tahrir to transform their “*Khalīfah*” natural” into a form like the Vatican, which he called a mondial caliphate or Cultural-Sivilisisional *Khalīfah*, namely the New World Order, was then widely discussed. and became a controversy in the midst of Indonesian society. In the end, Din Syamsuddin even wrote additional clarifications and explanations regarding the “commotion” on his way to attend the Session *Religions for Peace Internasional* on 02 April 2019.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> The word “Agreement and Testimony” is taken from the understanding in several verses of the al-Qur’an, as conveyed in the muqaddimah of the book “Negara Pancasila” as *Dār Abdi Wa Shahādah* with the expression: “Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta’ala sent Prophet Muhammad s.a.w. to preach Islam as a treatise that brings mercy to the universe (Qur’an: al-Anbiyā: 107). Muslims as a unit of Muslim human beings everywhere are obliged to carry out and preach the teachings of Islam ordered by Allah and His Messenger as a form of worship and caliphate to achieve the goodness life in the world and the hereafter (Qur’an: al-Dzariyāt: 56; al-Baqarah: 30, Hud: 61; and al-Baqarah: 201). The obligation to carry out the mission of Islam is never finished and must continue to be carried out as a manifestation of testimony (*shahādah ‘alā al-nās*) throughout life in personal life, family, community, nation, and the realm of universal humanity. Muhammadiyah as a strategic component of the *Ummah* and the nation in the Republic of Indonesia has a collective obligation and has been active for more than a century to preach Islam to invite goodness, order on what is good, and prevent things from being evil as the initial mission of its birth contained in the Qur’an, Ali Imran: 104. Muhammadiyah is committed to making Muslims as *khayra ummah* or the best people (Qur’an, 3: 110) who appear as the middle group (*ummatan wasa’ah*)

supported by TGH. Subhan Abdullah Acim, whose concept of the caliphate in the perspective of Muhammadiyah is no different from the views of NU superintendents. This was also evidenced at the end of 2018 during which both of the Islamic organizations decided that the caliphate system could never be implemented in the country for many reasons. The argument put forward by TGH. Subhan Abdullah Acim regarding the concept of a caliphate which may lead to the overhaul of the philosophy of the Indonesian nation is quite reasonable because Muhammadiyah firmly stands to declare that the State of Indonesia is formed according to the general consensus (دارالعهد), which must be obeyed towards goodness following the words of the Prophet:<sup>64</sup> “*Al-Muslimūn ‘Alā Syurūṭin Illā Syarṭan ‘Aḥalla Ḥarāman ‘Anw Ḥarrama Ḥalālan.*”

The agreement made was aimed at achieving one pure goal, namely mutual masculinity, referred to as public benefits because there was wisdom,<sup>65</sup> both for Muslims and non-Muslims, to live together under the harmonious condition, namely love of nation<sup>66</sup> depicted in the democratic system (*shūra*); and to uphold the integrity and sovereignty, togetherness, brotherhood, mutual assistance. Also, along with all components of the nation, it was to strengthen national unity through peaceful and brotherhood atmosphere. Furthermore, the caliphate is

and play a role as martyrs' ala al-nas or witnesses for human life (Qur'an, al-Baqarah: 143), 2 so that its presence is a blessing for the universe (Qur'an: al-Anbiya: 107). In national life, Muhammadiyah and Muslims as the majority group have a major and main responsibility to make the Indonesian state the “*Baldatum Ṭayyibatun Wa Rabbun Ghafur*”, namely a good country and under the mercy of Allah (Qur'an: Saba: 15). In this country, the inhabitants are faithful and devoted so that they are blessed by Allah (Qur'an: al-'Arāf: 96), they build this country with good care and do not cause damage (Qur'an: al-Baqarah: 11, 60; al-Rūm: 41; al-Qaṣaṣ: 77). Thus, Muhammadiyah is committed to continuing to strive to project Indonesia to become a Pancasila State that is advanced, just, prosperous, dignified, and sovereign under the protection of Allah. M. Din Syamsuddin and Agung Danarto, *Negara Pancasila Dar Abdi Wa Ayyahadah* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2015), p. iv.

<sup>64</sup> Abū Bakar Ahmad bin al-Husain bin 'Alī al-Baḥaqīy, *al-Sunan al-Kubrā wa Zāilih al-Jauhar al-Nuqā*, vol. VII (Haidar Abar: Majlis Dā'irah al-Ma'ārif al-Nizhāmiyah, 1922), p. 248.

<sup>65</sup> Muḥammad bin 'Alī bin Muḥammad al-Shaukāniy, *Irshād al-Fuḥūl ilā Taḥqīq al-Ḥaq Min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl* (Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1998), p. 89.

<sup>66</sup> Muḥammad bin Ṣāliḥ bin Muḥammad al-'Uthaimin, *Sharḥ Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn* (Riyadh: Dar al-Watan, 1995), p. 140.

culturally acceptable because for him it is literally meant is a leadership from the lowest to the highest levels, even everyone can become a leader or imam or caliph called *ra'in* (leader) according to the following hadith:<sup>67</sup> “*Kullukum Rā'in Wa Kullukum Mas'ūlun 'An Ra'iyatih.*”

However, when *kbilāfab* is translated into a structural sense, this is what TGH Muhammaq Iqbal firmly rejects because it does not match the characteristics of the Indonesian Republic.<sup>68</sup> Meanwhile, the President of Indonesia can be called the caliph for the Indonesian context because he is al-Imam *A'zham* (the great leader) and is often called the top leader of the Republic of Indonesia according to the following expression:<sup>69</sup> “*Naṣbu al-Imāmi al-A'zhami Farḍ Kifayab.*” Similar to that of TGH Muhammad Iqbal, TGH. Falahuddin also emphasizes the scope of *kbilāfab* in the cultural view stating that every human is a leader. He states that there is no word *kbilāfab* in Al Quran; it uses *kbilāfab* instead of *kbilāfab*. It is a cultural meaning, so the idea of reintroducing *kbilāfab* in structural or political plate is useless<sup>70</sup>. Furthermore, Arsyad Ghani points out that the implementation of *kbilāfab* in Indonesia will demolish the structure of the state because it is widely recognized that Indonesia is a nation-based Pancasila, called “*Dār al-'Abdi wa al-Shabādah*” (house of agreement and witnesses), and because the symbol of Bhineka Tunggal Ika does not lie only on the rhetoric level, but it also lies in the reality. Hence, Muhammadiyah strongly opposes the idea of *kbilāfab* propagated by HTI<sup>71</sup>. The argument is also backed up by H. Marliadi who argues

<sup>67</sup> Abū al-Faḍal Aḥmad bin 'Alī bin Muḥammad bin Aḥmad bin Ḥajar al-'Asqalāniy, *Itrāf al-Musnad al-Mutalliy bi Aṭraf al-Musnad al-Ḥambaliy*, vol. III (Damascus: Dār al-Kutub al-Ṭayyib), p. 550.

<sup>68</sup> The personality of the Republic of Indonesia is the personality or trait seen in the behavior of a person or an Indonesian nation that makes it different from other nations as a personal characteristic of its territory sociologically anthropologically which binds race, ethnicity, history, cultural customs and also religion or a belief called primordial ties. The national personality of the Republic of Indonesia has behavioral characteristics and characteristics that can be seen in the life of a community in a national unity. , <https://gurupkn.com/pancasila-sebagai-kepgawai-bangsa>, Accessed 20 Oct 2019.

<sup>69</sup> al-Ḥambaliy, *Lawāmi' al-Anwār al-Bahiyah wa Sawati' al-'Asrār al-Athariyah li Sharh al-Durrah al-Muḍiyah fi Aqd al-Firqah al-Marḍiyah*, II: 416.

<sup>70</sup> TGH. Falahuddin, interview (25 Jun 2019).

<sup>71</sup> Arsyad Ghani, interview (25 Jun 2019).

that it is strictly forbidden for anyone trying to alter the state's system with the *khilāfah* as upheld by HTI in that it is against the consensus of the founding founders who sacrificed their lives to gain the Indonesian independence. It is certainly not easy to replace its current governance system<sup>72</sup>.

The abovementioned justifications for the denial of the concept of *khilāfah* can be explicitly translated into two parts: cultural and structural caliphate. The former can be associated to anyone because he is a leader for himself, while as the later, the concept will be difficult to carry out in the Republic of Indonesia because the country has become a State of Agreement known as *Dār al-Abdi Wa al-Shahādah*, which means testimony<sup>73</sup> to be the best people (*khair ummat*)<sup>74</sup> in relationships between people. Therefore, the position of president in Indonesia can be called caliph,<sup>75</sup> and it is not necessary for the state to establish the caliphate system. Furthermore, the state-based Pancasila is already very Islamic in the sense that considering that an agreed state based on Pancasila alone is very Islamic where the Islamic teachings are prevalent.

#### **D. Khilafah According to Tuan Guru Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) in Lombok**

The Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) is one of the local mass Islamic organization on the island of Lombok that particularly helps maintains diversity and unity in the island. Nonetheless, the concept of caliphate gaining current public attention can threaten such a unity and harmony in that it may diminish the Indonesian unity.

TGH. Zaenal Arifin<sup>76</sup> described the term “*khilāfah*” linguistically. It derives from the basic word (*maṣḍar*)<sup>77</sup> in Arabic, stemming from the word “*خلف*», which can mean to turn back, replace, or lead.<sup>78</sup> He further explained that the general term used by ulema is *al-Imārah* (government)

<sup>72</sup> H. Marliadi, interview (28 Jun 2019).

<sup>73</sup> Qur'an, 2: 143.

<sup>74</sup> Qur'an, 3: 110

<sup>75</sup> TGH. Falahuddin, interview (18 August 2019).

<sup>76</sup> TGH. Zaenal Arifin, interview (14 Aug 2019).

<sup>77</sup> al-Islāmiyah, *al-Mansū'ah al-Fiqhiyah al-Knaitiyah*, VI: 196.

<sup>78</sup> al-Zamahshariy, *Asās al-Balāgh*, p. 122.

in several countries<sup>79</sup>. While *al-Imāma* (leadership),<sup>80</sup> Ibn ‘Ābidin defines leadership in religious and world affairs as a substitute for «Prophet.» Subsequently, the word *khilāfab* is defined in terms of leadership based on operational Islamic teachings. Therefore, it can be interpreted as a medium featuring three tenets. First, that the caliphate is based on the al-Qur’ān and al-Sunnah, which is implemented consistently and thoroughly in all aspects of government; secondly, it refers to the election of leaders from among Muslims who can carry out the Islamic teachings; and third, it also refers to the parliamentary elections by selecting candidates for legislative members who are believed to be able to channel their aspirations and interests related to the embodiment of Islamic values in state life.”<sup>81</sup>

Meanwhile, the *khilāfab* (leadership) system can be carried out in 2 (two) ways: first direct election, where voters can elect their candidates through elections such as the election of Umar bin Abdul Aziz as caliph. It can also be executed through indirect elections, namely elections by or through representatives who have the right to decide cases for the benefit of the people, such as the case of choosing Abu Bakr as caliph and may also be proposed by the leader of the ummah or proposed by the previous caliph, such as the election of Umar bin Khattab as the caliph “which was later called ‘*Amīr al-Mu’minīn*.”<sup>82</sup>

However, concerning the system of government in a modern state today, the term *khilāfab* is no longer relevant due to the development of a modern state that requires adjustments to titles, such as president, prime minister, and so on. Hence, the concept of *khilāfab* is broad in that it can also entail one of the duties of man in this world to become a caliph, like the Prophet Adam and humans as his descendants, “*khilāfab fī al-‘Arḍi*,”<sup>83</sup> and in this context, man is the caliph. However, it does not pertain

<sup>79</sup> Su’ūd bin Abd al-‘Alī al-Barudiy al-‘Atibiy, *al-Mausū‘ah al-Jināyah al-Islāmiyah al-Muqāranah bi al-Anḥumah al-Ma’mūl Bihā Fī al-Mamlakah al-‘Arabīyah al-Su’ūdiyyah* (Riyadh, 2005), p. 143.

<sup>80</sup> Ibnu ‘Ābidin, *Radd al-Mukhtār ‘Alā al-Durr al-Mukhtār Sharh Tanwīr al-Abṣār Fiqh Abū Hanīfab* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2000), p. 547.

<sup>81</sup> TGH. Zaenal Arifin, interview (14 Aug 2019).

<sup>82</sup> Abū Bakar Muhammad bin Khalaf bin Hayyan bin Shadaqah al-Dabbiy al-Bagdādiy al-Mulaqqab bi al-Wāqī’, *Akbār al-Qudāt* (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tijāriyah al-Kubrā, 1947), p. 56.

<sup>83</sup> Qur’an, 2: 29.

to the caliph related to the system which is often politically driven known as *Dār al-Islām* (areas led by Muslims), *Dār al-Ḥarb* (areas led by infidels).<sup>84</sup>

Historical accounts show that the concept of caliphate by all means benefitted the people in the past. However, given its current context, the term *khilāfah* is no longer relevant because the world has been divided into several nations with their own state ideology and system. This means that it has lost its contextual use to be applicative because it is no longer beneficial and relevant if it is applied to the current state and state conditions. Moreover, governing Muslims around the world under one leader is highly unlikely to be true. In fact, the Indonesian state has agreed to use the Pancasila principles and the 1945 Constitutional Law, which cannot be separated from the *ijtihād* (endeavor) of the previous scholars. The primary importance is that the Islamic principles are clearly formulated in Pancasila and the state's constitution. Hence, it does not contradict the principles of Islam and Sharia.

Similarly, TGH Said Gazali,<sup>85</sup> one of the Islamic figures from the NW, opined that anyone elected as the highest Islamic priest of the Islamic *ummah* in Indonesia, he can also be categorized as a caliph with reference to the initial goal of the caliphate system, which requires a single caliph who leads the whole world, not just one country. In other words, the title of the caliph is only limited to the designation, the same as the title Sultan, king, or President, and does not reflect the caliphate as the global-centralistic political meaning of the caliphate. Thus, by product, the concepts of *khilāfah* and *khilāfah* have been questionable and rejected.<sup>86</sup> Therefore, creating a new government system means violating or betraying the initial consensus of the founding fathers and scholars in the past.

Another figure from the Islamic organization also states its objection of the concept of *khilāfah* as propagated by HTI in that he argued that it is debatable (*ijtihādīyah*). Furthermore, the Republic of Indonesia has been final, and it is in line with the multicultural context where everyone has a political, social, educational right equally.

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<sup>84</sup> Abū al-Baqā' 'Ayūb bin Musā al-Ḥusaini al-Kufuwīy, *Kitāb al-Kullīyat* (Beirut: Mua'ssah al-Risālah, 1998), p. 451.

<sup>85</sup> TGH. Said Gazali, interview (14 Jun 2019).

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

Furthermore, he mentioned that Indonesia has already been *khilāfab* because the element of leadership has existed, where we have a leader who manages and regulates a nation. The main purpose of the leadership is to ensure that the nation benefits its people entirely by providing education, economy, politics, religion, social, culture, brotherhood, tolerance, welfare, justice, unity, etc. These are enumerated in Pancasila as the agreement of the founding founders. Therefore, *khilāfab* supported by HTI is strongly rejected by NW<sup>87</sup>.

Specifically, the idea of *khilāfab* is deniable in that it opposes the agreement of the nation-state Republic of Indonesia where the right of the public to express their religious and social activities is legalized. Hence, Indonesia can be categorized as *khilāfab* in the context of leadership election because it accords with the essence of *khilāfab*, a leadership to manage the need of the public.<sup>88</sup> He also negates the idea of *khilāfab*. Faishal emphasizes that the concept of *khilāfab* supported by HTI is meaningless because Indonesia has been considered as *khilāfab* with reference to the leadership of any type, and simultaneously the country is controlled by the leader who aims to escalate public welfare.<sup>89</sup> Likewise, M. Fikri states that the concept of *khilāfab* offered by HTI is not compatible with the Indonesian principles, Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity) as the foundation of the nation.<sup>90</sup>

## E. Concluding Remarks

In general, Islamic scholars and priests from NU, Muhammadiyah, and NW on the Island of Lombok agree upon the nature of *khilāfab*. Linguistically, they shared similar definition of the concept as leadership, basically enabling everyone to be a leader both for himself and certain regions. They also generally buy the idea of *khilāfab* to mean *imārah* (government), where public welfare and wellbeing are guaranteed under the auspices of certain leaders who manage and regulate the country. On the other hand, they also negate the concept of *khilāfab* as a state's

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<sup>87</sup> Abdul Fattah, the Secretary of Nahdatul Wathan, interview (26 Jun 2019).

<sup>88</sup> Hurnawijaya, the Secretary of Nahdatul Wathan Islamic Boarding School, interview (26 Jun 2019).

<sup>89</sup> TGH. Faishal, interview (27 Jun 2019).

<sup>90</sup> M. Fikri, The Vice Leader of Nahdatul Wathan, interview (27 Jun 2019).



system in that it is not compatible with the current state's systems, such as republic, kingdom, and etc., as opposed to that of the past. For instance, Indonesia has been anchored in the five state's principles known as Pancasila as the product of the agreement of the founding fathers of the state. For that reason, Indonesia does not conform to the caliphate system promoted by HTI. For the same token, the Islamic priests or ulema from NU advocates that Indonesia is already a country of agreement or *Dār al-Misthāq* (land of agreement). Hence, it is basically deemed as khilafah. In addition, Muhammadiyah uses the term "*Dār al-Abdi wa al-Shabādah*" (country of agreement and testimony), while NW does not associate it to any existing term, but strongly rejects the concept of caliphate propagated by the banned HTI due to the provision of freedom of religious conducts in Indonesia. Overall, the three mass Islamic organizations as the subjects of this research recognize the Indonesian president as the caliph for the country in the republic system.

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